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Abstract 
Existing insider threat defensive technologies focus on monitoring network traffic 
or events generated by activities on a user’s workstation. This research develops a 
methodology for signaling potentially malicious insider behavior using virtual machine 
introspection (VMI). VMI provides a novel means to detect potential malicious insiders 
because the introspection tools remain transparent and inaccessible to the guest and are 
extremely difficult to subvert. This research develops a four step methodology for 
development and validation of malicious insider threat alerting using VMI. Six core use 
cases are developed along with eighteen supporting scenarios. A malicious attacker 
taxonomy is used to decompose each scenario to aid identification of observables for 
monitoring for potentially malicious actions. The effectiveness of the identified 
observables is validated through the use of two data sets, one containing simulated 
normal and malicious insider user behavior and the second from a computer network 
operations exercise. Compiled Memory Analysis Tool – Virtual (CMAT-V) and Xen 
hypervisor capabilities are leveraged to perform VMI and insider threat detection. Results 
of the research show the developed methodology is effective in detecting all defined 
malicious insider scenarios used in this research on Windows guests.  
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1 
INSIDER THREAT DETECTION ON THE WINDOWS OPERATING SYSTEM 
USING VIRTUAL MACHINE INTROSPECTION  
 I. Introduction 
Users interact with computer workstations to access and manipulate data that is 
fundamental to the functionality of an organization. As a result, these components of a 
network contain sensitive information valuable to an attacker, either internal or external. 
An insider attack against a workstation often results in a breach of the confidentiality, 
integrity, and/or availability (CIA) [11]. Successful modification of the CIA impacts the 
organization through data loss, data manipulation, destruction of information, and denial 
of access to data or a service, all of which negatively impact an organization’s efficiency, 
profit, public image, and overall mission [89]. 
Unlike external attackers, insiders are already trusted with information on 
workstations and access portions of it daily. Their trusted position within an organization 
enables them to cause greater damage. Therefore, developing a monitoring capability to 
alert for potential insider threats on a workstation can greatly improve defensive 
potential. Although insider threat monitoring technologies currently exist [4] [77-78] 
[86], they run at the same privilege level as the insider, allowing the possibility of 
subversion or determining its capabilities. As such, a monitoring capability which is 
invisible to a user would be an improvement to mitigating a determined malicious insider. 
1.1 Background 
Insiders are typically defined as individuals who have association with an 
organization, have or had access or knowledge of the organization’s information systems, 
 
2 
data, policies, and procedures. [4] [6-11]. This definition is used to define the malicious 
insider; a subset of individuals who abuse their trusted position within the organization to 
accomplish an objective that is not aligned with the organization’s mission. This trusted 
position within a network allows insiders to have the potential to cause much more 
damage than an external attacker. While financial damage may be the most easily 
observed, malicious insiders can also cause significant damage to an organization’s 
reputation or a government’s alliances with other countries. 
Detecting malicious insiders is often difficult due to the trusted nature of their 
position within the organization. Legitimate user commands or functions, such as 
printing, removable media, or document access, can easily be leveraged against an 
organization by an insider. 
Within the Department of Defense (DoD) computer networks, it is estimated that 
approximately eighty-seven percent of intrusions are the result of insider threat actions 
[19]. This figure illustrates that current mitigation techniques for internal attackers are 
ineffective compared with the technologies employed to prevent external attackers. 
External attackers are mitigated using defense-in-depth, which employs multiple tools at 
various components within a network to require an external attacker to bypass all of them 
to execute a successful attack. 
1.2 Research Objective 
Security tools currently exist for monitoring a user’s workstation for insider threat 
actions, but these tools execute at the same privilege level as the user [4] [77-78] [86]. It 
is believed that through virtual machine introspection, insider threats can be reliably 
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alerted on a workstation. The primary objective of this research is to develop a 
methodology to generate alerts for potential malicious insider threat actions and to rely 
exclusively on virtual machine introspection capabilities of the Compiled Memory 
Analysis Tool – Virtual (CMAT-V) [47], therefore remaining transparent to potential 
insiders by executing at a higher privilege level. 
Security tools that do address insider threats, such as host based security systems 
(HBSS) [87] or intrusion detection systems (IDS) [88] are vulnerable to subversion by a 
malicious insider. HBSS systems running on a user’s workstation could be disabled either 
due to misconfiguration, privilege escalation, or by a user with administrative credentials. 
Once the workstation defenses are disabled, an organization has no way to monitor the 
current actions a user is performing, save for a coworker looking over the insider’s 
shoulder. A malicious insider who has root permission, or who collaborates with an 
external third party could disable or modify current host based monitoring capabilities 
leaving an organization unaware of actions currently being performed by an insider. 
Network layer defenses can be subverted through encryption of traffic, or by 
avoiding the network layer entirely. An insider employing encryption such as Secure 
Sockets Layer (SSL), Secure Shell (SSH), or Virtual Private Network (VPN) would 
defeat any traffic inspection capabilities. A security analyst would only see traffic 
originating from a user’s workstation with the destination at a remote server, they could 
not determine the contents of the traffic. 
A monitoring tool executing at a higher privilege level than an insider could 
obtain ensures an organization can maintain observation over a user’s behavior. 
Additionally, by running completely transparently to the user, detection of the existence 
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of the tool is extremely difficult and as a result, a potential insider may be more reckless 
in their attack and not try to conceal their actions. Furthermore, virtual machine 
introspection has proven successful for detection of malware and post-incident forensics. 
Therefore, development of alert generation capabilities for malicious insider actions 
seems plausible and is a logical approach to defending against them. 
1.3 Methodology 
To alert to a potential malicious insider threat, organizations must develop use 
cases which categorize possible attack techniques, such as data exfiltration via printing. 
From a generic use case, specific attack scenarios are developed to enumerate steps a 
malicious insider may perform. 
The taxonomy developed by Howard and Longstaff [50] for a network attacker is 
modified to be specific to insider threats. Each generated scenario is broken down using 
this taxonomy to provide a better understanding of the attack. After each action in an 
attack is identified, corresponding observables are recorded which enable alerting when a 
specific action is performed. 
Once observables for each action are identified, they are tested against malicious 
insider threat data to confirm the alerting technique for each action is successful. An alert 
is generated if a potentially malicious action is detected for any observable during a 
scenario. The alert generation techniques are also compared against two data sets not 
containing an insider threat. This enables confirmation that the detection techniques only 
alert for malicious activity and not normal user actions. 
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1.4 Assumptions and Limitations 
The research is limited in terms of accuracy of malicious insider scenarios. 
Generated scenarios are intended to be representative of realistic attacks performed by 
insiders, but finding specific details about the techniques insiders used is often difficult. 
Technical reports often only provide recommendations for organizations to implement 
and actual incidents, such as [26], often only provide one small piece of information 
regarding the insider’s methods. 
Additional limitations are encountered in an effort to generate additional 
observables for malicious actions. These limitations are accounted for during experiment 
and analysis portions of the research. Specific details regarding these assumptions can be 
found in Chapter 3. 
1.5 Implications 
This research presents a novel method for alerting on potential insider threats. 
Leveraging VMI enables the alerting method to remain invisible to the individual being 
monitored. Furthermore, using VMI ensures a malicious insider needs develop a zero day 
exploit to escape the virtual machine to disable the monitoring capabilities, a difficult 
task. As previously mentioned, this research is able to alleviate some of the difficulties 
encountered with current mitigation techniques being defeated by malicious insiders. 
Additionally, this research provides a reproducible methodology to detect additional 
insider attack vectors specific to an organization. Six use cases are used to generate 
eighteen malicious insider attack scenarios. The alert generation techniques developed 
through taxonomy development and identification of VMI observables successfully 
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identifies all eighteen malicious insider scenarios. In the non-malicious scenarios, 
malicious insider action is not detected. Within the Advanced Cyber Education (ACE) 
Hackfest data set, fifteen scenarios do not have malicious insider activity detected. Three 
clipboard scenarios could not be determined due to clipboard limitations. 
1.6 Thesis Overview 
This chapter presented an introduction to the problem of malicious insider threats 
and the motivation for the research. Chapter 2 provides background information 
addressing such as: insider threat definition, insider threat impact, insider threat 
characteristics, insider threat case studies, virtualization of information technology 
systems, leveraging virtualization to introspect virtual machines, insider threat 
taxonomies, and insider threat countermeasures. Chapter 3 describes the research 
approach, the two networks used to collect data, and experimental limitations. Chapter 4 
presents each use case, scenarios performed in support of each use case, decomposition 
of each scenario using a modified computer and network incident taxonomy developed 
by [50], and virtual machine introspection (VMI) observables. Chapter 5 presents the 
analysis of the previously identified observables against malicious insider threat data and 
non-malicious data and explains resulting alerts generated. Chapter 6 summarizes the 
results, lists possible future work areas, presents information learned from reverse 
engineering several Windows internal components, and provides conclusions. 
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II. Literature Review 
As discussed in Chapter 1, malicious insiders are much better positioned than an 
external attacker to cause significant damage to an organization. Malicious insiders are 
trusted by an organization and conduct their daily job functions, as well as their malicious 
actions, behind a majority of the organization’s network defenses. As a result, additional 
defensive mechanisms need to be developed and implemented to mitigate this trusted 
threat. 
This chapter describes the background for the research. First, malicious insider 
characteristics, impact, and attributes are explored. The psychological aspects of 
malicious insiders and cyber espionage are examined. Virtual machines and virtual 
machine introspection technologies are discussed. Finally, existing insider threat 
detection and mitigation methods are examined. 
2.1 Malicious Insiders 
Investigating the characteristics, impact and attributes of malicious insiders allows 
for a better understanding of their potential impact to an organization and increased 
accuracy and usefulness of defense mechanisms. The Defense Security Service (DSS) 
reports since 1950, twice as many insiders volunteered than were recruited. Additionally, 
eighty-five percent of those committing espionage were able to successfully transfer 
information before being caught [5]. 
2.1.1 Defining the Insider Threat 
Insiders are frequently [4] [6-11] defined as individuals who are current or former 
members of an organization, contractor or partner, who are trusted and have or had access 
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or knowledge of the organization’s information systems, and objectives. Malicious 
insiders is a subset of individuals who intentionally misuse their trusted position through 
a set of actions and against a target or targets which results in a violation of 
confidentiality, integrity and/or availability (CIA). Malicious insiders may be disgruntled 
employees, employees who see an opportunity for financial benefit or spies who join an 
organization in order to commit espionage or financial fraud. Expanding upon this, 
malicious insiders within the government sector may also be viewed as traitors or spies 
[10] [11] [13]. 
2.1.2 Insider Threat Impact 
Insider activities resulting in a breach of CIA can be the result of deliberate 
malicious activity, inappropriate but not malicious activity or accidental; malicious 
activities accounted for ninety-three percent of breaches caused by insiders [7]. Malicious 
insiders accounted for 17 percent of all breaches in 2010, a decrease from previous years. 
[7] attributes this not to a decrease in malicious insiders, but an increase in external 
attackers. Malicious insider activities are also under reported by organizations. 
Organizations attempt to remediate malicious insiders internally for several reasons, such 
as avoiding personnel problems and potentially very damaging negative publicity [12] 
[13]. Publically revealing an organization has been a victim of an insider threat would be 
very damaging to its reputation. Since some insider incidents are quickly dispatched 
within an organization, the extent of the insider threat cannot be determined. 
Quantifying the damage a malicious insider can cause is extremely difficult, 
especially if the insider’s goal is not financial gain. Underreporting, handling incidents 
internally and insiders who are never caught result potentially inaccurate measurements 
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of their impact. Within the government sector, a CERT study reported forty-two percent 
of cases in which insiders were caught a substantial portion caused greater than fifty 
thousand dollars worth of financial damage to their organization [15]. Within the critical 
infrastructure sector, thirty-one percent of cases had financial damages greater than fifty 
thousand dollars [17]. In the financial sector, thirty percent of cases had damages 
resulting in more than five hundred thousand dollars [14]. 
Not all malicious insiders’ activities can be quantified with a monetary value. 
Some of the most damaging insider threat events occur against a nation state and are 
difficult, if not impossible, to apply a monetary value to. In addition to the dissemination 
of sensitive information, relationships with allies can be damaged. Malicious insiders 
within the Intelligence Community(IC) are typically performed by spies and not a result 
of computer network exploitation (CNE) [12]. It is estimated that eighty-seven percent of 
identified intrusions into Department of Defense (DoD) information systems are a result 
of insider threat activities [19]. A malicious insider within the IC could provide 
manipulated data to decision makers resulting in extremely damaging decisions begin 
made regarding policy towards another country [18]. 
In addition to violating confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability during 
employment, insiders also take information with them when they leave an organization. 
In a survey by the Ponemon Institute focusing on data leaks from 945 respondents who 
were fired, changed jobs, or laid-off in the past twelve months, seventy-nine percent of 
respondents took information without company permission. The primary reasons 
respondents chose to justify this behavior were other laid-off employees had done it, the 
information may be useful to the employee, and no one checked their property when they 
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left on their last day. Sixty-seven percent of respondents used information from their 
previous employer to assist in obtaining new employment. This type of data leak cannot 
easily be monetarily quantified unless the insiders sold the data and volunteered how 
much they received for it. Although not directly asked in the survey, it may be inferred 
that a majority, if not all, of the 945 respondents were not caught because eighty-eight 
percent stated they had some form of current employment or were a student and the 
remaining percentage responded as retired, disabled, or other. If these individuals had 
been caught, it would be much more difficult for them to obtain new employment. This 
survey illustrates the necessity of observing users during employment to detect malicious 
insiders earlier and prevent the loss of intellectual property when employees are 
dismissed or seek other employment opportunities [20]. 
2.1.3 Insider Threat Characteristics 
Malicious insiders do not share a common set of characteristics, technical 
experience or job position [14-17]. The characteristics of malicious insiders vary based 
on job sector. Within the government, banking, finance, and critical infrastructure sectors, 
insiders were approximately fifty percent male; however in the information technology 
(IT) and telecommunications (Telecom) sectors, ninety-one percent of insiders were 
male. The majority of male insiders in the IT and Telecom sectors is attributed to the 
field being primarily male employees [16]. In the IT and Telecom sectors, female 
employees are as likely to commit insider activities as in other fields; they just represent a 
much smaller percentage of the workforce than in other fields. The age of malicious 
insiders is also diverse, with employees ranging from approximately eighteen to sixty 
years. Based on the characteristics of past insiders, no specific set of characteristics can 
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be used to generate a profile for potential malicious individuals. Gender, age technical 
ability cannot be used as indicators to identify individuals who will become malicious in 
the future or are already malicious [10] [14-17] [20]. 
Furthermore, malicious insiders did not have a common amount of technical 
knowledge and were employed in various positions within an organization. Within the 
banking and financial, and government sectors, twenty-three and twenty-six percent of 
insiders held a technical position, respectively. A major finding within the CERT study is 
the lack of technical sophistication needed to perform the malicious activities. Within the 
government sector, eighty percent of insider actions involved only user commands. 
Similarly, insiders in banking and financial sectors used regular user commands for 
eighty-seven percent of actions. However, technical actions used for malicious activities 
should not be ignored, especially in fields where individuals with technical knowledge 
compromise a majority of the workforce. Within the IT and Telecom sectors, fifty-eight 
percent used technical methods such as scripts, tools or backdoors to perform malicious 
actions [14-16]. Verizon’s 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report supports this data 
with eighty-five percent of insiders being regular employees and nine percent holding 
technical positions (helpdesk, system or network administrator, or software developer) 
[7]. Figure 2.1 illustrates how technical sophistication required for executing a cyber 
attack is decreasing, increasing the ability for malicious insiders to attack their 
organization. The technical ability required by a malicious insider is decreasing as tools 
and scripts become more powerful and easier to use. As a result, few insiders need 
advanced technical knowledge in order to execute their plan [21]. 
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Figure 2.1: Attack Sophistication vs. Intruder Technical Knowledge [21]. 
 
The CERT studies on insider threat also reveal the motivation for the insiders to 
commit their malicious action. In the four studies, the insiders were motivated by a 
specific event more than fifty percent of the time, with ninety-two percent of critical 
infrastructure insiders having a specific event triggering their actions. Revenge and 
financial gain constituted the majority of motivations for malicious insiders. Insider’s 
motives were also based on their employment sector. Employees within the banking and 
financial sectors were motivated in eighty-one percent of cases by financial gain, whereas 
employees within the IT and Telecom sectors were motivated primarily by revenge (fifty-
six percent of incidents). Some of the less frequent motivations include: lack of 
appreciation, disagreements with management, culture or policies, and take information 
with them to a new organization [14-17]. 
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Additionally, insiders typically planned their actions before committing their 
malicious behavior. In three of the four CERT studies, more than three quarters of 
insiders formulated a plan prior to carrying out their malicious actions. In approximately 
one third of incidents, malicious insiders performed preliminary actions such as 
discussing their plan with others, obtaining programs, commands or scripts, testing or 
attempting to access the system, sabotaging backups, or creating a backdoor. In a 
majority of cases, insider’s plans and negative feelings towards the organization were 
communicated to others [14-17]. 
2.2 Insider Threat Detection 
To understand the techniques malicious insiders employ in their attacks, it is 
important to decompose the attack into individual pieces. Taxonomies, or attack 
trees/models, provide a method for analyzing past and future network attacks.  
2.2.1 Attack Models 
Computer network attack taxonomies are a standard, formal method for modeling 
the security of a system based on possible attacks. It enables network defenders to 
consistently classify network attacks. These taxonomies should also take into account all 
parts of an attack, such as who is the attacker, in this case malicious insiders, techniques 
used in attacking, and the targets [48]. A quantified and visual representation of known 
attack methods allows research efforts to address potential shortfalls of network defense 
technologies. Figure 2.2 illustrates an example attack taxonomy for insider threats, 
expanding upon interactions insider threats have with IT systems that can be monitored 
[49]. 
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Figure 2.2: Cyber Event/Observable Taxonomy [11]. 
 
Traditional attack taxonomies focus on addressing external attacks; that is 
someone who is external to an organization and often does not have knowledge of the 
internal network. This research will use a modified version of [50]’s taxonomy to model 
malicious insider threats. Figure 2.3 presents Howard and Longstaff’s Computer and 
Network Incident Taxonomy. The modified model focuses solely on the insider threat 
and does not address the motivation for the attack, such as financial gain or revenge. In 
respect to insider threats, the tool and vulnerability used by a user are extremely 
important, especially in regards to detection within a Windows OS. Other attack 
taxonomies, such as [79], are considered, but [50]’s taxonomy allows for rapid 
identification of multiple portions of an incident. An insider attack is comprised of more 
than just an action against a target; it is important for an organization to also be able to 
identify the tools employed, the vulnerability exploited, as well as the insider’s objective, 
and effect of the attack. 
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Figure 2.3: Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy [50]. 
 
2.2.2 Honeypots 
Honeypots, compared to network technologies such as firewalls or IDSs, are a 
relatively new technology. A honeypot is a security technology that differs from other 
network technologies because its function is to be compromised. Honeypots are 
computers deployed on a network in order to gather information about attacker’s tools 
and techniques. If a honeypot is not attacked, it provides no value for network defenders. 
Honeypots are useful for detecting “0-day” exploits; that is, an exploit for a previously 
unknown vulnerability in an OS or service running within the OS. Table 2.1 summarizes 
the features of honeypots that differentiate them from typical network defenses [51-53]. 
Honeypots can be developed to imitate an existing service and OS within a network, or 
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run an actual OS. They are typically implemented to be attacked by external agents, 
sometimes sitting outside the perimeter defenses of a network [3]. 
Table 2.1: Spitzer Honeypot Benefits [52]. 
Feature Description 
Small Data Sets 
Honeypots only capture data when they are interacted with. 
This results in less, but more useful data. 
Reduced False Positives 
False positives are reduced because honeypots provide no 
services to end-users; therefore any interaction is malicious. 
Catching False Negatives 
Similar to reduced false positives, any interaction is malicious 
and this allows honeypots to detect novel attacks. 
Encryption 
Some network traffic monitors are unable to decrypt 
encrypted traffic, whereas a honeypot decrypts any 
encrypted traffic it receives. 
IPv6 
Although not widely implemented, IPv6 is still not 
implemented in older devices within networks. 
Highly Flexible 
Honeypots can be configured to simulate any piece of 
hardware and contain any type of data an attacker may be 
looking for. 
Minimal Resources 
Since honeypots do not provide any network services, they do 
not require extensive resources like other network defense 
technologies. 
 
A honeypot is a viable solution or resource to combat the insider threat, when 
appropriately placed on a network [3]. Since an insider’s first step is typically not to 
attack another computer within the network, honeytokens, or a digital entry, is placed 
somewhere in a system. It can be any type of information, but its purpose is similar to 
that of a honeypot [54]. One example demonstrated in [52] is a fake username and 
password. The login credentials are not used by any user, and are not used on any system. 
When an insider sniffs the traffic and tries to use the credentials, the organization will 
know the user is performing malicious actions. Honeytokens could also be used to 
monitor an employee’s data access behavior. Tokens are created that imitate legitimate 
company data and if an employee accesses the data, it can be monitored for malicious 
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activity. Furthermore, the insider can be directed to a honeynet, a network of honeypot 
computers, to determine if the user has malicious intentions [52] [54]. Current efforts [2] 
seek to include forensic capabilities as part of the honeypot in order to rapidly extract 
useful information regarding the compromise of the honeypot. 
Honeypots are not without their drawbacks with respect to detecting malicious 
insiders. First, the insider may not use the honeypot while performing malicious actions 
against an organization, rendering the honeypot insignificant. Secondly, if a honeypot is 
misconfigured or poorly designed, it may be discovered by an insider and then false 
information is provided to deceive administrators [52].  
2.2.3 Perimeter Network Defenses 
Computer network defense techniques often rely on the concept of defense in 
depth. Specifically focusing on technology, this strategy relies on the idea that an 
adversary will need to overcome multiple barriers in order to gain access to a specific 
target [83]. These technologies typically consist of a hardware firewall, an intrusion 
detection and/or prevention system, and a proxy. In relation to insider threats, these 
systems attempt to stop sensitive or classified information from being exfiltrated to an 
external host using methods such as Secure Shell (SSH), Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), 
Peer to Peer (P2P), or email. A current research effort with network based defense to 
mitigate the insider threat is Sensitive Information Dissemination Detection (SIDD). 
SIDD uses deep packet inspection (DPI) in order to retrieve data from within a network 
packet. It uses anomaly detection to determine if outbound communications are 
potentially malicious. The system then inspects packets for authorized or unauthorized 
application traffic. Next, the system attempts to identify the packet contents for any 
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sensitive information using signatures. Lastly, a packet is examined for covert channel 
communication. SIDD may intervene if it determines network traffic to contain sensitive 
information [83]. 
2.2.4 Userlevel/Workstation Defenses 
In addition to network based defense, another common method used to mitigate 
insider threats is monitoring the user’s workstation. Compared with network defenses, 
this is extremely advantageous as monitoring is not limited to only activities that require 
internet access, but instead research efforts can monitor every aspect of a user’s 
interaction with a computer. 
2.2.4.1 Linux Operating System Auditing 
The Linux operating system is not as frequently employed as a workstation than 
its Windows counterpart. As a result, insider threat detection methods are often 
substantially behind. Current research efforts, such as [77], seek to present a 
methodology an organization to employ to obtain better information for existing logging 
functionality of the system. A solution such as [77] requires minimal additional cost and 
little overhead to employ. This research sought to maximize the logging capabilities of 
Linux in order to detect insider threats earlier in their attack, rather than after the insider 
accomplishes their objective. 
2.2.4.2 Windows Operating System Logging 
Similarly, research by [78] developed a methodology to generate a custom 
auditing template for the Windows XP OS. Existing Windows logging capabilities are 
often employed without knowledge of what the organization’s actual logging 
requirements are. A methodology is developed which allows an organization to create an 
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insider threat logging template tailored to their requirements, thus improving the response 
time to detect insider threat actions. 
2.2.4.3 Physical Hardware Logging 
An overlooked area for insider threat detection is logging on physical hardware. 
Research by [80] presented a methodology and solution to detect insider threat attacks 
against Cisco network devices. The solution relies only upon existing functionality of the 
device, meaning implementation is straightforward by an organization and it does not 
require any additional firmware to be installed on the device for detection to be 
successful. Network infrastructure devices are often overlooked by security personnel as 
they are often thought of as not possessing enough storage capability to hold information, 
but they process all traffic on a network [80]. 
2.2.2.4 Registry Forensics 
The Windows registry is a hierarchical database that stores configuration 
information about the system, such as configuration information for users, applications 
and, hardware devices [58]. Table 2.2 describes each of the root keys of the Windows 
registry.  
Table 2.2: Windows Registry Root Keys [42] [58]. 
Hive Name Acronym Function 
HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT HKCR 
Contains information correlating a file type to the 
application which opens it. 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER HKCU 
Active, loaded profile for currently logged-on 
user. Contains information such as Control Panel 
settings. 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE HKLM 
Configuration about the system, including 
hardware and software. 
HKEY_USERS HKU 
Contains all the actively loaded user profiles on 
the system. 
HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG HKCC 
Contains the system hardware profile used at 
system startup. 
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The registry is extremely useful for post-incident forensic analysis of a system. 
Malware can modify the auto-run features of the registry to start itself after a reboot of 
the system and forensic investigators often start with the registry to determine if malware 
has compromised the system. After finding malware in the registry, investigators can 
determine how the system was compromised [40]. If malware is not found using the 
registry, investigators can use the registry to determine what software programs are 
installed on a system and if any are unauthorized. Additionally, the registry can contain 
valuable forensic information, such as Network Interface Cards (NICs), Media Access 
Control (MAC) address, network shares, auto run functionality, and removable media 
[42]. 
Through thorough examination of the Windows registry, a detailed profile of the 
user’s activities on a computer system can be compiled. Current research efforts, such as 
[4], present solutions to insider threats through live monitoring of the Windows registry. 
This technique allows an organization to build a strong profile of a user’s computer usage 
pattern, enabling rapid insider threat detection and mitigation. 
2.3 Case Studies 
Examination of insider threat case studies expands upon knowledge gained from 
the previous section. Case studies allow observation of more specific insider threat 
instances and obtaining information such as vulnerability exploited, tools employed, 
actions performed, objective of the attack, and consequence of the insider’s attack for the 
organization. 
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2.3.1 Terry Childs 
Terry Childs was a developer and sole network administrator for the city of San 
Francisco’s FiberWAN network. FiberWAN network handled sixty percent of the 
municipal government’s traffic. In June, 2008, he believed he was going to be fired or 
transferred and refused to give the passwords for the routes and switches to his 
supervisors. Additionally, he had installed a backdoor in order to maintain access to the 
system. When the city fired him, Childs demanded three million dollars to cover attorney 
fees and lost pay [22-24]. 
In this case, Childs was able to cause an estimated $200,000 of damage to the city 
as a result of having to pay for consultants to investigate damage to FiberWAN before he 
divulged the password. Mr. Childs was successful in his attack because he was the only 
one with knowledge of the FiberWAN infrastructure and passwords. A lack of proper 
management and failure to adhere to established policies was deemed the source of his 
ability to inflict damage on the city. Unfortunately in situations where there is no 
monitoring, automated or manual, insiders are much more successful in their malicious 
actions [24-25]. 
2.3.2 Bradley Manning 
One of the most recent and widely publicized examples of a malicious insider is 
Pfc. Bradley Manning. Pfc. Manning had a Top Secret/SCI security clearance during his 
deployment to Baghdad [26]. In 2010, he allegedly supplied WikiLeaks, a repository for 
whistleblowers to anonymously submit information, with 1.6 gigabytes of files, 
containing in excess of 250,000 diplomatic cables, logs from operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and a video. A CD-RW was the tool Pfc. Manning used to exfiltrate data 
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from the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) where he worked [27]. 
Pfc. Manning’s actions are a breach of confidentiality, and the leaked documents are 
likely extremely damaging to the United States and its relationships with its allies. Pfc. 
Manning’s ability to repeatedly burn files to a CD-RW demonstrates the lack of effective 
monitoring at the time he committed his malicious activities. 
2.3.3 Aldrich Ames 
Aldrich Ames was a spy for the Soviet Union for nine years in the 1980s and 
early 1990s [28]. During his service with the central intelligence agency (CIA), Mr. 
Ames supplied the Soviets with codes, techniques, financial spending, and the identities 
of several American double-agents [29]. Ames eventually provided the identities of all 
assets he knew to protect himself [28]. Of those whose names were supplied to the KGB, 
at least four are known to have been killed [29]. To obtain the information, Ames 
searched datasets from workstations that had floppy disk drives. Additionally, no 
protections were in place that restricted Ames to the least amount of information 
necessary to perform his job. He also had access to information not within his need-to-
know [12]. At the time of his trial and conviction, he was referred to as the most 
damaging spy in the history of the United States [28-30]. 
2.3.4 Robert Hanssen 
Robert Hanssen is a former FBI agent who sold information to the Soviet Union 
between 1985 and his arrest in 2001 [31]. During his career, he exfiltrated numerous top 
secret/sensitive compartmented information (TS/SCI) documents focusing on the USA’s 
counter-intelligence program. Hanssen was extremely technical and used IT systems to 
assist in his malicious activities; he had developed several IT systems for the FBI during 
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his employment. To exfiltrate sensitive data, he would use floppy disks, removable 
storage, and a handheld computer [12]. Hansen used the databases he had access to 
perform keyword searches beyond his need to know to ensure he had not been detected. 
Searches included checking recent FBI entries, searching for his home address, or for a 
document drop location name. On several occasions, there were possibilities for him to 
be caught because of his actions on an IT system, but he remained undetected. In one 
such instance he was discovered with a password cracking program on his computer, but 
was able to avoid punitive action by claiming it was necessary to obtain the administrator 
password to install a printer. Ultimately, Hanssen was not caught as a result of his use of 
IT systems, but when his voice was identified [12] [31]. 
2.4 Virtualization 
Within the Intel x86 architecture, there are four privilege modes or rings, which 
are numbered 0 to 3 and 0 is the most privileged. On a host OS, the operating system and 
kernel execute at ring 0 and applications at ring 3; rings 1 and 2 are not used. The 
separation of privileges allows the kernel and operating system to remain secure if an 
application should become compromised [35]. However, it is possible that ring 0 could 
become compromised and therefore the entire machine would be under an attacker’s 
control. Virtual machines can assist with mitigating this threat. 
In order to preserve the security the ring structure provides, Xen’s paravirtualized 
environment runs the VMM at ring 0, the guest OS and kernel at ring 1 and  guest 
programs at ring 3. The downside of paravirtulization is that it requires the guest to be 
modified, something that cannot be performed for Windows guests [35]. Full 
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virtualization, which is what will be used for this research, guests do not need 
modification. The hypervisor provides CPU emulation to the guest to allow privileged 
CPU functions. In both instances, the hypervisor are running at lower rings than the 
guest, therefore maintaining security between the guest and hypervisor. 
A virtual machine is an isolated guest operating system instance running on a 
normal host operating system instance. A host operating system is able to run multiple 
virtual machine instances; the only limitation is the hardware resources available to the 
host operating system. Virtual machines have hardware abstraction performed through 
the hypervisor, or virtual machine manager (VMM). This allows VMs to function exactly 
the same as if they were a host OS. A VMM is designed as a small software layer to 
ensure isolation between virtual machines and the host system [32]. Additionally, the 
VMM allows users to specify the amount of virtual hardware, such as memory, available 
to a VM. Unlike host operating systems, VMs can be suspended and resumed without 
requiring a restart of the operating system. Suspending a VM pauses all currently 
executing processes and saves the guest OS’s memory contents into the VM image file. 
This can be beneficial when a host needs to be restarted and the VM is critical to an 
organization’s mission; the VM can be suspended, moved to a new host and restarted 
without negative impact to the organization’s mission [33-34].  
2.4.1 Benefits of Virtualization 
One of the most obvious and valuable benefits is improved hardware utilization. 
A single host running a single set of services is not as efficient as running several 
virtualized operating systems with each running a single service. Additionally, user’s 
workstations can be virtualized and connected via thin clients. Virtualizing a workstation 
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lets users have the ability to run programs that require a specific OS without giving them 
full control over a VMM on their desktop. Additionally, it allows organizations to 
combine several user workstations on a single host, resulting in improved hardware 
utilization [33]. 
 As a testing environment, VMs provide a consistent system to programs, such as 
software or malware, to be developed. With snapshots, a VM can be quickly restored to a 
known good state in the event the guest becomes corrupted or unstable. This also allows 
for researchers to perform repeated experiments with similar outcomes because of the 
identical starting states. 
2.5 Virtual Machine Introspection 
Virtual machine introspection (VMI) is the process of externally examining a 
virtual machine “…for the purpose of analyzing the software running inside it.”[37] This 
section describes motivation for VMI, the semantic gap problem between a hypervisor 
and the VM, and an overview of current VMI research and product capabilities. 
2.5.1 VMI Motivation 
With the recent increase in virtualization, organizations have looked for new 
techniques to monitor the security of their systems. VMI is emerging as a feasible and 
valuable method for securely monitoring a guest OS. Although bridging the semantic gap 
is challenging, VMI enables more secure guest OS monitoring. Software running within 
the guest OS is vulnerable to malicious insider modification or disabling while also 
remaining undetected to administrators. A user with full permissions to an OS instance 
can easily disable any security software with enough time, an abundant resource for 
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insiders. With VMI, users with full permission are unaware of the monitoring capabilities 
of the VMI tool and are also unable to compromise them. VMI allows the system 
administrators to continue to receive information about a VM despite the guest OS being 
compromised [37]. Additionally, a host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) 
typically runs at user-level, meaning it can easily be compromised by malicious insiders 
or malware [37]. 
2.5.2 Semantic Gap 
The semantic gap refers to the knowledge separation between a hypervisor and a 
guest VM. A hypervisor can easily observe raw memory values of a running guest, but 
turning that information into higher level data that is useful to an analyst or an automated 
tool is extremely difficult. Hypervisors cannot use API calls to the running guest without 
software running within the guest to serve as a middleman between the hypervisor and 
the guest OS. Without source code for the guest, an OS, such as Microsoft Windows, 
requires extensive reverse engineering of the guest’s kernel and data structures to 
translate specific memory addresses into useful data. Additionally, patches to the guest 
OS or different version of the guest OS may change the data structure of an object, 
resulting in wasted reverse engineering effort [38]. 
Expanding further upon the inability to convert low-level system data into OS 
level information, obtaining context is also extremely difficult. Information such as 
employee’s job position, work schedule, or project deadlines is valuable to an 
investigator in determining if a set of events are malicious or not [36]. 
One method for defeating the semantic gap involves paravirtualization. With a 
paravirtualized OS, the OS would supply information back to the VMM about programs 
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or data within the guest VM. This method requires modification of the guest OS in order 
to supply desired information. As a result, all closed source OSs, such as Microsoft 
Windows, cannot be paravirtualized. Additionally, since the guest VM is being trusted to 
supply correct information, it is susceptible to a malicious insider [84]. 
2.5.3 VMI Research 
VMI provides a powerful platform to monitor processes and activity within the 
guest OS; a VMM can observe a guest while a compromised guest cannot disable the 
monitoring capabilities of the VMM. Much research has been performed on VMMs on 
detecting malware within a running guest. Unfortunately, most of these tools only address 
external system attackers and techniques they use to remain undetected from non-
introspective anti-virus and forensic solutions. Malicious insiders typically do not employ 
malware for their actions and already have access to all of the sensitive information; 
therefore these tools are not well suited for detecting the insider threat.  
2.5.3.1 Forensics 
Forensics conducted through VMI has the added benefit of not requiring the target 
system to be shutdown; shutting down a production system can be very expensive for an 
organization. Additionally, shutting down the machine informs an attacker, either internal 
or external, that their actions have been detected. Research by [59] indicates that forensic 
analysis on a running and paused virtual machine provides approximately the same 
quality of results.  
Research by [60] resulted in a VMI tool for Xen called Virtual Introspection tools 
developed for Xen (VIX). VIX was originally developed in order to overcome forensic 
challenges on running and powered off systems. On running systems, the use of forensic 
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analysis tools can result of a loss of critical data. Information such as the registry, 
network connections, logs, and temporary files are modified [60]. Additionally, running a 
tool can result in paging of memory out to disk. VIX provides similar functionality as 
Compiled Memory Analysis Tool – Virtual (CMAT-V), providing the capability to 
perform the following commands on a DomU system: ps, lsmod, netstat, lsof, who, and 
top. However, unlike CMAT-V, VIX pauses the target before acquiring the necessary 
data [60].  
2.5.3.2 Static Forensic Analysis 
In forensics, the traditional method for conducting investigations is static analysis. 
Static analysis has many existing policies and procedures to ensure captured data is 
legally valid. Typically the first step performed is to power down the compromised 
system [38-39]. Unfortunately, this immediately destroys valuable system information 
contained within the computer’s memory. More importantly, if the system has an 
encrypted hard drive, the key is inaccessible once the machine is turned off. When 
shutting down a system, two methods are suggested: using the OS shutdown and pulling 
out the power cord. Both of these methods can contaminate the resulting disk image. 
Using the OS shutdown results in possible modification of logs, installing updates, or 
possibly malware that cleans up as the machine is shutdown. Pulling the power cord can 
result in an inconsistent or corrupt file system [38] [41].  
2.5.3.3 Live Forensic Analysis 
Live analysis remedies some of the problems arising from static analysis. Unlike 
static analysis, live analysis enables forensic investigators to obtain volatile information 
about the configuration of the system. The volatile information is often more useful when 
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performing forensic investigations. Volatile information on a system is kept in the 
memory and includes important information such as currently executing processes on the 
system, network connections, and contents of any files open on the system that have not 
been paged to the swap [42]. 
Although live analysis provides additional data to investigators, it also introduces 
some potential problems. First, malicious insiders could have running tools that hide 
critical information that would reveal their involvement in malicious activities. Since the 
tool and the forensic investigators tools are running simultaneously, the malicious tool 
can manipulate system responses provided to the investigator [38][43] Additionally, by 
examining the system, investigators may inadvertently cause the system to change state, 
causing subsequent data collections to not match the initial data capture.  
Following Ken Thompson’s axiom of “You can't trust code that you did not 
totally create yourself” [90], the next step for live analysis is leveraging VMI in order to 
preserve the volatile system data while ensuring the data collected is repeatable and not 
compromised. The introspecting process is running outside of the knowledge of the guest 
OS and therefore isolated from any tampering. Since the VMM controls all aspects of the 
virtual hardware presented to the guest OS, it can access all necessary volatile data an 
investigator requires [1]. 
2.5.4 XenAccess 
XenAccess is a VMI and virtual disk monitoring tool used to monitor guest OSs 
running in Xen hypervisor. XenAccess’ virtual disk monitoring is experimental and 
requires overcoming the semantic gap in to obtain useful data, meaning extensive reverse 
engineering would be required to monitor Windows disk activity. Xen runs guest VMs in 
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an unprivileged domain (DomU) and an administrative domain, which runs in privileged 
domain 0 (dom0) [32]. XenAccess does not need to modify the VMM or the guest OS in 
order to map memory of a DomU VM to a local address rage. XenAccess uses a structure 
called xa_instance to maintain as much information about the DomU guest as 
possible; this improves performance on subsequent calls. XenAccess then calls one of 
three possible functions. An example of mapping a kernel symbol to a virtual address 
provided by [32] is shown in Figure 2.1. System.map is a table of symbols and 
addresses used by XenAccess to find a virtual address for the requested symbol. 
 
Figure 2.1: XenAccess Architecture [32]. 
 
2.5.5. Compiled Memory Analysis Tool – Virtual 
Compiled Memory Analysis Tool – Virtual (CMAT-V) extends upon the 
XenAccess VMI library and compiled memory analysis tool (CMAT). Unlike other 
memory analysis tools, CMAT is able to be run against any Windows operating system 
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because of Program Database (PDB) files from the Microsoft Symbol Server in order to 
determine the location of specific application symbols [45]. 
CMAT analyzes memory dumps for system information such as network ports, 
active processes, drivers, registry keys, clipboard information and current users and it can 
save this information into feature files [45-46]. CMAT-V extends upon CMAT and is 
designed to perform live forensics upon a Windows DomU VM. Paravirtualization is not 
possible with CMAT-V because the tool is designed to run for Windows VMs and 
Windows is a proprietary operating system; necessary modifications to the guest 
operating system cannot be performed. The architecture developed by [47] is shown in 
Figure 2.2. CMAT-V utilizes Xen’s hypervisor management API to interact with Dom0 
and manage DomU virtual machines. CMAT-V was designed to run with CentOS version 
5, but likely runs on any Linux distribution running a Xen kernel and with the necessary 
dependencies for XenAccess and CMAT-V. 
 
Figure 2.2: CMAT-V Architecture [47]. 
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The most beneficial aspect of CMAT-V, for the purpose of this research, is its live 
introspection mode. This mode still generates the previously mentioned feature files and 
also produces full guest memory captures. The feature files are described in Table 2.X 
and by default, all of the files are created every thirty seconds, except for text file 5, 
which occurs at the same time as a full memory capture. Full memory captures are 
generated by default every thirty minutes and cause the creation of feature files to be 
suspended because CMAT-V is not multi-threaded. The impact on the guest while 
running virt-live mode was determined by [47] to be approximately 3% to 4.5% decrease 
in performance. On systems with multiple guests and instances of CMAT-V executing in 
virt-live mode, it can be expected that performance will continue to decrease because the 
Dom0’s hard drive has more data generated by CMAT-V to write and each guest will 
have its own disk queries for normal system usage. This could be alleviated through the 
use of Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAID) level 0 or Solid State Drives 
(SSD). Full memory captures enable forensic analysts to expand upon CMAT-V’s feature 
files and either use existing tools or modify CMAT-V to obtain additional information 
from the guest’s memory.  
Table 2.3: Description of CMAT-V Feature Files. 
Filename Suffix Description 
_1.txt 
Lists currently running processes, including: process ID, process 
name and owner.  
_2.txt Lists current network connections, both TCP and UDP. 
_3.txt 
Lists currently loaded libraries, the path to the library on the system 
and the corresponding process ID. 
_4.txt 
Lists all current file handles, process ID, and the permission that 
process has to the file. 
_5.txt 
Lists process ID, and any registry entry corresponding to the process 
ID, to include the memory location for that registry entry. 
_6.txt Lists all currently loaded drivers and its base memory address. 
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2.6 Summary 
This chapter summarized current insider threat research. A distinction was made 
between an insider and a malicious insider to create a definition to expand the research 
on. Insider threat characteristics, such as demographics, technical ability, and attack 
methods were presented. Next, several detection techniques were examined. The topics of 
virtualization and virtual machine introspection were introduced and the benefits they can 
provide. Lastly, the chapter described the tools which will be employed to develop an 
insider threat mitigation strategy. 
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III. Methodology 
A malicious insider is capable of causing more damage to an organization because 
they are trusted individuals and function behind a majority of computer network 
defenses. This objective of this research is to determine if virtual machine introspection 
(VMI) can be leveraged to signal potential malicious insider threat behavior. 
This chapter describes the formal methodology used to develop a proof-of-
concept solution to malicious insider threats through VMI. The first section describes the 
problem, the goals of the research, assumptions which are made to limit the scope of the 
research, and the expected outcome. The second section describes a four step method for 
analysis of each malicious insider use case and corresponding generated scenario. The 
third section describes the test environment used to obtain malicious and non-malicious 
data. The last section describes problems and solutions encountered with Xen and 
Compiled Memory Analysis Tool – Virtual (CMAT-V). 
3.1 Problem Definition 
Existing malicious insider threat detection systems (ITDS) focus on the network 
level [83] [85], or execute at the same privilege level that the malicious insider is 
operating in [4] [77-78] [86]. Most host-based ITDSs are visible to the user therefore 
such systems can be subverted by an insider. Sensors placed on the network are unable to 
detect malicious actions that occur only at the user’s workstation, such as copying files to 
removable media. Additionally, encryption can be used to bypass network level 
monitoring techniques. This research is motivated by the need to perform real-time 
analysis of a user’s workstation while remaining undetected and executing at a higher 
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privilege level than the user. This provides security analysts with a more complete 
representation of the user’s current actions. 
3.1.1 Research Goals 
The primary goal of this research is to determine whether insider threat detection 
can be performed on a Windows guest virtual machine (VM) through virtual machine 
introspection (VMI) using the CMAT-V. This research does not modify any files in the 
guest Windows operating system and uses existing capabilities of CMAT-V to perform 
full memory captures. The result allows guest VM introspection to remain transparent 
and inaccessible to the user. Additionally, the research also attempts to determine the 
successfulness of only generating alerts for malicious insider actions. Two additional data 
sets are used to validate the alerting methods. Although one or two observables within 
non-malicious data may cause an alert to be generated, all observables identified in a 
particular insider threat scenario should not be identified in non-malicious data. 
3.1.2 Assumptions 
The following assumptions are introduced to limit the scope of the research. These 
assumptions are independent of all use cases. If a use case requires specific assumptions, 
they are discussed in the description of each use case in Chapter 4. 
- Users have full access to files on the DomU system, except for those specifically 
restricted by the Windows OS. 
- Users are unaware of the existence of CMAT-V. As a result, malicious insiders 
will not attempt to obfuscate their activities from CMAT-V specifically, but may 
attempt to hide from DomU level monitoring. Previous work by [47] revealed a 
3% to 4.5% decrease in performance within VMs while CMAT-V was executing; 
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users likely will not detect performance degradation and therefore will not detect 
introspection of their system. 
- The host OS (Dom0), virtual machine manager (VMM), and CMAT-V cannot be 
circumvented, disabled, infected, or modified by the user. 
- Threats modeled are intentionally malicious and their actions are not the result of 
an accidental breach of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA). 
- The malicious insider is acting alone and does not utilize social engineering 
tactics to aid their attack. 
- The registry contained within DomU cannot be modified by the insider to hide 
their actions. 
- Malicious insiders will not use physical attack to access other systems in the 
network. 
- Workarounds for Xen USB passthrough and optical discs produce similar 
observables as native Windows functionality. Motivation for this assumption is 
provided in section 3.4 Experimental Limitations. 
- Clipboard and print operations are performed on pre-determined files for both 
malicious and non-malicious users. Section 3.4.5 CMAT-V Limitations elaborates 
the rational for this assumption. 
- All of the actions of a single malicious insider scenario are performed within the 
time span of one memory capture and each action is performed in the order 
specified. 
- Documents deemed sensitive to the organization have been identified and 
appropriately flagged.  
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3.1.3 Expected Outcome 
It is expected that through VMI of a Windows guest, specific registry keys and 
hexadecimal patterns within memory can be monitored for changes. When a change is 
observed, an alert is generated displaying the changed values, enabling an analyst to 
determine malicious intent. Additionally, an organization can mitigate potential 
disadvantages of alternative insider threat detection methods, such as cost or 
compatibility issues, by employing a tool relying on open-source code and executing 
outside of Windows workstations, preventing the tool from being compromised by the 
insider. Testing the alerting methods against data not containing a malicious insider, 
malicious insider attack patterns should not be identified. This outcome confirms the alert 
generation methods do not produce alerts for non-malicious user behavior.  
3.2 Research Approach 
To accomplish these research goals, a finite sequence of steps are developed and 
performed. Decomposing the research methodology into a precise sequence of steps 
allows the research to be repeated with the same results. The approach to the problem of 
insider threat alert generation through VMI involves four interrelated steps. The four 
steps are: development of malicious insider taxonomy, VMI observable analysis, 
malicious insider detection, and data validation. Prior to performing the four step process, 
six use cases are identified and decomposed into scenarios.  Chapters 4 and 5 are 
organized by each use case and related scenario. The purpose of each scenario is 
discussed before addressing the four steps of the methodology.  
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3.2.1 Use Case Development 
Use cases provide a high-level overview of actions a malicious insider could 
perform to achieve an unauthorized state of the system. The use cases are selected 
through examination of malicious insider techniques and security reports as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Each use case represents a malicious insider attempting to accomplish a 
malevolent objective differing from the organization’s mission, such as theft of data or 
damage against an organization. Specific to each use case are several scenarios which are 
performed. These scenarios provide different techniques a malicious insider may employ 
and also allow the malicious steps to be decomposed into an attack taxonomy. 
3.2.2 Malicious Insider Taxonomy 
To accurately model and prevent malicious insider behavior, each scenario is 
decomposed into individual attack actions that can be observed from beginning to end. 
Decomposition of attacks enables VMI observables to be identified and an effective 
alerting strategy to be developed. As mentioned in Chapter 2, detailed information about 
real-world malicious insider incidents is not readily available; information is often 
summarized into preventative steps an organization should employ. The model described 
by [50] can be slightly modified and used to describe each malicious insider attack 
scenario. Each component of the taxonomy is described below. 
Attacker. Malicious insiders are the attackers who perform actions against a company 
using information technology to accomplish an objective. A classification of these 
individuals is described in [50]. For the purpose of this research, the attacker is 
always a malicious insider. These individuals are already trusted users of the 
system and as such, attempting to classify them into the types of attackers 
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identified in [50] only differentiates the title of the attacker and not the tool, 
action, and target of their action.  
Tool. A malicious insider begins their attack by using a tool to exploit some vulnerability 
within the system. A tool can range from a simple and legitimate command, such 
as copy and paste, to an automated program or virus. Multiple tools can be 
employed by a malicious insider during a single scenario. 
Vulnerability. A vulnerability is a weakness or deficiency within an information system 
that can lead to unforeseen and unauthorized access [50]. A vulnerability is 
typically considered a bug in implementation of a software program that can lead 
to the development of an exploit. However, it can also be an architectural problem 
with the design of the system or a misconfiguration of the system. 
Action. An action is a step taken by the malicious insider in order to obtain a desired 
effect. Actions incorporate the tool and vulnerability against the target in order to 
provide the desired result. Actions can include modification, deletion, disabling, 
moving, copying, pasting, installation, bypassing, or printing. Scenarios may 
include multiple actions by the insider. 
Target. The target is the focus of the malicious insider’s tool, vulnerability, and actions. 
A malicious insider’s target is data on the system, or a running program on the 
system. Several example targets include sensitive corporate documents, other 
user’s account credentials, and running programs on the system. 
Unauthorized Result. An unauthorized result is defined to be the conclusion of the 
malicious insider’s actions that is not permitted by the organization. These results 
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can include increased system privileges, denial of service, distribution of 
information, or modification of information. 
Objective. The final item in the malicious insider taxonomy is the insider’s objective. For 
the purpose of this research, knowledge of the objective is not relevant to 
successful detection, but possible objectives a malicious insider may have are 
enumerated. Objectives can include, but are not limited to, financial gain, damage, 
or espionage. 
 
Figure 3.1: Modified Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy [50]. 
 
Figure 3.1 describes the modified taxonomy developed by Howard, et al. [50]. 
Through modification of the computer and network incident taxonomy, the steps needed 
to successful complete an attack can be analyzed, starting from the tool employed by the 
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insider to the objective. This analysis will assist in determining indicators that can be 
observed through VMI. 
3.2.3 VMI Observable Analysis 
In the four-step research approach, the third step is identification of possible 
introspection observables. Each action in the scenario, as identified in the taxonomy, is 
individually analyzed and an identifier is recorded which facilitates successful 
observation. These identifiers consist of registry entries, hexadecimal patterns, or 
clipboard information. To identify observables, each action is performed within a 
Windows 7 virtual machine running procmon.exe to identify any possible changes in 
running processes or registry entries. If no observables are identified for an action using 
this method, a memory capture with an action is examined using a hex editor. Memory 
captures are examined for any unique hexadecimal patterns which would allow 
observation of an action. It is possible that a scenario may only have few or no 
observables through VMI and as a result, Windows event logs are employed to assist 
with identification of observables. 
3.2.4 Malicious Insider Detection 
The fourth step utilizes information obtained from the previous three steps to 
generate an alerting method for each scenario. Since the research focuses on VMI, 
observables identified in Section 3.2.3 are used for alerting methods, in combination with 
Windows event logs. Observables available within the guest that could improve detection 
accuracy are not used for insider alerting. Several scripts are developed to assist with the 
extraction of VMI observables from full memory captures. These scripts also compare 
changes between observables between different memory captures and generate an alert if 
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a change occurs, signaling potentially malicious behavior. Alerts highlight the changed 
items in different colors, based on the change from a previous memory capture. Green 
indicates a new entry, yellow indicates a change, and red indicates the entry no longer 
exists. After extracting the data from the full memory captures, the output is analyzed for 
each specific step in the scenario to determine if a single step can be declared malicious. 
For the purposes of this research, each malicious scenario has the actions performed in 
the order specified, thereby causing alerts to be generated in a specific order. Successful 
detection of a scenario requires alerts to be generated in the same order each action is 
performed, as listed previously in the assumptions section. Additionally, an entire 
scenario needs to occur between a single memory capture allowing each observable to 
generate an alert within the time span of one memory capture. 
3.2.5 Data Validation 
After developing detection techniques for each step in a scenario, the detection 
technique is compared against manually performed non-malicious scenarios and data 
collected from the Advanced Cyber Education (ACE) Hackfest. This allows the 
developed alerting mechanisms to be evaluated for accuracy in identifying only insider 
threats. Specific information regarding the non-malicious scenarios and ACE Hackfest 
can be found in sections 3.3.1.5 and 3.3.2, respectively. Analysis of generated alerts is 
expected to show several of the same observables identified in sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 
are present, but do not indicate malicious activity. 
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3.3 Data Collection 
For this research, two networks were used to capture data. The first data 
collection network is created specifically for this experiment to perform malicious insider 
scenarios. The second network used for data collection is one created during the ACE 
Hackfest. The experimental network also contained several non-malicious users which 
allows for collection of non-malicious data.  
3.3.1 Malicious Insider Network Setup 
For the insider threat experiment and data collection, the network is similar to the 
one used for the ACE Hackfest is constructed. CentOS 5.5 is used for the Dom0 OS and 
runs a Xen Linux kernel, 2.6.18-194.el5xen. The experiment uses two servers and five 
workstation VMs and are running on two Dom0 systems. The first host machine is a Dell 
Precision 690 desktop with 4GB of RAM, a 70 GB hard drive, and a dual-core Intel Xeon 
5160 CPU running at 3.00 GHz. This machine runs two Windows 7 workstation VMs. 
The second physical machine is a Dell Precision M4500 laptop with 8GB of ram, a 
450GB hard drive, and a quad-core Intel Core i7 M640 CPU running at 2.80 GHz. This 
machine runs three Windows 7 workstation VMs, and two Windows Server 2003 server 
VMs. These two machines are connected to a Linksys SD205 100 Megabits per second 
(Mbps) switch. This switch is connected to another network to obtain internet access for 
installing dependencies on the Dom0 machines and allow internet browsing on the 
workstation VMs. Figure 3.2 illustrates the logical configuration of the insider threat 
experiment network.  
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Figure 3.2: Logical Malicious Insider Network Design. 
 
3.3.1.1 Servers 
Server VMs consist of Windows Server 2003 with Service Pack 2 without 
additional security patches. The virtual hardware for the server VMs consists of 512 MB 
of ram, 10 GB of hard drive space, one virtual CPU, and are fully virtualized. One server 
runs Active Directory (AD) and a Domain Name System (DNS) server, and the second 
server runs the Microsoft Exchange mail server and a network file server. These services 
are found on many enterprise and government networks.  
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3.3.1.2 Workstations 
Workstation VMs run Windows 7 without any security patches. Windows 7 is 
selected as the operating system for the workstations for two reasons; first, the Air 
Force’s Standard Desktop Configuration will now use Windows 7 [68], demonstrating 
the relevance to the current Air Force mission. The second reason is Windows 7 provides 
consistency with the data captured during the ACE Hackfest. The virtual hardware for the 
workstations consists of 1024 MB of ram, 15 GB of hard drive space, one virtual CPU, 
and are fully virtualized. All Windows 7 workstations have Office 2007 Enterprise 
installed and are connected to a Windows domain running on one of the servers. 
Windows binaries often change when service packs or security patches are installed. Not 
installing any additional security patches ensures Windows data structures remain the 
same between both the ACE Hackfest and malicious insider data sets.  
3.3.1.3 Windows Configuration 
Changes are performed to the baseline Windows installation to enable features 
found in enterprise networks, and to allow additional attack methods for a malicious 
insider. All workstations and servers are configured to allow incoming Remote Desktop 
Connection (RDC). All workstations are connected to a networked printer. All 
workstations are configured to share their user’s personal folder. For example, if a user is 
named mcrawford, the folder C:\Users\mcrawford is shared. Lastly, all users in the 
experiment are granted permission to all folders on the network file server. 
3.3.1.4 CMAT-V Configuration 
CMAT-V configuration is slightly modified for the malicious insider experiment. 
Instead of performing full memory captures every thirty minutes, delay between full 
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captures is reduced to ten minutes. Increasing the frequency between full captures 
enables collection of more data and less change can occur on the DomU systems with a 
shorter window. As a result, the malicious insider activity can be signed faster. 
CMAT-V was also modified to accept an argument to create only full memory 
captures and only feature files. This enables two separate CMAT-V processes to be run 
against a single guest. Additionally, writing information to the feature files is no longer 
suspended during the full memory dump because there are two separate processes. 
CMAT-V is run in live introspection mode against all DomU machines and two instances 
of CMAT-V, one for feature files and the other for full memory captures, are run against 
each guest. The command to generate the full memory captures every ten minutes is 
listed below.  
cmat -data <output_path> -memdump -feature <file_prefix>  
-virt_live <VM_ID>  
 
The six feature files are generated with a slightly modified set of command line 
arguments. The command used to generate feature files is listed below. 
cmat –data <output_path> -feature <file_prefix> -virt_live 
<VM_ID>   
 
3.3.1.5 Non-Malicious Data 
In addition to malicious insider scenarios, normal user behavior is performed 
within the malicious insider network. To generate non-malicious data, a script created by 
[67] is used. Some of the malicious insider scenarios performed by [67] are modified or 
omitted to maintain the research focus. In addition to this script, non-malicious scenarios 
are derived from the malicious insider scenarios. The purpose of performing actions 
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similar to malicious insider actions is to ensure only the insider threat actions are alerted 
on, and not normal user actions. The full script is presented in Appendices D and E. 
3.3.2 Advanced Cyber Education 
Advanced Cyber Education (ACE) is an eight week course at Wright-Patterson 
Air Force Base (WPAFB) held during the summer and is open to Air Force, Army, and 
Navy ROTC cadets. Participants are currently juniors and seniors and specializing in 
Computer Engineering, Computer Science, or Electrical Engineering. Subject matter 
during the course includes information warfare, computer network operations (CNO), 
digital forensics, reverse software engineering, and cryptography. The course is 
conducted at the Center for Cyberspace Research (CCR). The culmination of the course 
is a two day exercise focusing on CNO, where two teams attack and defend, while also 
performing typical user behavior, such as editing Word documents or sending email [55-
56].  
For this research, data from the ACE exercise is only used as an additional data 
set. Unfortunately, many actions simulated in the normal user data set are not present 
during the ACE Hackfest, such as USB activity, printing, or extensive file access. 
Actions that are performed are not well documented and assumptions used for this 
research, such as pre-identification of sensitive files, are not present for ACE data. 
For the ACE Hackfest exercise, CentOS v5.5 was used for the Dom0 operating 
system running the Xen kernel. CMAT-V was configured to perform full memory 
captures of DomU virtual machines every thirty minutes and generating feature files 
every thirty seconds. DomU VMs consisted of two different types of machines. Servers 
for the exercise were running Windows Server 2003 with Service Pack 2, without any 
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additional security patches. These VMs were allocated 512 MB of ram. Workstations ran 
Windows 7 without any security patches and were allocated 1024 MB of ram. Security 
patches were not installed to improve the success of the attacks against the workstations 
and servers because only open-source tools were leveraged during the exercise. 
Documentation regarding additional software that may have been installed or used was 
not recorded. Additional machines on the network were attacker machines running 
BackTrack 5, a Linux distribution with many Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) 
tools. Attacker machines did not have CMAT-V running and are not included in the 
malicious insider test network.  
3.4 Experimental Limitations 
After initial research and reverse code engineering of the Windows printer, user-
level and kernel level clipboards, it was discovered that CMAT-V cannot capture the 
information before the pointers are dereferenced. Additionally, several hindrances with 
Xen were encountered after the initial setup of the malicious insider network. This 
section describes the limitations encountered with Xen and CMAT-V, and the 
workarounds implemented to maintain a realistic corporate network. Information 
obtained from reverse code engineering the aforementioned Windows components can be 
found in Chapter 5. 
3.4.1 Xen USB Support 
VMMs allow configuration of virtual hardware to be presented to the guest as 
physical hardware. Examples of virtual hardware presented to the guest include network 
adapter, hard drive, processor, memory, sound cards, CD or DVD drives, and USB 
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devices. The version of Xen compatible with CMAT-V has very limited support for USB 
device passthrough to the guest and no support for passing through CD or DVD writing 
capabilities. The officially documented method for USB 1.1 passthrough to a fully-
virtualized guest is using QEMU-dm [63]. QEMU is a machine emulator and virtualizer. 
In machine emulation, QEMU can run software designed for one type of machine on a 
different type. The virtualizer mode of QEMU allows execution of guest code directly on 
the Dom0 CPU [61]. The advantage QEMU-dm passthrough provides is it does not 
require additional drivers to be installed in the host or guest. Unfortunately, this method 
as documented by [62] [63] [64] only successfully passes a few devices to the guest. 
During setup of the experiment, only a USB printer was able to be successfully passed to 
the guest. Several external storage mediums including a flash drive, three external hard 
drives, an MP3 player, and an Android phone could not be passed to the guest. Although 
the printer appeared to be successfully passed to the guest, the device was not fully 
supported by Windows and when print jobs were sent to the printer, the Windows guest 
immediately displayed an error message. 
3.4.2 USB Workaround 
In order to generate realistic exfiltration scenarios, a solution to the limited USB 
interface support in Xen is needed. USBIP is a tool that was mentioned on the Xen Wiki 
page [63], so this was examined as a possible solution. Unfortunately, the server portion 
of the program required a Linux host and required somewhat extensive configuration. 
After testing several more programs, USB over Network [65] was determined to provide 
the necessary functionality with minimal setup. The disadvantage is the free version only 
allows one USB device to be connected by the client. USB over Network installs a driver 
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on the client and server machine to allow USB imitation. USB commands are 
encapsulated and transmitted over IP between the server and guest instances of USB over 
Network. During testing, external drives were presented to the guest as a local drive and a 
USB printer was able to receive and print documents. 
3.4.3 Xen Optical Disc Support 
Similar to USB support, Xen allows the passthrough of physical CD-ROMs to the 
guest, as well as passing an International Organization for Standardization (ISO) image to 
the guest. The guest is only given read permission to the aforementioned optical storage 
mediums and attempting to provide write support to the guest for these devices is not 
officially documented and has very little community discussion [66]. Several attempts 
were made to present the guest OS with a writeable optical disc, but the Windows guest 
always mounted a read-only optical disc. 
3.4.4 Optical Disc Workaround 
To allow a greater number of exfiltration scenarios, a solution to the lack of 
writeable optical discs is necessary. Researching this problem revealed many ISO 
generating tools, but few that support a virtual CD/DVD-RW. KernSafe’s TotalMounter 
was chosen because it allows for discs to be created using the native Windows 7 
CD/DVD-RW functionality [67]. Using the existing Windows 7 disc writing 
functionality is the most realistic scenario for exfiltrating data using a CD or DVD. 
Organizations are not likely to have additional tools installed for writing to CDs. For the 
purpose of the experiment, TotalMounter is used to mount an image file to CD/DVD-RW 
and then files are written to it using the Windows 7 burning functionality.  
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3.4.5 CMAT-V Limitations 
The final limiting factor in this research is the current capability of CMAT-V. 
Extensive research was performed to obtain the user-level clipboard source and 
destination file path, as well as the kernel clipboard, move, and delete operations. 
However, CMAT-V currently does not perform captures frequently enough to obtain this 
information. This data is transient and can only be directly access while a specific 
function is executing on the processor. After execution finishes, it remains in memory, 
but can only be accessed through string searches. String searches for recovering clipboard 
contents are useful in forensic analysis only when it is known what is on the clipboard. In 
reality, it is impossible to perform string searches to determine what is on the clipboard. 
For this experiment, each clipboard operation is documented so string searches can be 
performed to simulate the ability to capture clipboard file operations. 
In addition to the clipboard, extensive reverse engineering and kernel level 
debugging was performed to obtain information regarding print jobs. A similar limitation 
is faced regarding print jobs. The data remains in memory after the print job finishes, but 
it can only be accessed by kernel symbols while the function is being executed. Through 
analysis of several memory dumps, the following hex pattern was identified as being able 
to identify print jobs in memory captures. 
4E005400 20004500 4D004600 20003100 2E003000 300038 
Unfortunately, this hex pattern can appear approximately ten times even if only 
one actual print job is present, which requires additional analysis by a security analyst. It 
could not be determined why additional instances of this pattern occur in memory. 
Further examination revealed the following string to eliminate the false positives. 
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4E005400 20004500 4D004600 20003100 2E003000 30003800 00004D 
However, this limits the captured print jobs to only Microsoft Office products; 
print jobs from programs not starting with the term Microsoft, such as Notepad, would be 
missed. 
3.5 Methodology Summary 
This chapter described the expected goals of the research and the methodology 
developed to perform and evaluate the research. The taxonomy to decompose each use 
case into a scenario was presented, along with the generation of observables, malicious 
insider detection and data validation. The third section discusses the experiment setup for 
the ACE Hackfest and the malicious insider networks. The last section discusses 
experiment limitations encountered in Xen and CMAT-V.  
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IV. Use Case Exposition 
A malicious insider exists as an entity that is trusted by an organization and 
functions behind a majority of network defensive technologies. Their trusted position 
enables them to cause significant damage to an organization. Therefore, an improved 
mitigation technique which is transparent to potential insiders would greatly improve 
insider threat alerting capabilities. 
This chapter discusses part of how the methodology created in Chapter 3 is 
implemented. The chapter is broken down by six use cases (UC) and presents the 
corresponding scenarios (S). Each scenario is broken down based on the malicious 
insider taxonomy, and a set of possible observables through virtual machine introspection 
(VMI) is generated. A summary of the VMI observables identified in this section is listed 
in Table 4.1. The structure for each section in this chapter consists of use case number, 
followed by the scenario number, and lastly the step number.  
Table 4.1: VMI Observables Summary 
Scenario Description VMI Observable 
UC1.S1 Current Printers 
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Environments\
Windows NT x86\Drivers\Version-3 
UC1.S1 Network Printers 
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Monitors\Stan
dard TCP/IP Port\Ports 
UC1.S1 Current Printers 
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Hardware 
Profiles\0001\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Prin
ters 
UC1.S1 
UC6.S1 
UC6.S2 
Addresses typed 
in Windows 
Explorer 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explor
er\TypedPaths 
UC1.S1 
UC1.S3 
UC4.S1 
Recently mapped 
network drives 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explor
er\Map Network Drive MRU 
UC1.S1 
UC1.S2 
UC4.S1 
UC6.S1 
UC6.S2 
Recently accessed 
Word documents 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\12.0\Word\File MRU 
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Scenario Description VMI Observable 
UC1.S2 
UC6.S1 
Queries sent to 
Windows search 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explor
er\WordWheelQuery 
UC1.S3 
UC5.S1 
Current user 
session info (W 7) 
HKCU\Volatile Environment\1 
UC5.S1 
Current user 
session info 
(2003/XP) 
HKCU\Volatile Environment 
UC1.S3 
Recent documents 
and shortcuts 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explor
er\RecentDocs 
UC2.S1 
Microsoft Security 
Essentials 
Monitoring 
HKLM \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Microsoft Antimalware\Real-
Time Protection\DisableRealtimeMonitoring 
UC3.S1 
UC4.S5 
USB Device 
Information 
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\{53f5
6307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b} 
UC3.S1 
UC4.S5 
USB Device 
Information 
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\{53f5
630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b} 
UC3.S1 
Mounted 
removable devices 
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Storage\Volume\ 
UC3.S2 
UC4.S2 
Mounted network 
shares 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explor
er\MountPoints2 
UC3.S2 
CD Burning 
Information 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explor
er\CD Burning 
UC3.S2 
CD Burning 
Information 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explor
er\Shell Folders\CD Burning 
UC4.S2 
Typed URLs in 
Internet Explorer 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\TypedURLs 
UC4.S2 
Mounted devices 
driver letter 
HKLM\SYSTEM\MountedDevices 
UC5.S1 
RDP Information 
(Windows 7) 
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\{28d7
8fad-5a12-11d1-ae5b-
0000f803a8c2}\##?#Root#RDPBUS#0000# {28d78fad-5a12-
11d1-ae5b-0000f803a8c2}\#TS001 
UC5.S2 
RDP Information 
(W2003/XP) 
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\{28d7
8fad-5a12-11d1-ae5b-
0000f803a8c2}\##?#Root#RDPDR#0000# {28d78fad-5a12-
11d1-ae5b-0000f803a8c2}\#TS001 
UC2.S3 
InPrivate 
Browsing 
49006E007400650072006E00650074002000450078007000
6C006F0072006500720020002D0020005B0049006E005000
7200690076006100740065005D 
UC1.S2 Print Jobs 
4E005400200045004D004600200031002E00300030003800
0000 
UC2.S3 
UC4.S2 
File Downloads 
003A005A006F006E0065002E004900640065006E00740069
006600690065007200 
UC2.S3 
UC6.S2 
UC6.S3 
Browsing History 68007400740070003A002F002F00 
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Scenario Description VMI Observable 
UC2.S3 
UC6.S2 
UC6.S3 
Browsing History 0063006F006D005B0031005D002E00680074006D 
UC6.S3 Email Contents 
3C68746D6C20786D6C6E733A763D2275726E3A736368656
D61732D6D6963726F736F66742D636F6D3A766D6C222078
6D6C6E733A6F3D2275726E3A736368656D61732D6D69637
26F736F66742D636F6D3A6F66666963653A6F6666696365
22 
4.1 UC1: Printing Activity 
Printer use is a legitimate activity performed by a majority of computer users on a 
daily basis. However, a printer can be employed as a technique to exfiltrate sensitive or 
classified information by a malicious insider. In an environment without strict monitoring 
of employee’s possessions when exiting the premises, a malicious insider could easily 
walk out with sensitive information. As discussed previously in Chapter 2 and by [68], 
disgruntled employees may use a printer as their method for stealing corporate data.  
4.1.1 UC1.S1: Local Printer 
This scenario examines a malicious insider who connects a new printer to their 
workstation. The first advantage presented to the insider by this technique is bypassing 
any network monitoring tools. Network printers are connected to workstations via 
Ethernet, which allows administrators to easily capture all or specific traffic items, such 
as print jobs. Another advantage the insider obtains though this method is bypassing 
monitoring methods on the printer itself. Tools such as [69] are often deployed within 
networks to monitor printer utilization and record job information. By directly connecting 
the printer to their workstation, the malicious insider is able to bypass both of these 
security features. 
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4.1.1.1 UC1.S1.Step1: Taxonomy Development 
To more accurately identify observables in subsequent sections, the attack method 
is decomposed using the malicious insider taxonomy. This enables rapid identification of 
the actions performed by the insider and subsequently improved identification of VMI 
observables. 
 Tools: For this scenario, the attacker uses several tools. The first tool is the 
Windows 7 OS. Servers are typically separated from printers through the use of 
virtual local area network (VLAN) and are physically secured in a locked room 
with locked server racks, so Windows Server OS is not analyzed for this scenario. 
The second tool the attacker uses is the printer itself. The printer is directly 
connected to the workstation by the malicious insider. 
 Vulnerability: Several vulnerabilities can exist which would result in successful 
execution by the insider threat. One such vulnerability would be a lack of 
monitoring of USB ports on a user’s workstation. This vulnerability allows 
malicious insiders to freely connect USB devices without an administrator’s 
knowledge. Another possible vulnerability is relaxed policies regarding printer 
usage. IT staff may be willing to let users connect personal printers to their 
workstations without actual valid business reasons. For this scenario, the 
malicious insider will be exploiting both mentioned vulnerabilities. 
 Action: The malicious insider performs the following steps in order for this 
scenario. First, the insider maps a network drive 
MS01\Organization\Project\Firewall to the Z drive locally. Next, the Xen USB 
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workaround program, USB-over-network, is opened. After opening the program, 
HP LaserJet 4350 is connected to the workstation. The Windows drivers 
automatically install and when installation is finished, the insider opens and prints 
Firewall Project Proposal from the previously mapped Z drive. 
 Target: A malicious insider would likely target anything of potential financial 
value or anything that may be damaging to the organization if it were released to 
the public and/or an adversary. In this scenario, the malicious insider prints a 
Word document, FirewallProjectProposal.docx. 
 Unauthorized Result: As a result of the malicious insider’s actions, the user is 
now able to print documents at their own workstation without being detected by 
existing safeguards designed to prevent data exfiltration. Any documents printed 
can now be distributed without knowledge of the organization. 
 Objective: The objective for this scenario is financial gain. The malicious insider 
has chosen to print FirewallProjectProposal.docx to reveal specifications about 
an upcoming project to an adversary. 
4.1.1.2 UC1.S1.Step 2: VMI Observables 
Identification of observables is critical for developing an alerting mechanism. The 
first observable, opening the USB-Over-Network program creates a new process on the 
system. This observable was omitted from alerting methods as the software is running 
only to emulate USB functionality for the Xen guest. This observable would not exist on 
separate hypervisors and may not exist on newer versions of Xen.  
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Several possible registry entries are identified for the action of connecting the 
printer to the workstation. The first is registry entry is 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Environments\Wind
ows NT x86\Drivers\Version-3. This registry entry maintains a list of print drivers 
currently loaded on the system. 
In addition to the Version-3 registry entry, the entry of 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Monitors\Standard 
TCP/IP Port\Ports is monitored for changes. Since the printer was not connected via 
network, no additional entries were created, however if the malicious insider were to 
connect to a different network printer instead of using a local printer, it would be shown 
in this entry. In addition to the Ports registry entry, 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Hardware 
Profiles\0001\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Printers is also 
monitored. In initial testing before the experiment, this appeared to have similar 
information as the Version-3 entry, but no changes are observed either before or 
immediately after performing this scenario. 
The first registry entry evaluated is 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Ty
pedPaths. This registry entry retains the twenty five most recent addresses typed into the 
Windows Explorer address bar. Monitoring this registry entry can assist organizations to 
ensure employees are staying within their work scope. During execution of this scenario, 
the value of this entry did not change; the malicious insider did not directly type the 
address into the Windows Explorer window. 
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In addition to the TypedPaths registry entry, HKEY_CURRENT_USER\ 
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Map Network Drive 
MRU registry entry maintains information about the most recently mapped network drives 
by the current user, in this case, the malicious insider.  
The third action performed by the insider is opening the document 
FirewallProjectProposal.docx. By itself, this is not a malicious action and opening 
documents is an action performed by users of a computer multiple times per day. 
Additionally, the malicious insider’s job description is software engineer and one of the 
projects he is working on is development of firewall software. The registry key 
HKEY_CURRENT_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Office\12.0\Word\File MRU maintains 
a list of the fifty most recently used (MRU) Microsoft Word documents; when a new file 
is opened, that file becomes Item 1 in the list, and all other entries in the list have their 
item number increased by one.  
The final action is observed through scanning full memory captures for a 
hexadecimal string. The pattern 4E005400 20004500 4D004600 20003100 2E003000 
30003800 00004D successfully captures all Microsoft Office print jobs, but will not 
capture print jobs from non-office products such as Notepad. Therefore, a less precise 
pattern of 4E005400 20004500 4D004600 20003100 2E003000 30003800 0000 is 
used to scan memory captures for print jobs. This pattern generates several false 
positives, but will capture print jobs from any type of program. 
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Table 4.2: UC1.S1 VMI Observables. 
 Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Open USB-Over-Network Running Process* 
2 Connect Printer (HP LaserJet 4350dtn) to Workstation Registry Entry 
3 
Map local drive Z to 
\\10.1.0.205\Organization\Projects\Firewall 
Registry Entry 
4 Open FirewallProjectProposal.docx Registry Entry 
5 Print Document to Local Printer Memory Artifact 
* Denotes this observable would not exist on a normal workstation and is therefore ignored. 
4.1.2 UC1.S2: Work Scope Breach 
This scenario examines a malicious insider who attempts to exfiltrate data not 
related to their position within an organization by searching for keywords.  Motivation 
for this scenario is to determine if a work scope breach and printing the resulting 
document can be detected. This scenario uses the local printer discussed previously; for 
organizations that do not allow local printers, this scenario will have a similar taxonomy 
and observables for network based printers. 
4.1.2.1 UC1.S2.Step 1: Taxonomy Development 
The malicious insider threat taxonomy is again used to decompose this attack 
scenario to assist in identification of observables.   
 Tools: For this scenario, the attacker uses several tools. The first tool is the 
Windows 7 OS. As mentioned in the previous scenario, printing from a server 
is impractical for a malicious insider and would also be very suspicious if an 
individual carried a printer into the server room. Another tool employed the 
malicious insider in this scenario is the previously mentioned local printer.   
 Vulnerability: For the malicious insider to achieve the desired objective, they 
exploit a configuration vulnerability in the organization. This vulnerability is 
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lack of access control between different departments of the organization. This 
misconfiguration allows individuals to view all files on the organization’s 
network drive. 
Actions: The malicious insider performs the following actions in the listed 
order to accomplish the malevolent objective. First, the insider opens 
Windows Explorer. Next, the insider types the address \\10.1.0.205 into the 
address bar. After connecting to the network drive, the insider uses Windows 
search functionality to search for “Classified”. When the results of the query 
are displayed, the insider opens AirForceBriefing.docx. The attacker 
completes the scenario by printing the document to the USB printer. 
 Target: Unlike the previous printing scenario, this scenario presents an 
instance where a malicious insider knows several of the projects occurring at 
the organization, but is not familiar with the details of the projects in other 
departments. The malicious insider will target classified information in other 
departments of the organization. 
 Unauthorized Result: As a result of the insider’s actions, the insider is able to 
access classified information which he is not authorized to access.   
 Objective: The objective by the malicious insider in this scenario is either 
financial gain by selling the targeted information to a competitor or damaging 
the organization by publicly releasing the information. 
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4.1.2.2 UC1.S2.Step 2: VMI Observables 
The insider’s first action, opening Windows Explorer does not generate any 
observables. Explorer.exe process is always running on a Windows system and opening a 
new instance of Windows Explorer does not cause another explorer.exe process to be 
spawned. 
Identification of navigating to a network drive is performed using the TypedPaths 
registry entry. As previously mentioned, this registry entry maintains a list of addresses 
typed into Windows Explorer taskbar. 
The insider’s next action is to search the network drive for “Classified”. To 
facilitate detection of this action in the scenario, the registry key of 
HKEY_CURRENT_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\W
ordWheelQuery is analyzed. Through analysis, it is determined that this registry entry 
stores the one hundred MRU Windows explorer search terms. When a new query is 
performed by the user, the each item in the list increases in number by one and the last 
item is removed from the MRU list. 
The fourth action performed by the insider is to open AirForceBriefing.docx, the 
unauthorized document. After initially performing this scenario and a subsequent 
scenario, it was discovered that Compiled Memory Analysis Tool – Virtual (CMAT-V) 
had crashed sometime during this scenario. As a result, the unauthorized document access 
appears in both screenshots, but detection of this step can still be declared successful. 
Analysis of the output revealed the previously mentioned registry key of 
HKEY_CURRENT_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Office\12.0\Word\File MRU would 
provide the necessary information for detection of this step.  
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The final action, printing the document, is detected via raw memory scanning of 
the previously identified hexadecimal pattern. 
Table 4.3:UC1.S2 VMI Observables. 
 Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Open Windows Explorer window None identified 
2 
Navigate to network drive by typing address in explorer 
window (\\10.1.0.205) 
Registry Entry 
3 Search network drive Registry Entry 
4 Open AirForceBriefing.docx Registry Entry 
5 Print Document to Local Printer Hexadecimal pattern 
 
4.1.3 UC1.S3: Suspicious Print Time 
The final printing scenario examined involves a malicious insider printing an 
unusually quantity of documents outside of normal work hours. Recall from Chapter 2 
that malicious insiders perform malicious actions outside of normal workplace hours to 
avoid detection by coworkers. Of the presented printing scenarios, this is likely the most 
damaging to an organization as the user has almost zero risk of being caught by a 
coworker if they are the only one in the office. Additionally, the insider has ample time to 
determine which documents are the most valuable and formulate a plan to avoid detection 
by any physical security at the building’s entrance.  
4.1.3.1 UC1.S3.Step 1: Taxonomy Development 
 Tools: For this scenario, the attacker uses several tools. The first tool is the 
Windows 7 OS. Another tool employed the malicious insider in this scenario 
is the previously mentioned local printer.  
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 Vulnerability: For this scenario, the malicious insider is again exploiting the 
improper security configuration on the network drive. As described 
previously, the network drive is incorrectly configured to allow all users 
access to all files on the drive. 
 Actions: To successfully execute the attack, the malicious insider performs the 
following steps in order. First, the insider accesses the workstation at a time 
outside of normal business hours for the organization. For this scenario, the 
access time is 00:02. Next, the insider maps a network drive to the 
organizations network file server. The folder \\MS01\Organization\ is mapped 
to the one of the insider’s local drives. After mapping the network drive, the 
insider copies the five targeted files, Logger.cpp, PacketInspection.cpp, 
AutoUpdate.cpp, VM Configuration.xlsx, and Passwords.xlsx to the Desktop. 
The attack concludes with the insider printing the five documents to the local 
printer. 
 Target: This scenario has the insider threat targeting the source code files for 
one of the projects at the organization and several other sensitive documents. 
 Unauthorized Result: After performing the actions, the malicious insider is 
able to perform a disclosure of information to a third party. 
 Objective: Similar to the previous exfiltration via printer scenario, the 
objective by the malicious insider is financial gain by selling the targeted 
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information to a competitor; either a competing company or adversarial 
nation-state. 
4.1.3.2 UC1.S3.Step 2: VMI Observables 
Prior to performing any malicious actions on the workstation, the user must first 
login to the system. Recall from Chapter 3 that all workstations are connected to a 
domain and as a result, all logon/logoff events are recorded both to the local machine and 
to the domain controller. This provides the organization with an advantage in that if the 
malicious insider is able to disable event logs on their own machine, some events are still 
recorded on the domain controller.  
In addition to domain controller event logs, the registry entry 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Volatile Environment\1 contains several subkeys which 
maintain information regarding the current user session. The SESSIONNAME subkey is set 
to Console when a user is currently connected to the system. 
After logging on to the workstation, the malicious insider begins targeting several 
sensitive documents. To expedite this process, the user maps a drive to 
\\ms01\Organization, the hostname for the organization’s network drive. Analysis of 
previous scenarios indicates 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Ma
p Network Drive MRU is the registry key needed to detect this action. The malicious 
insider then copies five targeted files to the local desktop. This action is observed using 
brute force string search of the full memory captures. 
The insider completes the attack by printing the five targeted documents to the 
local printer. Observation of this step is performed by searching full memory captures for 
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an aforementioned hexadecimal string. Additional observation is performed using the 
RecentDocs registry entry. Analysis revealed the registry entry 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Re
centDocs maintains a list of the one hundred and fifty most recently accessed files by 
the user. Additionally, this folder also contains subkeys for each file extension the user 
has ever opened on the system. These subkeys also contain a MRU list and an 
MRUListEx value to indicate which items were accessed the most to least recently.  
Table 4.4: UC1.S3 VMI Observables. 
Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Login to workstation Registry Entry 
2 Map network drive Registry Entry 
3 Copy files Clipboard 
4 Open Document Registry Entry 
5 Print Documents Hexadecimal pattern 
4.2 UC2: Disable Defense Tools 
This use case focuses on a malicious insider who has a technical background. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, some malicious insiders are technically proficient and may 
attempt to subvert known monitoring technologies. The motivation for this use case 
comes from the potential ability of a malicious insider to disable monitoring that is 
occurring on their workstation. The use of CMAT-V allows monitoring from a higher 
privilege level than the user and cannot be directly attacked or disabled unless the 
malicious insider is able to break out of the virtual machine, an undertaking that is 
extremely difficult. 
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4.2.1 UC1.S1: Disable Antivirus 
For almost every organization, antivirus is the primary defensive tool employed 
on workstations against malware that is spread via email, browser exploits, or network 
exploitation. Newer HBSS may also employ user-level monitoring for insider threat 
actions. Depending on the specific product an organization uses to defend their 
workstations, this scenario may need to be modified to capture different observables.  
4.2.1.1 Assumptions 
Disabling certain antivirus or HBSS programs may require administrative 
privileges. This may help to reduce the number of individuals within an organization who 
are capable of disabling the protection on the workstation, but a determined individual 
could obtain this ability through several means, such as: collaboration with an external 
agent, social engineering of a coworker, or the user is already an administrator. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this research, it is assumed that the malicious insider has 
somehow obtained the required privilege to disable the antivirus. 
4.2.1.2 UC2.S1.Step 1: Taxonomy Development 
 Tools: For this scenario, the attacker a single tool, user commands. As stated 
in the assumptions, it is already assumed that the malicious insider has enough 
privilege to perform their actions. 
 Vulnerability: The malicious insider is exploiting a design vulnerability within 
the antivirus product. Specifically, the antivirus has the ability to be disabled, 
which enables users to freely execute malicious programs on the system. This 
feature of an antivirus may be beneficial for a testing environment or personal 
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computer where suspicious programs are intentionally executed by the user, 
but in a corporate network under constant attack by external attackers, users 
should be prevented from disabling the antivirus. 
 Actions: The insider performs the listed actions in order to accomplish the 
malicious objective against the target. First, the insider opens Microsoft 
Security Essentials. Next, the insider clicks the settings tab and selects “Real-
time protection”. The “Turn on real-time protection (recommended)” 
checkbox is unchecked and the insider clicks save changes. 
 Target: A malicious insider is targeting the antivirus program in this scenario. 
Changing the properties of this process results in disabling this component of 
the workstation’s defenses. 
 Unauthorized Result: Upon disabling the antivirus, the malicious insider can 
perform a variety of tasks. Without any software to prevent malicious 
programs from executing, an attacker could cause a denial of service, corrupt 
or destroy valuable information, use their workstation to launch additional 
attacks against the network, or steal information that was protected by the 
HBSS. 
 Objective: The objective of the attacker in this scenario is to mitigate any 
defensive technologies implemented by the organization to protect their 
workstation. After defeating the defensive tools, an attacker’s objective may 
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be to steal documents for financial gain, hold certain data for ransom, or 
simply cause damage out of revenge. 
4.2.1.3 UC2.S1.Step 2: VMI Observables 
The first action performed by the malicious insider to disable the antivirus 
program is to open the program in order to access the settings. This step in the process 
did not provide any observables through VMI. Registry entries are typically not modified 
to indicate a program is open or closed, so instead the running processes on the system 
are examined. The process, MsMpEng.exe, provides the back-end functionality for the 
antivirus program. The graphical user interface (GUI) has a separate process, 
msseces.exe, but this process runs regardless of if the GUI is open or closed. 
Furthermore, changing to a different tab within the user interface did not create any 
possible observables. 
This scenario only provides one possible observable for all actions, but arguably it 
is for the most importation action, disabling the antivirus. The registry entry 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Microsoft Antimalware\Real-Time 
Protection\DisableRealtimeMonitoring does not exist until the antivirus is disabled 
for the first time. Upon being disabled by the malicious insider, the entry is created and 
the value is set to one.  
Table 4.5: UC2.S1 VMI Observables 
Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Open Antivirus None Identified 
2 Navigate to Settings component of Antivirus Non Identified 
3 Disable Antivirus Registry Entry 
4 Open Document Registry Entry 
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4.2.2 UC2.S2: Clear Windows Event Log 
The Windows event logs are a valuable tool to administrators and security 
analysts to monitor activity on a system, such as installing software and account 
logons/logoffs.  
4.2.2.1 Assumptions 
Clearing Windows event logs requires administrative privileges. A technically 
proficient malicious insider could obtain administrator privileges through various 
techniques, such as: collaboration with an external agent, social engineering of a 
coworker, or the user is already an administrator. For this scenario, it is assumed that the 
malicious insider already has the necessary permission to clear the event logs. Another 
assumption is the event logs cannot be modified. Unlike Linux OS, Windows event logs 
are protected by the operating system and even administrators are unable to modify the 
event log; administrators can only clear all log entries. Linux treats the logs as a text file 
and any user with appropriate permission could remove individual entries from the log.  
4.2.2.2 UC2.S2.Step 1: Taxonomy Development 
 Tools: For this scenario, the attacker a single tool, user commands. As stated 
in the assumptions, it is already assumed that the malicious insider has enough 
privilege to perform their actions. 
 Vulnerability: The malicious insider is exploiting a design vulnerability within 
the antivirus product. Specifically, the antivirus has the ability to be disabled, 
which enables users to freely execute malicious programs on the system. This 
feature of an antivirus may be beneficial for a testing environment or personal 
 
71 
computer where suspicious programs are intentionally executed by the user, 
but in a corporate network under constant attack by external attackers, users 
should be prevented from disabling the antivirus. 
 Actions: To disable event logging on the insider’s workstation, the following 
steps are executed in the order listed. The attack commences with the insider 
opening event viewer from the Start menu. The insider then expands the 
Windows Logs section and right clicks on Security. On the drop down list, the 
insider selects Clear Log. When prompted, the contents of the log are not 
saved. The insider repeats the steps to also clear the System event log. 
 Target: A malicious insider is targeting the Windows event logs. By clearing 
the event logs, the insider is able to perform many tasks on the system and 
hide the evidence of their suspicious actions. 
 Unauthorized Result: The immediate consequence of this scenario is the 
corruption of information; specifically removal of possibly incriminating log 
events on the user’s workstation or server.  
 Objective: The objective of the insider is to remove evidence of malicious 
activities performed on a workstation. 
4.2.2.3 UC2.S2.Step 2: VMI Observables 
The first step performed by the malicious insider is opening the Windows Event 
Viewer. The Windows Event Viewer contains several default event logs for a system 
including Application, Security and System. Events can be one of five possible types: 
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critical, error, warning, information, or audit success. Administrators can apply custom 
filters to identify specific event types or time periods to assist in troubleshooting a 
problem. Analysis of the running processes revealed mmc.exe to be the process that 
handles the Event Viewer GUI. 
No VMI observables are able to be captured for the action of clearing the event 
log. The registry contains information regarding the event logs, but it does not have any 
information detailing when the log is cleared. Additionally, no new processes are created 
during this event. 
Table 4.6: UC2.S2 VMI Observables. 
Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Open Windows Event Viewer None Identified 
2 Clear Event Log Windows Event Log 
 
4.2.3 UC2.S3: Private Browsing 
Private browsing is a feature in most modern browsers, including Internet 
Explorer, Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox. The purpose of this functionality is to 
prevent history and multimedia items from being stored on the local computer. Although 
this does not prevent network level traffic inspection, a malicious insider could use this in 
combination with either HTTP Secure (HTTPS) or Secure Shell (SSH) to bypass network 
level defenses and possibly hinder post-incident forensics. For the purposes of this 
scenario, only Internet Explorer will be evaluated as most organizations do not allow 
users to install additional software on their workstation.  
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4.2.3.1 UC2.S3.Step 1: Taxonomy Development 
 Tools: The malicious insider leverages two tools during this scenario. First, 
the insider uses Internet Explorer and the private browsing mode. Lastly, the 
insider uses built-in user commands. 
 Vulnerability: The insider is exploiting a configuration vulnerability within 
the network. Windows Group Policy is capable of preventing users from 
accessing this feature within Internet Explorer, and private browsing should 
be blocked.  
 Actions: To subvert potential workstation forensics, the insider performs the 
following steps in order. The insider begins by opening Internet Explorer (IE). 
Next, IE is switched to InPrivate browsing mode using Ctrl + Shift + P. The 
insider then navigates to http://www.darkcomet-rat.com. Due to some sort of 
bug, the download does not work and the insider goes to google.com and 
searches for “poison ivy hack”. The insider clicks the first link leading to 
http://www.poisonivy-rat.com. The latest version, Poison Ivy 2.3.2, is 
downloaded by the insider and saved to 
C:\Users\tgreen\Downloads\PI2.3.2.rar.  
 Target: The target of the malicious actions is the user’s own computer. By 
enabling private browsing, the insider is attempting to minimize the forensic 
artifacts resulting from web browsing.  
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 Unauthorized Result: The consequence of the actions by the insider is 
corruption of information. In particular, some of the forensic artifacts typically 
remaining from web browsing are not written to disk while private browsing 
is activated. This limits the ability of a forensic investigator to recover the 
user’s actions.  
 Objective: The malicious insider’s objective is to minimize forensic artifacts 
left from downloading a piece of malware.  
4.2.3.1 UC2.S3.Step 2: VMI Observables    
The first action performed by the insider is opening Internet Explorer. This action 
can easily be observed through monitoring the running processes on the system. 
However, this is a very normal action and performed by a majority of users on a daily 
bases. Attempting to differentiate malicious from non-malicious intention through this 
action would be extremely difficulty. 
The second action the insider performs is switching Internet Explorer to InPrivate 
mode. No registry entries or processes could be identified to be modified as a result of the 
switch to InPrivate mode. Instead, a brute force search through memory is performed for 
the pattern listed below. This pattern is the hex representation of “I.n.t.e.r.n.e.t. 
.E.x.p.l.o.r.e.r. .–. .[.I.n.P.r.i.v.a.t.e.]”, with the periods representing null characters. 
49006E007400650072006E006500740020004500780070006C006F00720065007
20020002D0020005B0049006E0050007200690076006100740065005D 
 The next action performed by the malicious insider is to navigate to several 
remote administration tool (RAT) download sites. Since the insider is using private 
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browsing, no registry entries are recorded for the user directly navigating to these pages. 
Instead several patterns are identified which allow limited detection of browsing history, 
while generating some false positives. The identified patterns are listed below 
68007400740070003A002F002F00 
0063006F006D005B0031005D002E00680074006D 
The last action performed by the malicious insider is downloading the RAT. 
Again, no registry or process observables are identified, so a pattern based brute force 
search is required. The pattern is listed below. 
003A005A006F006E0065002E004900640065006E00740069006600690065007200 
Table 4.7: UC2.S3 VMI Observables. 
Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Open Internet Explorer Running Process 
2 Switch to InPrivate Browsing Hexadecimal Pattern 
3 Visit RAT Websites Hexadecimal Pattern 
4 Download RAT Hexadecimal Pattern 
4.3 UC3: Removable Media 
As discussed in Chapter 2, removable media is another frequently used method 
for stealing sensitive data from an organization. The Department of Defense (DoD) 
currently bans removable flash media, such as USB thumb drives, from all Unclassified 
but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) computers [70]. However, as 
demonstrated by a use case in Chapter 2, malicious insiders will find alternate methods to 
exfiltrate data while still adhering to DoD policy. This use case addresses malicious 
insiders who use DoD approved removable media to steal sensitive information. 
 
76 
4.3.1 UC3.S1: External Hard Drive 
The most obvious alternative to a USB flash media is a USB hard drive. Both 
provide similar functionality and are fairly compact in size; a USB hard drive could 
easily be hidden inside a stack of papers, briefcase, or a shoe to bypass physical security 
inspections. This scenario examines an insider who uses a USB hard drive to steal a 
document contained within the insider’s work scope. 
4.3.1.1 UC3.S1.Step 1: Taxonomy Development 
 Tools: The malicious insider employs several tools in this scenario. First, 
normal user commands are performed to copy the file to an external hard 
drive. The final tool is the external hard drive itself. Due to limitations with 
Xen, a software workaround is used to simulate direct connection of the USB 
drive to the workstation. The program used to facilitate this is discussed in 
Chapter 3, but will not be listed as a tool in this section so this scenario 
remains representative of a real-world attack. 
 Vulnerability: The insider is exploiting a policy vulnerability in this scenario. 
Although removable hard drives are effective for transferring data between 
computers, they introduce a great advantage for a malicious insider. The 
policy should prohibit all removable hard drives, or if they must be used, they 
need to be returned on the same day the drive is loaned out.  
 Actions: To successfully exfiltrate data via a USB hard drive, the insider 
performs the following actions in the sequence listed. The insider first opens 
USB-over-network and connects a Western Digital My Passport external hard 
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drive to the workstation. The drivers for this drive are automatically installed 
by Windows 7. After the drivers are finished installing, the insider copies 
FirewallSource.zip from C:\Users\tgreen\Desktop to the external hard drive. 
The scenario concludes with the insider disconnecting the external hard drive 
from the workstation using USB-over-network. 
 Target: A malicious insider is targeting the any sensitive information that will 
provide financial benefit. In this scenario, the malicious insider is targeting the 
source code to a firewall project. The insider is the developer, so accessing the 
source code is not suspicious. 
 Unauthorized Result: The effect of the malicious actions is disclosure of 
information. The organization’s confidential documents can be released by the 
insider to individuals who are not authorized by the organization to possess 
this information. 
 Objective: As illustrated in Chapter 2, the malicious insider’s objective or 
motivation may not be purely financial; the insider may perceive themselves 
to be a whistle blower on corruption and seek to disseminate information that 
ultimately damages the organization.  
4.3.1.2 UC3.S1.Step 2: VMI Observables 
Ignoring the Xen USB workaround, the first action performed by the malicious 
insider is connecting the external hard drive to the workstation. During initial analysis, 
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several observables are discovered that may  indicate a change in currently connected 
removable media devices.  
Several registry keys are examined for detecting the malicious insider’s first 
action of connecting the external hard drive to the workstation. The first key is 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\{53f56307
-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}. This registry key records all devices connected to 
the system and also enables analysis to determine when the last device was connected to 
the system, based on the last updated timestamp.  
In addition to the aforementioned registry key, the registry key 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\{53f5630d
-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b} maintains a similar list of devices connected to the 
system.  
A small discrepancy was discovered between the Xen workaround for external 
drives and physically connecting them to a workstation; physically connected drives have 
the prefix ##?#STORAGE#VOLUME#_??_USBSTOR#DISK&, whereas the mounted external 
drive only contained the prefix ##?#STORAGE#VOLUME#. Recall from Chapter 3 that the 
Xen workaround causes the external drive to be mounted as a local volume to the guest 
instead of removable media. 
The final registry entry changed as a result of the first action is 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Storage\Volume\. This 
registry entry contains subkeys listing what appears to be a unique identifier for each 
storage device.  
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The second action performed by the insider is to copy the file to the clipboard and 
paste it to the external hard drive. Due to the aforementioned Xen limitations, this 
detection is limited to a brute force search through the full memory capture. The ability to 
detect clipboard file operations is discussed in Chapter 5. 
The final action performed is disconnecting the external USB hard drive from the 
workstation. Detecting this action allows a full timeline of events to be created and 
provide further details for a security analyst to determine if the actions are malicious or 
benign. No observables were detected for this action in the scenario. 
Table 4.8: UC3.S1 VMI Observables. 
Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Connect USB hard drive to workstation Registry Entries 
2 Copy files to clipboard Clipboard 
3 Disconnect USB hard drive None Identified 
 
4.3.2 UC3.S2: Optical Disc 
Another alternative to USB flash media is an optical disc, such as a Compact 
Disc-Recordable (CD-R), Compact Disc-Rewritable (CD-RW), or DVD-Recordable 
(DVD-R). Although these devices are not as easy to hide as an external hard drive and do 
not store as much information, they are still a useful storage medium for a malicious 
insider to exfiltrate data.  
The most obvious alternative to a USB flash media is a USB hard drive. Both 
provide similar functionality and are fairly compact in size; a USB hard drive could 
easily be hidden inside a stack of papers, briefcase, or a shoe to bypass physical security 
inspections. This scenario examines an insider who uses a USB hard drive to steal a 
document contained within the insider’s work scope. 
 
80 
4.3.2.1 UC3.S2.Step 1: Taxonomy Development 
 Tools: Similarly to the external storage scenario, two tools are employed in 
this scenario, excluding the Xen workaround. First, normal user commands 
are issued. The final tool is the external hard drive itself. Due to limitations 
with Xen, a software workaround is used to simulate direct connection of the 
USB drive to the workstation. The program used to facilitate this is discussed 
in Chapter 3, but will not be listed as a tool in this section so this scenario 
remains representative of a real-world attack. 
 Vulnerability: A policy vulnerability is exploited by the malicious insider in 
this scenario. An organization’s files can be extremely sensitive and steps 
need to be taken to ensure users cannot transfer data to any form of optical 
disc or removable media. As previously discussed, optical discs should only 
be allowed in rare circumstances.  
 Actions: The insider’s attack commences by mapping the remote drive 
\\workstation3\Users\lscarlet to X. Subsequently, the insider copies the files 
NewHire.docx, Payroll.xlsx and SocialSecurityNumber.xlsx from the X drive 
to his or her C drive. The insider then opens KernSafe TotalMounter and 
creates a virtual CD-RW. Windows is then presented with a burnable CD and 
a new CDRom drive. The insider opens Windows Explorer and opens the 
newly blank CDRom. The aforementioned files are copied from the C drive to 
the CDRom folder. Next, the insider burns the files to the CD using the 
Windows burn functionality. The attack ends when the burn is complete. 
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 Target: In this scenario, the malicious insider is targeting human resources 
information contained on another user’s workstation. Specifically, the files 
NewHire, Payroll and SocialSecurityNumber are targeted by the insider.  
 Unauthorized Result: The direct result of the insider’s actions is disclosure of 
information. Additionally, the insider has unauthorized access to the user’s 
documents on workstation 3. These documents are confidential and the 
organization does not want them to be disclosed publicly or to a competitor. 
 Objective: The objective in this scenario is to steal the sensitive information 
from the organization.  
4.3.2.2 UC3.S2.Step 2: VMI Observables 
To identify the first action, the aforementioned Map Network Drive MRU registry 
entry is monitored. As previously mentioned, this MRU list maintains a list of the most 
recently mounted network drives or shares. This registry entry enables alert generation 
for mapping a network drive. Additionally, the registry key 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Mo
untPoints2 maintains a list of all mounted volumes, including CDROMs and drives 
connected via net use user command and is used to verify the information obtained from 
the network drive MRU.  
The second action, copying several files from the mounted network drive, is 
observed using the Windows clipboard. Monitoring the clipboard for file copies allows 
security analysts to have detailed knowledge regarding file transfer operations occurring 
on a user’s workstation. 
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Several markers are identified within the Windows registry to enable monitoring 
of CD burning. First, 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\CD 
Burning contains information regarding the drive capable of writing to a CDRom. 
Additional analysis of the burning process revealed several changes which occur to this 
registry entry and allow for observation of this action. The second registry entry used to 
confirm the burning process is occurring is 
HKEY_CURRENT_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\S
hell Folders\CD Burning. Analysis of this registry entry reveals it contains the same 
information as the aforementioned …\Explorer\CD Burning registry entry. No 
observables are identified to verify exactly which files are burned, other than examining 
the clipboard. 
Table 4.9: UC3.S2 VMI Observables. 
Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Map Network Drive Registry Entry 
2 Copy Files Clipboard 
3 Burn CDRom Registry Entries 
4.4 UC4: Employee Behavior 
Sudden changes in employee behavior are frequently a precursor to malicious 
insider attacks against an organization. Recall from Chapter 2 that coworkers often 
observe visible warning signs from the insider before malicious actions are performed 
against the organization. These scenarios attempt to address several suspicious employee 
behaviors which an organization could monitor to assist in mitigating insider attacks. 
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4.4.1 UC4.S1: Unauthorized File Access 
The first employee behavior scenario is unauthorized file access by the malicious 
insider. This scenario is representative of an employee who is able to obtain access to a 
file that is not within their job description. For the purpose of this scenario, it is ignored 
how the access was obtained. Possible methods for access being obtained are through 
privilege escalation or incorrectly configured permissions. 
4.4.1.1 UC4.S1.Step 1: Taxonomy Development 
 Tools: The malicious insider only performs normal user commands to achieve 
the malicious objective.  
 Vulnerability: The exploited vulnerability is a result of a configuration error 
within the organization. Specifically, every folder on the network drive 
containing many sensitive documents can be accessed by any user with a 
domain account. 
 Actions: The attack starts with the insider maps the Y drive to the folder 
\\10.1.0.205\Organization\Mustard\Performance Reviews. The insider then 
navigates to the mapped network drive using Windows Explorer. The insider 
the copies all listed performance reviews, Crawford-2011.docx, Green-
2011.docx, Green-2012.docx, Peacock-2011.docx, Scarlet-2011.docx, and 
White-2011.docx. The insider pastes all of the documents to his or her local 
workstation in the directory C:\Users\tgreen\Desktop. The attack concludes 
with the insider opening White-2011.docx. 
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 Target: The malicious insider is targeting the performance evaluation of a 
coworker who receives a higher salary than the malicious insider. The targeted 
information is contained on the organization’s network drive in the CEO’s 
personal folder.  
 Unauthorized Result: The effect of the insider’s actions is unauthorized access 
to the CEO’s performance evaluations. The CEO’s confidential documents are 
disclosed to the insider without approval from the documents’ owner. 
 Objective: Obtaining the performance evaluation allows the insider to 
discover the pay information for other employees and compare that 
information against industry averages.  
4.4.1.2 UC4.S1.Step 2: VMI Observables 
The first action performed by the insider is to map a drive to the CEO’s folder on 
the organization’s network drive. The aforementioned registry entry of 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Ma
p Network Drive MRU maintains a list of currently mapped network drives and the 
corresponding letter on the local workstation. This registry entry enables observation of 
the first action. 
The Windows clipboard is observed for detection of the second action; copying 
and pasting the performance evaluations from the network drive to the insider’s desktop.  
The final action performed by the insider is to open the Microsoft Word document 
White-2011.docx, which is copied to the desktop. The previously identified Microsoft 
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Word File MRU list is the observable monitored to alert for the action within the 
malicious insider scenario. 
Table 4.10: UC4.S1 VMI Observables. 
Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Map Network Drive Registry Entry 
2 Copy Performance Evaluations to Desktop Clipboard 
3 Open White-2011.docx Registry Entry 
 
4.4.2 UC4.S2: Unauthorized Software 
This scenario models an insider who installs additional software on their 
computer to assist with data exfiltration. An insider who is able to install software can use 
the installed to subvert existing defensive technologies employed by the organization on 
the network and/or workstation.  
4.4.2.1 UC4.S2.Step 1: Taxonomy Development 
 Tools: The malicious insider uses Internet Explorer to obtain the software. 
Additionally, the insider uses the unauthorized software, TrueCrypt, to 
exfiltrate the data. Lastly, the insider performs normal user commands to 
access the desired data. 
 Vulnerability: The exploited vulnerability is a result of a configuration error 
of the domain. Users are allowed to install software on their workstation 
without administrator approval. However, even if users are prevented from 
installing software, some software does not require administrator rights and 
can be run without installation, so the vulnerability remains. To completely 
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eliminate this vulnerability, an organization would need to employ process 
whitelisting. 
 Actions: The actions performed in this scenario are completed in the order 
listed. The first action performed by the insider is to open Internet Explorer. 
Next, the insider types http://www.truecrypt.org into the address bar. After 
accessing the website, the insider downloads and installs a default installation 
of TrueCrypt. An encrypted volume is then created and mounted as the E 
drive. The malicious insider copies Firewall Project Proposal.docx to the 
TrueCrypt volume. The scenario ends when the insider dismounts the 
TrueCrypt volume. 
 Target: The malicious insider is targeting the FirewallProjectProposal.docx 
document. This document is within the insider’s work scope, so accessing it is 
not suspicious. 
 Unauthorized Result: By performing this attack, the malicious insider causes 
the document to be disclosed to individuals who are not authorized by the 
organization to view its contents. 
 Objective: The likely objective for the malicious insider in this scenario is 
financial gain or damage against the organization. Providing the document to 
a competing organization or nation-state would provide financial recompense 
for the insider. Releasing the information to the media would likely cause 
damage against the organization’s reputation. 
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4.4.2.2 UC4.S2.Step 2: VMI Observables 
Step one in the attack is opening Internet Explorer. This action can easily be 
observed through monitoring of the process list.  
The next action performed by the insider is navigating to TrueCrypt.org. The 
script developed to detect browsing history is likely the method to observe this action. 
Additionally, the registry entry HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet 
Explorer\TypedURLs maintains a twenty-five MRU list of URLs typed directly into the 
address bar. If a user accesses a URL via a link on a page, such as a search engine’s 
results, the URL will not be recorded in this MRU list. 
After navigating to the website, the malicious insider downloads TrueCrypt. This 
action can be monitored using the previously created script to scan memory captures for 
file downloads.  
Installation of the program can be monitored through analysis of the currently 
running processes on the system. An organization employing either blacklisting or 
whitelisting could rapidly detect this action, unless the process is renamed to a common 
process name, such as iexplore.exe, the process name for Internet Explorer. Registry 
entries are also often created during the software installation process, so an organization 
could compare a clean registry snapshot with a current snapshot to detect changes; 
however, this technique is not used for detection in this scenario. 
The fifth action performed by the malicious insider is creation and mounting of an 
encrypted TrueCrypt volume. Following a typical TrueCrypt encrypted file container 
setup results in a mounted volume showing up as a local drive and not a removable 
device. Therefore, previously identified VMI observables for external hard drives are not 
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applicable for this action. Analysis of TrueCrypt’s behavior reveals observables for this 
action are similar to connecting an external storage medium. To support detection of this 
action, the previously mentioned registry entry …\Mountpoints2 and 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\MountedDevices are monitored. The registry entry 
…\MountedDevices is a list of devices that have been mounted on a system and is stored 
in binary form. This list includes local system drives, such as the C drive.  
The sixth action performed by the malicious insider is copying 
FirewallProjectProposal.docx from a network drive to the TrueCrypt volume. Detection 
of this step is performed by monitoring the clipboard for file copy and paste operations. 
The final step performed by the malicious insider is to dismount and re-encrypt 
the TrueCrypt volume. The previously identified …\MountedDevices registry entry is 
determined to provide an observable for this action. 
Table 4.11: UC4.S2 VMI Observables. 
Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Open Internet Explorer Running Process 
2 Navigate to truecrypt.org Registry Entry 
3 Download TrueCrypt Hexadecimal Pattern 
4 Install TrueCrypt using default settings Running Process 
5 Create and Mount TrueCrypt Volume Registry Entry 
6 Copy FirewallProjectProposal.docx from network drive Clipboard 
7 Dismount TrueCrypt Volume Registry Entry 
 
4.4.3 UC4.S3: Suspicious User Command – FTP 
This scenario is representative of an insider who uses existing Windows 
functionality to exfiltrate data to a remote machine.  
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4.4.3.1 UC4.S3.Step 1: Taxonomy Development 
 Tools: The malicious insider uses only existing Windows functionality. 
Unlike the previous scenario, this scenario could prove more difficult to detect 
as there is not an obvious tool download and execution by the user. 
 Vulnerability: For the insider to achieve the desired objective, a configuration 
vulnerability is exploited. The organization does not prevent users from using 
the existing file transfer protocol (FTP) functionality found within Windows. 
This configuration vulnerability could be difficult to detect by an organization 
since the tool is completely contained within the OS. 
 Actions: To successfully exfiltrate the data, the malicious insider performs the 
following steps in the order listed. First, the insider opens a command prompt. 
The insider then navigates to the desktop using the command cd Desktop. 
Next, the mkdir files command is issued to create a folder on the desktop 
named files. The insider then changes directories using cd files. Once in the 
directory, the files are copied to this folder in preparation for exfiltration using 
copy z:\FirewallSource.zip c:\Users\tgreen\Desktop\files. The insider is not 
extensively familiar with the Windows ftp command and first issues ftp --help 
to learn more about the command. The insider then issues ftp 
martincrawford.net to connect to a remote server via ftp. When prompted, the 
insider supplies a known password. The command mput is used to put the zip 
file onto the remote machine and the insider finishes the scenario by issuing 
the quit command. 
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 Target: The insider is familiar with the organization’s firewall project and 
knows the value is extremely high. Therefore, exfiltrating and subsequently 
selling the data would be extremely profitable. 
 Unauthorized Result: Performing this attack results in disclosure of the source 
code by the insider to a third party not authorized to have access to the data. 
 Objective: The insider’s objective is to sell the source code to a competitor for 
a large financial reward.  
4.4.3.2 UC4.S3.Step 2: VMI Observables 
Unlike many other scenarios performed in this experiment, the insider exclusively 
relies upon the command line. Initial analysis resulted in several strings which generate 
an alert for command line ftp activity; no registry values are determined to change as a 
result of the previously listed actions. However, the Volatility framework developed a 
solution which is able to capture command line history. This tool is used in combination 
with the full memory captures to observe a user’s command line behavior. Windows 7 
command line history is much more difficult to obtain because as soon as the cmd.exe 
process is terminated, all history from the current cmd process is lost. Previous versions 
of Windows use csrss.exe to maintain command line history and the history persists even 
if cmd.exe is terminated [71]. 
Table 4.12: UC4.S3 VMI Observables. 
Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Command Line Commands Command Line History 
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4.4.4 UC4.S4: Suspicious User Command – File Deletion 
This scenario is representative of a malicious insider who is motivated by revenge 
and the desire to cause damage to the organization. Unlike other scenarios, the insider is 
not attempting to steal property from the organization. Instead, the only goal is to destroy 
data within the organization.  
4.4.4.1 UC4.S4.Step 1: Taxonomy Development 
 Tools: Similar to the previous scenario, the malicious insider uses only 
existing Windows functionality.  
 Vulnerability: The insider exploits a misconfigured network share on 
workstation 3 to perform the attack.  
 Actions: The malicious insider performs the following actions in order to 
attack the organization. First, the insider uses the command net use to list 
currently mapped network drives. Next, the insider issues the command x: to 
change to the x drive, a network drive previously mapped to workstation3. 
The insider lists the contents of the current directory with the dir command. 
Three files exist in the directory, funnypic.jpg, 
german_shepherd_dog_664_12.jpg, and Social SecurityNumbers.docx. The 
insider completes the scenario by issuing the del command to delete each file 
individually. 
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 Target: The insider has previously mapped a network drive to workstation3 
and seeks any files on the target computer to attack. 
 Unauthorized Result: The effect of the insider’s attack is a denial of service 
against the organization by deleting a critical file. 
 Objective: The objective of the insider is motivated by revenge against both 
the organization and the user of workstation3. The insider seeks to destroy any 
targets of opportunity found within workstation3. 
4.4.4.2 UC4.S4.Step 2: VMI Observables 
As mentioned previously, the Volatility project has a plug-in for their framework 
which reliably extracts command line history than a brute force string search. A string 
search is only effective when it is known what commands are issued by the user. No 
registry entries, save for the previously mapped network drive, are identified for 
assistance in detection of the insider’s actions.  
Table 4.13: UC4.S4 VMI Observables. 
Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Command Line Commands Command Line History 
 
4.4.5 UC4.S5: Administrator Abuse 
This scenario models a situation where an administrator abuses his or her elevated 
privilege in an attempt to perform malicious actions under a new user account. The 
malicious administrator creates a new user to prevent log entries from containing the 
insider’s username. 
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4.4.5.1 UC4.S5.Step 1: Taxonomy Development 
 Tools: In this scenario, the insider leverages administrator privileges and 
existing Windows functionality to execute the attack. 
 Vulnerability: As an administrator, the insider has permission to create new 
user accounts. However, the design of the system allows a privileged 
individual to arbitrarily create user accounts without verification for a 
supervisor or other administrator. 
 Actions: To achieve the malicious objective, the insider performs the 
following steps in order. First, the insider creates a new local administrator 
account, Mallory. The insider then logs off and logs into the workstation (not 
the domain) using the newly created local administrator account. Next, the 
insider attaches an external hard drive to the workstation using USB-over-
network. The malicious insider then copies the targeted file, Payroll.xlsx, from 
the C drive to the external hard drive. The insider completes their actions by 
dismounting the external drive and logging off. 
 Target: The malicious insider is targeting sensitive payroll information 
containing addresses, full names, spouse and family information, salaries, 
bank account numbers, social security numbers, and credit card information 
for all employees of the organization. 
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 Unauthorized Result: The result of the insider’s attack against the 
organization is a breach of confidentiality and disclosure of payroll 
information. 
 Objective: The malicious insider is motivated by seeking revenge against an 
organization by stealing personally identifiable information (PII) regarding the 
employees and providing it to a competitor or nation-state. 
4.4.5.2 UC4.S5.Step 2: VMI Observables 
Observation of users on the system can be performed using CMAT-V. CMAT-V 
lists all users on the system, including service accounts, as well as the SID and home path 
for each user. This action can also be observed using the Windows security log. 
Detection of the external hard drive is done using the previously mentioned 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\{53f56307
-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b} and 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\{53f5630d
-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b} registry entries. These two registry entries maintain 
a list of storage devices on the system. 
The copying and pasting of Payroll.xlsx is observed through brute force string 
search because file clipboard operations cannot currently be detected via CMAT-V. 
Table 4.14: UC4.S3 VMI Observables. 
Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Create User Mallory CMAT-V User List 
2 User Login None Identified 
3 Connect USB Hard Drive Registry Entry 
4 Copy Payroll.xlsx to External Drive Clipboard 
5 Dismount External Drive None Identified 
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4.5 UC5: Remote Access 
Referring back to insider characteristics discussed in Chapter 2, another technique 
employed by malicious insiders is remote access. Using remote access allows the insider 
to perform their attack while not being distracted by coworkers or their currently assigned 
work task. Additionally, coworkers cannot observe any potentially malicious activity on 
the insider’s screen and report the actions to a security manager within the organization. 
4.5.1 UC5.S1: Workstation Remote Access 
This scenario is representative of a user who uses Microsoft Remote Desktop 
Protocol (RDP) to access their workstation remotely, such as from their personal 
computer at home. The malicious insider uses RDP to steal data remotely from their work 
computer to a personal computer at home. RDP can be configured to use transport layer 
security (TLS) to prevent an organization from performing a man-in-the-middle (MITM) 
attack to determine the user’s activity, thus defeating any network level defenses. 
4.5.1.1 UC5.S1.Step 1: Taxonomy Development 
 Tools: The malicious insider uses several tools to perform this attack. The 
insider’s personal computer at home and their computer at work are both tools 
leveraged in this attack. On these two workstations, the insider only uses 
legitimate Windows commands. 
 Vulnerability: The malicious insider is not exploiting any vulnerabilities 
within the organization. Even a correctly configured RDP session would 
enable the malicious insider to execute this attack. An organization’s policy 
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may allow employees to work remotely and this is often seen as a benefit by 
prospective employees. 
 Actions: The following actions are performed in order by the malicious insider 
to accomplish the objective of this scenario, theft of sensitive information. 
First, the malicious insider connects to their workstation via RDP. After 
successfully authenticating, the insider copies the desired documents. 
Specifically, the malicious insider first uses ctrl c and ctrl v to copy and paste 
FirewallSource.zip from C:\Users\tgreen\desktop to the C drive on his home 
computer. Next, the insider copies JointStrikeFighter.docx from W:\Projects\ 
to the C drive on his computer. The insider completes the scenario by 
disconnecting the RDP session. 
 Target: The malicious insider targets several sensitive documents during this 
attack. The first, the firewall source code, is a project the insider is paid to 
work on, so accessing this should not raise suspicion. The second target is a 
document pertaining to the Joint Strike Fighter the organization is working on. 
These data are sensitive to the organization and would be financially 
damaging if a competitor obtained this information. 
 Unauthorized Result: A successful attack by the insider results in disclosure 
of confidential information belonging not only to the organization, but to the 
government and possibly additional business partners.  
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 Objective: A malicious insider may have a variety of motives for performing 
this action; likely the insider is attempting to steal the information to sell it to 
a competitor or nation-state.  
4.5.1.2 UC5.S1.Step 2: VMI Observables 
The first action performed by the insider is connecting to their workstation via 
RDP. This action can be detected using an identified registry entry, 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Volatile Environment\1. This registry entry contains 
information regarding the user’s current session on a workstation. When a user is locally 
connected, the value SESSIONNAME will be Console and CLIENTNAME will be NULL. If 
there are no current users logged on to a system, this key does not exist in the registry. 
Additionally, 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\{28d78fad
-5a12-11d1-ae5b-0000f803a8c2}\##?#Root#RDPBUS#0000#{28d78fad-5a12-11d1-
ae5b-0000f803a8c2}\#TS001, also records RDP session information. This registry key 
is not found in the registry unless an RDP session is currently in progress to the current 
workstation. 
File copy and paste operations are both limited in detection due to CMAT-V 
limitations. These are both detected via string search through the full memory captures. 
Table 4.15: UC5.S1 VMI Observables 
Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Connect to Workstation1 from Remote Machine via RDP Registry Entries 
2 Copy documents from remote machine to local machine Clipboard 
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4.5.2 UC5.S2: Server Remote Access 
This scenario is representative of a malicious insider who uses RDP to access one 
of the organization’s servers. Users may need to remote into one of the servers for a 
variety of reasons, such as making a configuration change or accessing files only 
available on that system. As previously mentioned, RDP can be encrypted to prevent 
MITM attacks, which also defeats any network level traffic monitoring. Additionally, 
using RDP to a server could allow an insider to bypass security mechanisms on their 
workstation.  
4.5.2.1 UC5.S2.Step 1: Taxonomy Development 
 Tools: The insider uses tools similar to the previous remote access scenario to 
execute this attack. The insider’s personal computer and the organization’s 
server are both relied up for this attack. In contrast to the previous scenario, 
the attacker also has a piece of malware. On these two Windows computers, 
the insider only issues Windows commands. 
 Vulnerability: Similar to the previous scenario, no vulnerabilities in 
configuration, implementation, or design are exploited during this scenario. It 
could be argued that the server is incorrectly configured to allow users to RDP 
to it, but administration of said server would be difficult using only command 
line. 
 Actions: The following actions are performed in order by the malicious insider 
to accomplish the objective of this scenario, implanting malware on the 
insider’s workstation for later execution. First, the malicious insider connects 
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the server MS01, which is the organization’s mail and file server. After 
successfully authenticating, the mounts workstation1\Users\tgreen to a 
network drive. Workstation1 is the malicious insider’s workstation. Next, the 
malicious insider copies DarkCometRAT.exe (DarkComet Remote 
Administration Tool), from their personal computer to ms01\tgreen\Desktop. 
After copying it to the desktop of the server, the malicious insider uses Ctrl C 
and Ctrl V to copy and paste the RAT from the server’s desktop to the 
mounted network drive, workstation1. The insider completes the scenario by 
disconnecting the RDP session. 
 Target: The malicious insider targets several sensitive documents during this 
attack. The first, the firewall source code, is a project the insider is paid to 
work on, so accessing this should not raise suspicion. The second target is a 
document pertaining to the Joint Strike Fighter the organization is working on. 
These data are sensitive to the organization and would be financially 
damaging if a competitor obtained this information. 
 Unauthorized Result: As a result of the insider’s actions, the insider placed 
malware on a workstation and can use it to increase access to the computer 
network and then steal, or corrupt information within the organization’s 
network. 
 Objective: The malicious insider’s purpose for the attack is to put malware 
onto their workstation in preparation for an attack against the organization. 
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4.5.2.2 UC5.S2.Step 2: VMI Observables 
Windows Server 2003 records RDP information in the registry slightly differently 
than the aforementioned Windows 7 registry entries. The ControlSet001 registry entry is 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\{28d78fad
-5a12-11d1-ae5b-0000f803a8c2}\##?#Root#RDPDR#0000#{28d78fad-5a12-11d1-
ae5b-0000f803a8c2}\#TS001 in Windows XP and Server 2003 and the Volatile 
Environment\1 registry entry is HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Volatile Environment.  
Observation of the mounted network drive by the insider on the server (MS01) to 
the workstation (workstation1) is performed by the previously mentioned Map Network 
Drive MRU registry key. 
The clipboard file operation steps are performed via brute force string search due 
to limitations within CMAT-V.  
The final step, disconnecting the RDP session is performed using the aforesaid 
Volatile Environment and ControlSet001 registry entries. 
Table 4.16: UC5.S2 VMI Observables. 
Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Connect to MS01 via RDP Registry Entry 
2 Map network drive Registry Entry 
3 Copy DarkCometRAT.exe from personal computer to MS01 Clipboard 
4 Copy DarkCometRAT.exe from MS01 to mapped network drive Clipboard 
5 Disconnect RDP session Registry Entry 
4.6 UC6: Clipboard Activity 
The Windows clipboard is used frequently by users on a system for normal 
computer tasks. However, it can also contains valuable information regarding an insider 
attack and therefore examination of the Windows clipboard for post-incident 
investigation is extremely valuable in determining actions performed by the user [46]. 
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Applying this principle to live introspection can significantly reduce the time between 
incident and detection and potentially generate real-time detection of malicious activity.  
4.6.1 UC6.S1: Document Contents Copy and Paste 
Copying and pasting between two documents is a common use of the Windows 
clipboard functionality. This scenario is representative of clipboard activity by a 
malicious insider who accesses an unauthorized document and copies and pastes the 
contents to a new document. The insider knows the organization works on a UAV for the 
Air Force, but is not familiar with where the documents are stored and therefore must 
search for the information. 
4.6.1.1 UC6.S1.Step 1: Taxonomy Development 
 Tools: To perform the attack, the malicious scenario uses only existing 
Windows user commands. 
 Vulnerability: The insider is exploiting a configuration vulnerability within 
the organization which enables them to access all files on the network drive. 
 Actions: The malicious insider performs the following actions in the order 
listed to conduct the attack. First, the insider opens Windows explorer and 
navigates to the network drive (10.1.0.205). Unlike several other scenarios, 
the insider does not map a network drive to this location. After accessing the 
network drive, the insider uses the Windows 7 search functionality to search 
for “UAV”. The insider then opens AirForceBriefing.docx and selects all of 
the text. Ctrl C is used to copy the contents of the document to the clipboard. 
A new Word document is created by the malicious insider and named 
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UAVData.docx. The insider finishes the attack by pasting the contents of the 
clipboard and saving the document. 
 Target: The target for the insider’s attack is a classified briefing document the 
organization is going to present to the Air Force. 
 Unauthorized Result: The effect of the insider’s attack is creation of an 
unauthorized copy of UAV information. The insider may disclose this 
information to a third party, but that is outside the scope of this scenario. 
 Objective: The goal of the attack is to obtain sensitive information regarding 
the organization’s upcoming project.  
4.6.1.2 UC6.S1.Step 2: VMI Observables 
Several observables are identified to monitor for changes during this scenario in 
order to detect the malicious insider behavior. To observe the changes performed by the 
insider’s first action, navigating to the network share, the registry key 
HKEY_USERS\<SID>\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Typ
edPaths is monitored, where SID is the Windows security identifier assigned to the a 
user. This registry key contains a list of the twenty-five most recently typed addresses 
into the Windows Explorer address bar. It is important to note the difference in 
information recorded between this and the aforementioned TypedURLs registry entry. 
As previously described and shown, the registry entry WordWheelQuery is an 
MRUList containing the most recent one hundred Windows search queries. This is 
monitored to detect the insider’s second action, searching for “UAV”. 
 
103 
Monitoring the insider’s file access activity is performed using the 
aforementioned …\Word\File MRU registry entry.  
Lastly, the Word text clipboard operations are observed using the Windows 
clipboard functionality.  
Table 4.17: UC6.S1 VMI Observables. 
Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Navigate to network drive Registry Entry 
2 Search for “UAV” Registry Entry 
3 Open AirForceBriefing.docx Registry Entry 
4 Copy document contents Clipboard 
5 Create new Word document called UAVData.docx Registry Entry 
6 Paste document contents Clipboard 
 
4.6.2 UC6.S2: Document Contents and Web Browser Copy and Paste 
Similar to the previous scenario, copying and pasting between a document and a 
web form is another common use of Windows clipboard. This scenario models an insider 
who uses an anonymous web form to exfiltrate information from the organization. The 
insider employs the Windows clipboard and Internet Explorer to perform the attack. 
4.6.2.1 UC6.S2.Step 1: Taxonomy Development 
 Tools: The malicious insider uses the Windows clipboard and Internet 
Explorer to perform this attack. 
 Vulnerability: The insider does not exploit any configuration, implementation, 
or design vulnerabilities within the system. All of the actions performed by 
the insider are legitimate system commands. 
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 Actions: The following actions are performed in order by the malicious insider 
during this scenario. First, the insider accesses unmanned systems icd draft v2-
2 (aroc approved).docx a document not related to the project the insider works 
on. Next, the insider opens Internet Explorer navigates to www.pastebin.com. 
The insider then uses Ctrl C and Ctrl V to copy and paste the contents of the 
document to Pastebin and submit the pasted contents. 
 Target: The target for the insider’s attack is an unclassified document 
containing detailed specifications of an upcoming UAV project. 
 Unauthorized Result: The consequence of the insider’s attack is public 
distribution of sensitive information. The organization has not publically 
released this information and doing so allows individuals to view it who have 
not been approved by the organization. 
 Objective: The malicious insider’s objective is to publicly release information 
regarding the organization’s UAV program which will damage the 
organization financially and create a negative public image. 
4.6.2.2 UC6.S2.Step 2: VMI Observables 
The previously identified Word\FileMRU is used for observing the insider’s file 
access activity. This registry entry maintains a list of recently accessed Microsoft Word 
files. 
To observe browser activity, the TypedURLs registry entry and string scan of full 
memory capture are monitored. The full memory scan generates some false positives due 
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to a limited hexadecimal pattern matching technique, but it also captures any links 
contained on a page, such as links on a search engine. 
Lastly, the clipboard is used to detect the text copy and paste operation. Text can 
currently be observed, but due to implementation limitations, source and destination file 
paths must be searched via full memory string search.  
Table 4.18: UC6.S2 VMI Observables. 
Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Open document not related to job Registry Entry 
2 Navigate to pastebin.com TypedURLs 
3 Copy and paste document contents to pastebin.com Clipboard 
 
4.6.3 UC6.S3: Outlook Email Contents and Web Browser Copy and Paste 
The final malicious clipboard scenario performed is similar to scenario 0, with the 
key difference being the source application used for the text clipboard operation. A 
malicious insider 
Similar to the previous scenario, copying and pasting between a document and a 
web form is another common use of Windows clipboard. This scenario models an insider 
who uses an anonymous web form to exfiltrate information from the organization. The 
insider employs the Windows clipboard and Internet Explorer to perform the attack. 
4.6.3.1 UC6.S3.Step 1: Taxonomy Development 
 Tools: In this modeled attack, the malicious insider uses Window 7 clipboard 
capacity, Microsoft Outlook 2007, and Internet Explorer 8 to accomplish the 
objective. 
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 Vulnerability: The insider does not exploit any design, configuration, or 
implementation vulnerabilities within Windows. It could be argued that a 
configuration error of a network level traffic monitor allows the user to visit 
pastebin.com, but the insider could use one of the many similar sites or create 
their own. 
 Actions: To accurately model an attack, the listed actions are performed by the 
malicious insider in the order given. First, the malicious insider opens Internet 
Explorer and Outlook. The insider then double clicks an email containing 
sensitive text in the body of the email to open it in a new window. After 
opening the email, the insider copies all of the text to the clipboard. The 
insider directly navigates to pastebin.com and pastes the contents of the email. 
 Target: The insider is targeting an email containing sensitive performance 
data about the organization’s UAV program. 
 Unauthorized Result: After performing this attack, the insider disseminates 
valuable information to an unlimited number of third-parties who are not 
authorized to possess this information. 
  Objective: The malicious insider’s motives are to seek revenge against the 
organization and damage any customers who have purchased the product by 
revealing limitations of the product. 
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4.6.3.2 UC6.S3.Step 2: VMI Observables 
A hexadecimal search is developed for obtaining email contents from the 
workstation’s memory and is listed below. It is suspected that the string only detects 
HTML based emails and not plain-text emails.  
3C68746D6C20786D6C6E733A763D2275726E3A736368656D61732D6D6963726F7
36F66742D636F6D3A766D6C2220786D6C6E733A6F3D2275726E3A736368656D61
732D6D6963726F736F66742D636F6D3A6F66666963653A6F666669636522 
Observation of navigation to pastebin.com is performed using the hex search of a 
full memory capture and TypedURLs registry entry. 
The last insider action is observed using CMAT-V’s clipboard monitoring 
capabilities. As previously stated, detection of source and destination application is 
limited. 
Table 4.19: UC6.S3 VMI Observables 
Insider Action Description VMI Observable 
1 Open Outlook Running Process 
2 Copy email contents Hexadecimal Pattern / Clipboard 
3 Navigate to pastebin.com Registry Entry 
4 Paste email contents Clipboard 
4.7 Summary 
This chapter presented the malicious insider use cases using the methodology 
detailed in Chapter 3. It elaborated on each of the methodology steps, describing the 
motivation for each use case, described specific scenarios performed for each use case, 
broke each scenario down using the modified computer and network incident taxonomy, 
and enumerated VMI observables for detection of each action within the scenario. 
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V. Insider Threat Detection and Data Validation 
To support the goal of this research, each scenario must be tested to determine if 
each observable identified can be monitored for possible insider activity. If a change is 
detected, an alert should be written for a security analyst to investigate further to 
determine if the user has malicious intent. Furthermore, to ensure previously identified 
observables only generate an alert for insider threat actions, the observables are tested 
with two different data sets not containing a malicious insider. One dataset is from 
manually generated normal user scenarios and the second dataset is from the Advanced 
Cyber Education (ACE) Hackfest containing computer network operations (CNO) 
actions by users. 
This chapter focuses on addressing the detection of the malicious insider and 
validating the detection method for each scenario described in Chapter 4. Section 5.1 
addresses printer use cases. Section 5.2 covers disabling defense tools. Section 5.3 
discusses the successfulness of removable media detection. Section 5.4 focuses on 
suspicious employee behavior. Section 5.5 addresses remote access attack vectors and 
detection. Finally, Section 5.6 provides detection for clipboard scenarios.  The chapter 
concludes with a summary in Section 5.7. 
5.1 UC1: Printing Activity 
Printers are frequently used by malicious and non-malicious insiders. Although 
printers are able to record information about print jobs, they cannot see into a user’s 
workstation to determine how the user obtained the information and if they are authorized 
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to access it. The ability to observe an entire print job on a user’s workstation enables an 
organization to more rapidly identify potentially malicious behavior. 
5.1.1 UC1.S1.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
Examination of the generated alert reveals one new entry to the Driver3 registry 
entry. The output of this alert is shown in Figure 5.1. As mentioned in Chapter 3, all 
workstations in the experiment are connected to a Lexmark C782 network printer, so one 
known print driver exists in this key. Additionally, several other standard drivers exist on 
the system before performing this scenario. These drivers are the Microsoft XML Paper 
Specification (XPS), the Microsoft shared fax driver and Microsoft OneNote Driver. The 
OneNote driver is installed when Microsoft Office 2007 is installed. An organization 
could determine this alert alone is enough to cause serious suspicion of a user, if this user 
does not have a legitimate reason for having a personal printer.  
 
Figure 5.1: UC1.S1 Alert – Driver3. 
 
The next action by the malicious insider is mapping a network drive to their 
workstation. Depending on what drive and folder is mapped, an organization could also 
identify this single action as malicious if the drive or folder is outside of the user’s work 
scope. However, in this scenario, the network folder accessed by the insider is within 
their work scope and he stores information on the network drive on a regular basis. 
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Figure 5.2 shows the resulting alert generated for the Map Network Drive MRU registry 
entry.  
 
Figure 5.2: UC1.S1 Alert - Map Network Drive MRU. 
 
Successful detection of the insider opening the targeted documented involves 
monitoring the previously identified Word\File MRU registry entry. Observing the 
change in this entry reveals malicious insider has opened Firewall Project Proposal.docx 
from the drive mapped to Z (determined previously to be 10.1.0.205) within the past ten 
minutes, shown in Figure 5.3.  
 
Figure 5.3: UC1.S1 Alert – Word\File MRU 
  
The last action performed by the insider in this scenario is printing the Word 
document to the local printer. During analysis, no registry entries were observed to 
determine if a document is printed. Instead, the pattern identified in the VMI Observables 
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section is employed to capture the print job. Successful detection of the print job 
generates an alert and is shown in Figure 5.4.  
 
Figure 5.4: UC1.S1 Detection – Print Job 
 
Through analysis of each step in this scenario, an organization can effectively 
employ a strategy to mitigate malicious insiders who use local printers to exfiltrate 
sensitive information. Each step in this malicious scenario is successfully alerted. As 
mentioned previously, an organization could alert on specific actions, but the 
combination of all steps is definitely malicious. Additional analysis by an organization 
enables completion of the malicious insider taxonomy to determine what the target and 
motivation is for the insider in this scenario.  
5.1.2 UC1.S1.Step 4: Data Validation 
Data validation for the Word File MRU registry entry and print jobs is contained 
in section 5.1.4 UC1.S2.Step 4: Data Validation. 
Within the MIN data set, six alerts are generated; two on workstation4 and four 
on workstation5. All of these generated alerts are false positives and are a result of the 
user logging on/off from the system and causing the registry entries to be removed or 
added, triggering the alert generation. Examining the ACE Hackfest data, fourteen alerts 
are generated for Version-3 registry entry. All alerts except for two appear to be the result 
of users logging on and off from the system. Two alerts show the connection and 
disconnection of a Lexmark C534 printer from the computer BSOD-10.  
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Three alerts are generated for the Map Network Drive MRU registry entry in the 
MIN data set. Two of the alerts are by users accessing their respective folders within the 
organization’s network drive. The third alert appears to be suspicious. User lscarlet 
mapped a network drive on her workstation to the CEO’s performance review folder on 
the network drive. Additional investigation and accounting for lscarlet’s job function 
reveals she is the employee relations advisor and therefore this information is related to 
her job duties. In the ACE data set, no alerts are generated for the registry entry.  
Examination of both the …\Standard TCP/IP Port\Ports and …\Printers registry 
entries reveals they contain the same information. For non-malicious scenarios, four false 
positive alerts are generated. For the ACE Hackfest dataset, twelve alerts are generated 
and all are false positives.  
5.1.3 UC1.S2.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
Detection of the first action with an observable is not successful. In a previous 
scenario, the insider had navigated to \\10.1.0.205 and therefore it is not added to the 
TypedPaths registry entry. Additionally, the timestamp on the registry entry is not 
updated. 
Detecting a user’s file search queries is valuable for signaling potential malicious 
actions by the user; searches outside of locations the user has access to or trigging on 
blacklisted terms can be the precursor to data exfiltration or destruction. Detection of the 
search performed by the user is successful, as shown in Figure 5.5. An alert is generated 
and the changed item is highlighted. 
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Figure 5.5: UC1.S2 Alert - WordWheelQuery 
 
Analysis of the alert discloses one initial value of “UAV” (the result of a different 
scenario) and an additional entry of “Classified”. The malicious insider did not appear to 
have detailed knowledge of what information to look for; instead the insider appears to 
target the most sensitive information within the organization. Additionally, the Last 
Updated time changed between both entries, although the time does not match the time 
the action is performed. 
Before execution of this scenario the targeted document is Item 3 in the MRU list, 
meaning it is the least recently opened file on the system. After performing this scenario, 
AirForceBriefing.docx is the first item in the MRU list, indicating it is the most recently 
accessed Word document by the user, as illustrated in Figure 5.6. An additional entry, 
White-2011.docx, also exists in the MRU list, but this is from a different scenario.  
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Figure 5.6: UC1.S2 Alert – Word\File MRU. 
 
The final action performed by the malicious insider is printing the classified 
document to a local printer. It is determined that detection for this action from a 
hypervisor perspective would remain the same if the insider used a network printer 
instead of a local printer; with a network printer, an additional network connection may 
be observable and assist a security analyst in confirming the print job. The output of the 
alert showing the print job is in Figure 5.7. 
 
Figure 5.7: UC1.S2 Alert – Print Job. 
 
Although no time information is provide from analysis of the memory, an 
estimated time can be obtained comparing the two memory capture file names. The two 
file names, w7_1_20120321142917_.dmp and w7_1_20120321145121_.dmp indicate the 
print job occurred on 21 March 2012 between 14:29:17 and 15:51:21. Unfortunately, a 
weakness of this detection method is also observed during analysis of this action. 
Specifically, the print job performed in this action has the exact same memory address as 
a print job from a previous scenario. As a result, it may be possible for a malicious 
insider to hide their print job this action’s detection method by printing several 
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unauthorized documents followed immediately by a legitimate document. It was not 
evaluated if a print job to a different printer would also store the information at the same 
memory address.  
5.1.4 UC1.S2.Step 4: Data Validation 
Analysis of the TypedPaths registry entry produced thirty-one alerts for the MIN 
network users and of these, eight are the result of users typing an address into the address 
bar; the remaining are a result of the registry entry being deleted/created when a user logs 
off/on to the workstation. Within the ACE Hackfest data, nine alerts are generated for the 
TypedPaths registry and of these, zero are the result of a user typing an address into 
Windows Explorer.  
For the MIN data, five alerts are generated for WordWheelQuery registry entry. 
All searches except for one appeared to be benign and related to the user’s position 
within the organization. The user on workstation2 performed a search for “Bath Salt” at 
approximately 14:20, which is not related to the user’s work position and may be related 
to a substance abuse problem within the user’s personal life. Examination of ACE data 
produced seven alerts for WordWheelQuery. All Windows Explorer searches did not 
appear to be malicious.  
On the MIN network, twelve alerts are generated for the Word\File MRU registry 
entry. Examining each alert reveals the user’s are operating within their work scope. For 
example, the CEO accesses and creates performance review documents. None of the 
generated alerts indicate suspicious behavior. 
ACE Hackfest data produced nine alerts for Word\File MRU registry entry. 
Without context for each user’s work scope, it is not possible to determine any 
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inappropriate or malicious file access. Nevertheless, the observed Word files accessed 
during the exercise include: Part 2 Problem 1.docx, pictures.docx, MemoTemplate.doc, 
MPFM0552.doc. A quick observation of the file names does not reveal any suspicious 
names, but the file could be obfuscated by the insider. 
The final validation point is for print job alerts. In the MIN dataset, twenty-five 
alerts are generated with fifty-six percent coming from workstation3 and the remaining 
alerts coming from workstations 2, 4, and 5. Of these alerts, seven are a result of actual 
print jobs, the remaining are false positives. Workstation2 showed two print jobs, both to 
the network printer and both relating to the user’s job position, which is consistent with 
the script. Workstation3 reported three print jobs, which again matches the script. 
Examination of the print jobs reveals none of the print jobs are related to the user’s job 
function and two indicate suspicious personal behavior. The two suspicious print jobs 
suggest the user is involved in a local swinger’s organization. Within the ACE dataset, no 
alerts are generated for print jobs. This is consistent with knowledge of the exercise; 
printing was not performed from workstations during the exercise.  
5.1.5 UC1.S3.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
Analysis of the domain controller event logs reveals the user’s successful logon at 
00:12:41 on 22 March 2012, shown in Figure 5.8. Furthermore, it reveals the user is 
attempting to logon to their workstation, an authorized action. Although this action may 
be authorized, a sudden change in computer activity may signal potential malicious 
behavior. 
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Service Ticket Request:
User Name: tgreen@THESIS.COM
User Domain: THESIS.COM
Service Name: WORKSTATION1$
Service ID: S-1-5-21-956557069-3517617492-2542546096-1108
Ticket Options: 0x40810000
Ticket Encryption Type: 0x17
Client Address: 10.1.0.210
Failure Code: -
Logon GUID: {0ac87e67-d393-c7b8-5a31-a3d78b09e160}
Transited Services: -
 
Figure 5.8: UC1.S3 Alert - Event Log 
 
An alert is generated for the aforementioned observable Volatile Environment\1. 
The resulting alert, shown in Figure 5.9, displays the lasted updated time for the registry 
entry is significantly later than normal business activity. A discrepancy is observed 
between this value and the actual time on the insider’s workstation. Both times are four 
hours later than the actual time the scenario is performed, but this is consistent 
throughout the insider experiment. 
 
Figure 5.9: UC1.S3 Alert – Volatile Environment\1. 
 
Detection of the insider mapping a network drive to \\MS01\Organization\ is 
successful. An alert is generated, signaling a change in the MRU list and potential 
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malicious activity on the workstation. The MRUList is modified to indicate the most 
recently added entry is the targeted network drive, as demonstrated in Figure 5.10. 
 
Figure 5.10: UC1.S3 Alert – Map Network Drive MRU. 
 
After mapping the network drive, the insider then copies the five targeted 
documents to his/her local desktop from the network drive. Performing a brute force 
string search through the memory capture does reveal the five files are accessed by the 
insider.  
The final action, printing the documents is detected with somewhat limited 
success. Examination of the RecentDocs MRUListEx alert reveals a significant change, 
as demonstrated in Figure 5.11. After performing this action, the value of MRUListEx 
significantly changes, adding 6 new entries to the beginning, in front of 0x0E, the 
reference to Scarlet Files.lnk. Additionally, the subkeys beneath …\RecentDocs has a new 
entry, .xlsx. Xlsx is the extension used for Microsoft Excel documents, so examining the 
referenced pointed to by MRUListEx should contain at least one Excel document. 
Following the order found in MRUListEx provides detection of all five files, shown in 
Table 5.. 
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Figure 5.11: UC1.S3 Alert – RecentDocs. 
 
Table 5.1: UC1.S3 Alert – RecentDocs MRUList. 
MRUListEx Value Registry Value 
0x12 Logger.cpp 
0x11 PacketInspection.cpp 
0x0B AutoUpdate.cpp 
0x10 VM Configuration.xlsx 
0x0F Passwords.xlsx 
0x01 System and Security.lnk 
 
The five targeted files by the malicious insider are all detected within the 
RecentDocs registry key. Analysis reveals the three .cpp files are part of the project the 
insider is working on, but the two .xlsx files are related to the network infrastructure of 
the organization and outside of the work scope of the insider. Observation of the file 
names reveals this information may be very damaging to the organization as it can expose 
weaknesses regarding workstation configuration and possibly contain user account 
passwords. 
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The previously employed analysis technique of scanning the memory dump for 
the print job pattern confirmed the theorized shortcoming discussed. That is, print jobs 
appear to use the same memory address and subsequent jobs overwrite previous entries. 
Before execution of this scenario, the previous print job of AirForceBriefing.docx 
remained in memory at address 0x1b050580. A nearby address of 0x1b050728 has the 
current print job written to it, overwriting part of the previous print job, shown in Figure 
5.12.  
 
Figure 5.12: UC1.S3 Alert - Print Job 1. 
 
 
Figure 5.13: UC1.S3 Alert - Print Job 2. 
 
After printing all five documents, only two documents, Logger.cpp and 
AutoUpdate.cpp, are successfully detected. The malicious insider could mitigate 
successful detection of this action by printing several benign documents to the printer 
after Logger.cpp, such as an email or a weather report.  
Through analysis of this scenario, the malicious insider’s actions can be detected 
with somewhat limited success. The limitation of this analysis is the document printing; it 
cannot be determined that the malicious insider printed all of the target documents. 
Additional analysis of the spoolsv.exe process, the Windows print spooler service, did 
not show a handle from the process to the printed files. Nevertheless, it can be 
determined that the malicious insider accessed five files within and outside of their work 
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scope, opened all of them and printed at least two; enough information to signal 
malicious intent. 
5.1.6 UC1.S3.Step 4: Data Validation 
Within the MIN data set, thirty-four alerts are generated for the RecentDocs 
registry entry. Of these alerts, twenty-seven were the result of user actions and seven 
were false-positives. Some of the files accessed by the non-malicious users include: 
otf2.pdf, NewHire.docx, numtest.xlsx, BraxtonPuggle.jpg, Payroll.xlsx, 
JointStrikeFighter.docx, draft copy of fighter design.docx, Swingers May Invite.txt, 
Payroll notes.docx, and many non-work related dog, car, and swingers pictures. This 
registry entry also records control panel sections and Windows Libraries. The MIN data 
set showed users accessing Hardware and Sound, Network and Internet, the Documents 
Library, and My Pictures Library. Although some files do not appear to be work related, 
none of the recently accessed documents appear to be outside of each user’s work scope. 
Examination of the ACE data results in 10 alerts. Within the alerts, there are 
several Word, Excel, and several photos. However, several suspicious files are identified. 
The first is an html file with a file name over 45 characters in length and appearing to be 
random letters and numbers. Additionally, this file is located on CAE-02, which appears 
to be a Windows Server 2003 web server, suggesting the server may be compromised and 
serving a malicious file. The second suspicious file is named PsTools.zip, which appears 
to be the PsTools suite developed by Mark Russinovich. The alert is generated for a 
Windows 7 workstation, so it is extremely suspicious that a user’s workstation would 
need to have a tool suite capable of executing remote processes, dumping event logs, and 
killing processes [72]. 
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Data validation for Map Network Drive and print job memory scans are covered 
in sections 5.1.2 UC1.S1.Step 4: Data Validation and 5.1.4 UC1.S2.Step 4: Data 
Validation, respectively, and are not discussed in this section. 
5.2 UC2: Disable Defense Tools 
Defensive tools running on a user’s workstation are the last line of defense for an 
organization for either an external attack targeting a workstation, or against a malicious 
insider. Tools running inside the guest can provide more information than introspection, 
but can also be subverted. These scenarios focus on identification of an insider disabling 
an organization’s workstation defense tools. 
5.2.1 UC2.S1.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
Examining the alert generated for disabling Microsoft Security Essentials, show 
in Figure Figure 5.14, reveals a new registry entry is created. This value indicates the 
antivirus has been disabled on the workstation, leaving it vulnerable to exploitation by the 
insider or an external attacker. 
 
Figure 5.14: UC2.S1 Alert – Real-Time Protection 
 
As this scenario only attempts to address if disabling the user-level system 
protection can be detected, additional actions are not performed by the malicious insider, 
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except re-enabling the antivirus. During the time that it is disabled, the malicious insider 
could run any public and detected malware tool without being prevented. The resulting 
registry change is displayed in Figure 5.15. A post-incident forensic analysis not 
involving Compiled Memory Analysis Tool – Virtual (CMAT-V) would not reveal the 
antivirus was disabled and re-enabled unless the event logs are also examined. 
 
Figure 5.15: UC2.S1 Alert – Enable Antivirus 
 
Detection for the malicious insider is declared successful as the change can be 
observed through VMI. 
5.2.2 UC2.S1.Step 4: Data Validation 
On the malicious insider network (MIN), only the insider threat’s workstation 
generated potentially malicious alerts; non-malicious users who have Microsoft Security 
Essentials running on their computer did not generate an alert. 
Analyzing the ACE Hackfest data, no instances of the 
DisableRealtimeMonitoring registry entry are observed. Several possible alerts were 
generated for differences in the 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Microsoft 
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Antimalware\Real-Time Protection\DisableRealtimeMonitoring 
registry entry, but further analysis did not indicate potential malicious behavior.  
These alerts are observed on computers BSOD-8 and BSOD-10 Windows 7 
workstations. Further analysis of running processes from the exercise confirms Microsoft 
Security Essentials was running on the machines in question, as well as other machines 
during the exercise. Other machines had consistent registry entries throughout the 
exercise and had values identical to the Potentially Malicious portion of the alert for the 
aforementioned workstations. As a result, this alert can be declared non-malicious. 
5.2.3 UC2.S2.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
As shown in Figure 5.16, the Security event log shows the time and user 
responsible for clearing the event log on the system. Detection of this scenario is 
extremely limited as there are no VMI observables and only one total observable. As a 
result, detection is determined to be successful, but limited due to lack of observables. 
 
Figure 5.16: UC2.S2 Alert – EventLog 
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5.2.4 UC2.S2.Step 4: Data Validation 
The malicious insider network did not contain any feature files with mmc.exe 
process running. Furthermore, analysis of event logs from the non-malicious workstations 
and servers did not contain any log clear events. Examination of the ACE Hackfest data 
did not reveal any instances of the mmc.exe process. Analysis of the log files did reveal 
several instances of team BSOD clearing the Security event log; however, these instances 
did not occur during the exercise and can be attributed to preparation for the exercise and 
therefore not-malicious. If the date of the exercise was not known, clearing the event log 
should be considered a malicious action.  
5.2.5 UC2.S3.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
The first detectable action is the insider switching the browser to InPrivate 
browsing mode. The aforementioned string can be found in memory only while Internet 
Explorer is open and in InPrivate mode; after Internet Explorer is closed, no references to 
the aforementioned hex pattern are observed. Organizations should increase the 
frequency of full memory captures to accurately determine if InPrivate mode is in use. In 
addition to revealing the user is running Internet Explorer in private mode, it also reveals 
the titles for the web pages the user has browsed, although a separate solution is 
developed to determine sites visited. Figure 5.17 displays the detection of InPrivate 
browsing mode via the hex pattern VMI observable and also reveals web page titles can 
be determined by searching for this hex string; the insider visited a page called “Dark 
Comet RAT – official web site” while using InPrivate browsing. 
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Figure 5.17: UC2.S3 Alert – InPrivate Browsing History. 
The next observable is the browsing history. As previously mentioned, several 
hex patters are developed and a script is created to brute force the full memory captures 
to find unique instances of possible URLs. The python script can be found in Appendix 
G. The developed script also captures resources loaded on a webpage, even if the website 
providing the resources is not directly accessed by the user. For example if the user visits 
http://www.example.com and the page contains an image from http://www.image.com, 
both will be reported by the script. Figure 5.18 illustrates several of the URLs found in 
the generated alert.  
 
Figure 5.18: UC2.S3 Alert – Overall Browsing History 
 
For this scenario, the user explicitly visited darkcomet-rat.com, poison-ivy.org, 
and google.com. Further examination of the alert reveals several other suspicious sites 
 
127 
that are referenced during the malicious insider’s web browsing. These include 
infiltrated.net, evileyesoftware.com, nuclearwintercrew.com, and rootrulerz.com. 
Reproducing a Google search for “Poison Ivy RAT” reveals the several of the 
aforementioned suspicious sites to be links on the Google search result, as shown in 
Figure 5.19. 
 
 
Figure 5.19: UC2.S3 Alert – Google Search Reconstruction. 
 
Although this could be argued to be a false positive by reporting more than the 
user’s actual browser history, it is valuable to an analyst as it confirms the user’s actions 
are indeed malicious. Examining the alert generated from the next memory dump, after 
completing the scenario, reveals all of the URLs written to memory in this scenario are 
no longer present in memory. An organization should consider this when determining the 
frequency of full memory captures. 
The final action performed by the malicious insider in this scenario is 
downloading Poison Ivy RAT version 2.3.2. Similar to the previous detection method, 
scanning the full memory capture for a hex pattern is the only VMI observable. The 
 
128 
report generated immediately after executing the scenario encountered a control character 
and could not continue generating the alert. However, a subsequently generated alert 
reports the suspicious file, PI2.3.2.rar, as shown in Figure 5.20. A security analyst could 
take this information and quickly determine this is the same file name used for Poison Ivy 
RAT. 
 
Figure 5.20: UC2.S3 Alert – File Download. 
 
5.2.6 UC2.S3.Step 4: Data Validation 
No alerts are generated for private browsing for other users within the non-
malicious data set. Therefore, this detection method alerts to potentially malicious 
activity successfully for all analyzed data. For the ACE Hackfest network, no alerts are 
generated for InPrivate browsing.  
Analysis of alerts generated for web browsing history reveals a significant 
number of false positives for both non-malicious and ACE Hackfest data. This can be 
partially attributed to freed memory having data written directly around the browser 
history pattern. To reduce the number of false positives, files alerts with a size less than 
one hundred kilobytes are omitted from analysis. Examining the alerts generated on the 
two servers on the non-malicious network reveal a maximum file size of fifty seven 
kilobytes. Both of these servers did not browse the internet during the non-malicious 
experiment, so they provide an estimated file size baseline.  
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Using the adjusted baseline file size, fifty five alerts are generated and of these, 
forty-six contain browsing history. Twenty-two alerts are generated for the ACE Hackfest 
data set. Of these alerts, eighteen contain actual browsing history.  
During analysis of this scenario, a significant number of URLs are added while 
the insider is performing browsing the web to acquire a RAT. The alert file capturing this 
alert is three hundred forty two kilobytes and the subsequent alert, which shows the 
URLs being deleted, is three hundred thirty nine kilobytes. Therefore, using a minimum 
alert file size allows an organization to detect browsing history with greater confidence. 
To further aid detection, an organization should also consider employing blacklisting to 
alert for sites identified as especially dangerous. Since this method runs against a user’s 
workstation memory, encryption techniques, such as SSH or VPN tunneling, employed 
by the insider do not subvert detection. 
5.3 UC3: Removable Media 
A common exfiltration method for malicious insiders is using removable media. 
Prohibiting removable media through the use of checkpoints and physical security is not 
effect as the data is no longer in the organization’s control once it leaves the computer 
network. It is important for an organization to be able to monitor and detect suspicious 
removable media actions on a user’s workstation to mitigate insider threats. 
5.3.1 UC3.S1.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
Detection of the first action is successful using the registry key 53f56307-
b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b. The change to this registry key is shown in 
Figure 5.21. The alert shows a Western Digital (WD) My Passport USBSTOR device is 
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connected to the workstation. Depending on an organization’s policies, this single action 
may be determined to be malicious. 
 
Figure 5.21: UC3.S1 Alert – {53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}. 
 
The registry key 53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b, shown in 
Figure 5.22, also generates an alert for a new storage volume being added to the 
workstation. Analysis of a heavily used workstation revealed a difference between the 
two registry keys, but it is not clear why only certain devices are kept within the registry 
key 53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b, whereas the aforementioned 
key appears to contain a more extensive list. Nevertheless, detection of this action is 
successful. 
 
Figure 5.22: UC3.S1 Alert – {53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}. 
 
Additionally, this list appears to allow correlation for copy and paste actions 
between volumes. As illustrated in Figure 5.23, the newest drive connected to the system 
is the third item in the list, a detail that will be important for detection of the second 
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action. However, no additional information could be obtained other than the obvious new 
entry was added. The aforementioned keys should be used as they provide details 
regarding what type of device was connected to the system.  
 
 
Figure 5.23: UC3.S1 Alert – Volume. 
 
The second action performed by the malicious insider, copying and pasting the 
file FirewallSource.zip from the desktop to the external drive can be detected by 
monitoring the user’s clipboard. As mentioned in the detection of the last action, it can be 
determined which storage volume the user copied the files to by examining the clipboard 
destination operation. Shown in Figure 5.24, the source for the copy operation is 
HarddiskVolume2 and tgreen’s, the malicious insider, desktop. Although this copy action 
is within the work scope of the user, the subsequent paste operation is not and is 
suspicious.  
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Figure 5.24: UC3.S1 Alert - Clipboard Source. 
 
Figure 5.25 shows the resulting paste operation occurs to HarddiskVolume3. 
Recall from the previous action detection that the third connected volume is the external 
hard drive. The malicious insider has successfully copied the .zip file to an external drive 
and the last remaining step is to disconnect the removable media. As previously 
mentioned, no VMI observables were identified for this action. 
 
Figure 5.25: UC3.S1 Alert - Clipboard Destination. 
 
5.3.2 UC3.S1.Step 4: Data Validation 
Examining the non-malicious scenarios, three alerts are generated. Two of these 
alerts appear to have the same error several of the ACE workstations had. Specifically, 
the hard drive and CDROM device is not listed for several memory captures and causes 
an alert to be generated. However, examining all of the alerts revealed a true positive on 
workstation2. Further analysis of this alert reveals the device is a Western Digital 
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external hard drive. The registry key …\{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b} 
contains a subkey of: 
##?#USBSTOR#Disk&Ven_WD&Prod_My_Passport_0730&Rev_1016#575848314533314C
4B543237&0#{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}. Per the non-malicious 
script, no information was copied to the drive, but nevertheless, an alert is successfully 
created for this potentially malicious activity by the user on workstation 2.  
Executing the script to generate alerts for the ACE data resulted in 19 alert files 
being generated, indicating there is a change in one of the aforementioned registry keys 
for removable storage. Upon closer inspection, all of these are determined to be false-
positives. In approximately half of the alerts, the alert reported a change for the registry 
keys 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\{53f56307
-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}, 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Storage\Volume, and 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\{53f5630d
-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}. The alerts showed the hard drive and CDROM 
devices missing from all three keys and being added in a subsequent memory capture. It 
is suspected that this occurred because either the guest had crashed or was in the process 
of restarting when a memory capture was performed resulting in the registry entry not 
being found. The remaining false-positives occurred because the last modified timestamp 
on HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Storage\Volume 
changed between two memory captures. However, these alerts did not contain any 
additional changes and suggest the device may have been rebooted, but a dump did not 
occur during the reboot. 
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5.3.3 UC3.S2.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
The first generated alert is for a change in the Map Network Drive MRU registry 
entry. A third entry is added to this list and reveals the malicious insider connected to the 
computer 10.1.0.212 and to lscarlet’s personal folder. Analysis of the alert generated for 
MountPoints2 confirms the detection of this action. An organization should be extremely 
suspicious of a user connecting to another user’s workstation and accessing a personal 
directory. 
 
Figure 5.26: UC3.S2 Alert – Map Network Drive MRU 
 
Detection of the clipboard operations in this scenario is limited to brute force 
string searching due to CMAT-V limitations discussed in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, 
analysis of clipboard activity indicates the malicious insider copies NewHire, PayRoll 
and SocialSecurityNumber documents from lscarlet’s folder to the local C drive. The 
malicious insider’s actions  
The final alert generated for the scenario is for the two CD Burning registry 
entries. As previously mentioned, analysis of these two entries revealed they appear to 
contain the same information when a disc is burned using existing Windows 
functionality. The highlighted items from the alert are only present during and 
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immediately after the burn process is complete. An alert is generated for the next memory 
capture and shows the DefaultToMastered and Auto Close Wizard entries are removed. 
 
Figure 5.27: UC3.S2 Alert - CD Burning 
 
5.3.4 UC3.S2.Step 4: Data Validation 
Within the non-malicious network, three CD Burn alerts are generated. One CD 
Burning alert is generated for workstation 3 with user lscarlet, and another for bwhite on 
workstation4. The third alert is a false positive. The alerts contains the same additions to 
the CD Burning registry key as the malicious insider scenario, therefore it cannot be 
determined if these actions are malicious by examining this one action. If an organization 
explicitly prohibits optical media, this alert should be immediately acted upon. No alerts 
are generated for the CD Burning registry entries within the ACE Hackfest data.  
The non-malicious insider data set contains eleven alerts for MountPoints2 
registry entry and of these, nine are the result of actual user actions. The remaining two 
are false positives. None of these alerts appear to indicate insider actions. The ACE 
dataset contains thirteen alerts for the MountPoints2 registry entry and of these thirteen 
are false positives 
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5.4 UC4: Employee Behavior 
The ability to detect a change in employee behavior can improve the response 
time an organization has to an insider attack. The following section discusses the success 
of detecting the employee behavior scenarios. 
5.4.1 UC4.S1.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
Observing the alert generated for the network drive MRU reveals a new network 
drive is connected to the insider’s workstation. Figure 5.28 shows the insider connected 
to the CEO’s network folder and the MRUList is updated to indicate entry b is the most 
recently added entry to the key. This observed action is suspicious because the malicious 
insider is connecting to a folder not within their work scope. 
 
Figure 5.28: UC4.S1 Alert - Map Network Drive 
 
In addition to the network drive MRU, the aforementioned MountPoints2 registry 
key also shows the mounted drive. Figure 5.29 shows the examination of the alert 
generated for this registry entry. The Performance Reviews folder is a recently mapped 
network drive and added since the last full memory capture. 
 
Figure 5.29: UC4.S1 Alert - Mountpoints2 
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Analysis of the Windows clipboard increases the evidence against the insider and 
reveals the insider copied six files (Crawford-2011.docx, Green-2011.docx, Green-
2012.docx, Peacock-2011.docx, Scarlet-2011.docx, and White-2011.docx) from the 
Performance Review folder. In addition to accessing files outside of the insider’s work 
scope, an organization should also be suspicious of such a large copy operation at one 
time from a non-local drive. Such a large copy and paste operation on a non-local drive 
could be deemed by an organization to be an unauthorized action. 
 
Figure 5.30: UC4.S1 Alert – Clipboard File Copy 
 
The final action performed by the malicious insider is to open White-2011.docx. 
An alert is generated for the aforementioned Word MRU and upon examining this alert, 
the malicious insider’s action is detected. Figure 5.31 shows the document as the second 
most recently accessed Word document; the first item in the list is related to a different 
scenario. Item 2 also reinforces the detection of the previous copy and paste action’s 
detection since White-2011.docx is opened from tgreen’s Desktop. 
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Figure 5.31: UC4.S1 Alert – Word\File MRU 
 
5.4.2 UC4.S1.Step 4: Data Validation 
5.1.2 UC1.S1.Step 4: Data Validation discussed data validation for network drive 
MRU and therefore it will not be repeated in this section. Additionally, validation for 
Word MRU is covered in section 5.1.2 UC1.S1.Step 4: Data Validation. Clipboard file 
copy validation is not possible due to CMAT-V limitations discussed in Chapter 3. 
During VMI observable analysis of the full captures for this scenario, no reliable hex 
pattern could be identified to assist with file copy and paste detection without generating 
an exorbitant amount of false positives. 
5.4.3 UC4.S2.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
Detecting the iexplorer.exe process running is straightforward using CMAT-V’s 
feature files. However, since this action is frequently performed by non-malicious users, 
an alert for potential malicious activity cannot be created. Examining the second action 
allows an alert to be generated. The alert generated for browsing history, as shown in 
Figure 5.32, reveals the insider visits truecrypt.org, the homepage for TrueCrypt.  
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Figure 5.32: UC4.S2 Alert – Browser History. 
 
Additional analysis on the generated alert also shows the download page 
(www.truecrypt.org/downloads) is also visited by the malicious insider. Examining the 
…\TypedURLs browser history provides additional evidence of the suspicious browsing 
action. Figure 5.33 shows the output of the alert generated for the TypedURLs registry 
entry; truecrypt.org is the most recently added item in the list. 
 
Figure 5.33: UC4.S2 Alert –TypedURLs. 
 
Detection of the downloaded file is also successful via the memory dump 
scanning script. The alert correctly identifies TrueCrypt Setup 7.1a.exe as the 
downloaded file by the malicious insider in this scenario. Although the Poison Ivy 
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installation file is also listed in this alert, it is not highlighted as a new entry, meaning it is 
contained in a previous alert, but the artifact remains in memory. 
 
Figure 5.34: UC4.S2 Alert – File Download. 
 
The TrueCrypt process is caught by CMAT-V’s process feature file very quickly 
after it is executed. The installation process and TrueCrypt process are both detected in 
the process feature file. Table 5.2 contains a timeline of the installation and execution 
process of TrueCrypt. Between the third and fourth entries, TrueCrypt.exe remains open; 
however, it is omitted from the table for brevity. The first process name, TrueCrypt Setu, 
is truncated by CMAT-V. 
Table 5.2: UC4.S2 Detection – Running Process. 
Process ID Process Name Feature File Timestamp 
1676 TrueCrypt Setu* 03/21/2012 14:56:17 
1728 TrueCrypt.exe 03/21/2012 14:58:29 
1728 TrueCrypt.exe 03/21/2012 15:00:33 
1728 TrueCrypt.exe 03/21/2012 15:13:52 (Last recorded entry) 
* Denotes process name was truncated. 
Mounting a TrueCrypt volume is successfully detected via the 
…\MountedDevices registry entry. Figure 5.35 shows the alert generated from 
…\MountedDevices registry entry. Of particular interest in this alert is line 119; the 
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TrueCrypt volume is assigned to the local disc letter E. This is important for verifying 
any clipboard operations are sent to the E drive, which is unauthorized.  
 
Figure 5.35: UC4.S2 Alert – MountedDevices. 
 
Examining the Windows clipboard artifacts reveals the Word document is copied 
from the insider’s Z drive (mapped in another scenario to the organization’s network 
drive) to the E drive, the TrueCrypt volume. Detecting this action is the most important in 
the scenario as it undeniably confirms malicious intent by the insider; the insider has 
stolen company property. 
The last action performed by the insider is to dismount the TrueCrypt encrypted 
volume. Detection of this action is successful using the …\MountedDevices registry key 
discussed in the VMI observables section and an alert is generated. As shown in Figure 
5.36 the MountedDevices registry containing the value \DosDevices\E: has changed 
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to an unknown string. It is suspected that this string is a unique identifier assigned by 
Windows; however, analysis is not performed to determine the contents of the string 
because it is not necessary for detection of this action. 
 
Figure 5.36: UC4.S2 Alert - MountedDevices 
 
5.4.4 UC4.S2.Step 4: Data Validation 
Within MIN, the non-malicious users generated forty-seven file download alerts. 
A higher number is expected, as the non-malicious insiders explicitly downloaded files as 
part of the experiment. Due to the limited detection method in use for generating these 
alerts, only nineteen alerts are generated for file downloads. 
Analysis of the twenty-three alerts generated during the ACE Hackfest reveals 
several very suspicious files downloaded by users during the exercise, as well as some 
benign downloads. Of these twenty three, only five contained actual file downloads. 
Several alerts contained multiple downloaded files. Suspicious files include: 
secretsaucecports.exe, psexec.exe, kasper_zaebal.exe, and 7z920.exe. Files of interest, 
but not necessarily malicious are: CAE-Scavenger_Part2-Q1.docx, Part2Question3.doc, 
Fall 2011 Mission Directive  O-Plan ORIGINAL.docx, and Fall 2011 Mission Directive  
O-Plan (10 Aug 2011).docx.  
Non-malicious users on the MIN experiment did not visit any potentially 
suspicious sites. Examination of the twenty-seven generated TypedURLs alerts reveals 
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these users visited primarily social networking, webmail, and sports sites. This aligns 
with the script followed by the non-malicious users. Of these twenty-seven alerts, five are 
false positives generated from users logging on/off from the system. 
The TypedURLs registry entry generated thirteen alerts during the ACE Hackfest 
and of these five were false positives as a result of users logging on and off of the system. 
Most entries appear to be the result of normal web browsing; however the following 
suspicious entries are observed in the alert files: ftp://10.1.30.12/, 
Y:\nw4eiruow43hjrf89rn4q32n9w3480d983u9d843ud43jdc83w\1033\W3SVC1\87y3yq7
dn23y4nd2q73j4d87q4, peerblock (this appears to be a search using the address bar), and 
several web requests to 127.0.0.1. 
Within the non-malicious data set, three alerts are generated for the 
MountedDevices registry entry. Two of the alerts show the connection of the KernSafe 
TotalMounter product on workstation2 and the third is potentially malicious, showing a 
device is mounted to the E: drive. Examination of the MountedDevices registry entry 
within the ACE dataset revealed ten alerts and all are false positives. The alerts indicate 
the user logged on and off of the system and as a result, it shows the adding and removal 
of the default CD-Rom device provided by Xen to the guest.  
5.4.5 UC4.S3.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
Detection of this scenario is successful, except for one action performed by the 
insider. Figure 5.37 shows the successful detection of the command line actions 
performed by the insider.  
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Figure 5.37: UC4.S3 Alert – Command Line History 
 
Although the file copy is successfully detected and reported in the alert, ftp is an 
external program and therefore command line history analysis does not reveal the actual 
commands issued once connected to the ftp server. Despite not fully capturing all ftp 
commands, examining the alert generated reveals very suspicious behavior by the insider; 
copying files and then immediately performing an ftp to an unauthorized site should 
cause an organization to increase monitoring of the user or take immediate action. 
5.4.6 UC4.S3.Step 4: Data Validation 
Examining the non-malicious MIN data, two alerts are generated. Analysis of 
these alerts shows the user on workstation3 issues the command ipconfig. This command 
shows TCP/IP configuration information for the current computer. Two alerts are 
generated because the first alert shows a change in command history between memory 
captures at 16:22 and 16:32. The second alert is generated because cmd.exe is closed 
after memory dump 16:32 and before the next capture causing the command history to be 
lost. 
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Two alerts are generated for the ACE Hackfest data for command line usage. The 
first alert is a false positive; it does not contain any valid command line commands. The 
second generated alert shows the user executed the ipconfig dir, netstat, and ping 
commands. These commands could be considered suspicious, but without knowledge of 
the user’s job position, it cannot be determined if these are commands they would 
normally execute or a precursor to an attack. 
5.4.7 UC4.S4.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
Unlike the previous scenario, detection for file deletion is much more 
straightforward because an external program is not called from the command line. The 
malicious insider issues the del command individually on files, allowing the resulting 
alert to contain all of the deleted filenames. Workstation3 is mounted as a network drive 
in a previous scenario. Figure 5.38 shows the output from the generated alert for this 
scenario, detailing the actions performed by the malicious insider. 
 
Figure 5.38: UC4.S4 Alert – Command Line History. 
 
5.4.8 UC4.S4.Step 4: Data Validation 
Data validation for this scenario is identical to the previous scenario since both 
rely heavily on command line history. As previously described, two alerts are generated 
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for both the ACE and MIN data sets. The MIN alerts are determined to be benign. The 
true positive ACE alerts cannot be evaluated without knowledge of the user’s profession 
within the organization.  
5.4.9 UC4.S5.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
The CMAT-V user list successfully reports the additional user added to the 
system. The output of Mallory S-1-5-21-3020999182-1602362634-1125454158-1001          
C:\Users\Mallory from CMAT-V should immediately draw suspicion to the workstation 
to determine who created a new user account. Consulting the Windows event logs reveals 
tgreen, the malicious insider, created the new account on the workstation1 domain, which 
indicates the account is a local account. 
 
Figure 5.39: UC4.S5 Alert – Event Log. 
An alert is generated for the malicious insider’s action of connecting the external 
hard drive. Figure 5.40 shows the resulting alert. From the alert, it can be determined the 
malicious insider connected a Western Digital My Passport brand drive to the system. 
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Figure 5.40: UC4.S5 Alert – {53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b} 
 
5.4.10 UC4.S5.Step 4: Data Validation 
Investigation of the MIN data did not reveal any new accounts created during the 
exercise. Examining the ACE Hackfest data shows two accounts are created by the 
BSOD team, but before the exercise started. Both accounts are created on station1 and the 
accounts are named Test and Frank. Team CAE also created several local accounts before 
the start of the exercise; these accounts are: FTP, Work11, _vmware_user_, CAE, 
Work6, workstation5, user, and workstation1. Detection of removable devices in ACE 
and MIN data sets is discussed in section 5.3.2 UC3.S1.Step 4: Data Validation. 
5.5 UC5: Remote Access 
An insider employing remote access allows the attack to avoid detection by a 
coworker. Additionally, it also allows the insider threat to concentrate on only the attack 
and not try to pretend to be working on a task assigned by their supervisor. The ability of 
an organization to detect malicious remote access improves their insider threat mitigation 
strategy. 
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5.5.1 UC5.S1.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
An alert is successfully generated for the first action by the insider, connecting via 
RDP. A security analyst should also be suspicious of the time that the insider is 
connecting to the workstation; examining the time the alert is generated reveals the time 
the key is changed is at 0:20. Figure 5.41 shows the output of the alert generated for this 
action. Note how session name has changed to RDP-Tcp#0, indicating the current 
connection to the workstation is not via Console (local), but over RDP. Clientname has 
changed from null to displaying the hostname of the insider’s home computer. 
 
Figure 5.41: UC5.S1 Alert – Volatile Environment\1. 
 
To further confirm the alert generated for the Volatile Environment registry key, 
the ControlSet001 registry entry is created and as a result, an alert is generated. Figure 
5.42 shows the changed entries added to this registry key; analysis reveals the Base Name 
is TS, which is an abbreviation for Terminal Server, indicating the insider’s workstation 
at work is serving the RDP session to the insider’s personal computer at home. Port 
Description also confirms the hostname of the insider’s personal computer at home. 
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Figure 5.42: UC5.S1 Alert – Windows 7 #TS001 
Examination of the Windows clipboard reveals the insider copies FirewallSource 
from C:\Users\tgreen\Desktop to the C drive on their home computer. Additionally, the 
Joint Strike Fighter documents are copied to the insider’s home computer from a 
previously mounted network share. 
5.5.2 UC5.S1.Step 4: Data Validation 
Analysis of the ACE Hackfest data results in generation of seven alerts. Further 
examination reveals but all of these are a result of users logging off of their workstation 
and causing the Volatile Environment registry entry to be deleted; no non-malicious users 
performed an RDP connection from an external computer to their workstation. For the 
non-malicious users, nine alerts are generated, but these are also the result of users 
logging off of their workstation. 
5.5.3 UC5.S2.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
Detection of the malicious insider’s first action is successful and an alert is 
generated for each monitored registry entry. Examining the first portion of the alert 
generated, as shown in Figure 5.43, shows the Port Description changed since the last 
memory capture and also reveals the hostname for the connected computer.  
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Figure 5.43:  UC5.S2 Alert – Server 2003 #TS001 
 
The alert also contains additional information regarding the RDP connection by 
the insider, contained in Figure 5.44. The Volatile Environment registry entry confirms 
the connected computer name is AUTOPWN, but also shows the security analyst the 
connecting user is tgreen and the user authenticated to the domain using ADS01 domain 
controller. The time of the attack can be determined by examining the timestamp on the 
alert; the attack occurs at approximately 00:30. 
 
Figure 5.44: UC5.S2 Alert – Server 2003 Volatile Environment 
 
The alert generated for Network Drive MRU shows a new network drive is 
connected to the server by the malicious insider. Figure 5.45 demonstrates the detection 
of this step is successful and the user connecting the network drive is tgreen.  
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Figure 5.45: UC5.S2 Alert - Map Network Drive MRU 
 
Examination of the clipboard contents reveals the malicious insider copied the 
executable from their personal computer to the server, MS01. The malicious insider first 
copied the file to the server’s desktop and then to the mounted network drive, which is 
their workstation. 
5.5.4 UC5.S2.Step 4: Data Validation 
For non-malicious users, twelve alerts are generated. All alerts except for one are 
the result of normal logon and logoff activity by either users on their own workstation or 
network administrators managing the servers. One alert however reveals a user connected 
from workstation5 to MS01. Examination of the clipboard contents for workstation5 and 
MS01 at the same time this alert is generated does not reveal any suspicious files being 
copied and appears to be text from a Word document. Therefore this alert can be 
dismissed as a false positive. Eight are generated for a RDP during the ACE Hackfest 
data analysis. Examining the generated alerts reveals they are all a result of users logging 
on or off on their workstation and not using RDP to connect to another workstation.  
5.6 UC6: Clipboard Activity 
The last use case examined is clipboard activity. Due to CMAT-V limitations, file 
clipboard operations are pre-determined for malicious insider scenarios. This also limits 
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the ability to validate data for these scenarios against ACE Hackfest data as file clipboard 
operations cannot be examined.  
5.6.1 UC6.S1.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
The malicious insider’s first action is successfully alerted on and examining 
Figure 5.46 reveals the action. MS01 (10.1.0.205) is a public network drive, so accessing 
this through Windows explorer is not a suspicious action, but when combined with the 
following events, reveals malicious intent. 
 
Figure 5.46: UC6.S1 Alert – TypedPaths. 
 
An analyst should become suspicious during examination of the 
WordWheelQuery alert, shown in Figure 5.47. The insider performs a search and the item 
searched for since the last memory capture is “UAV”. Knowledge of the insider’s 
profession allows this action to be suspicious since the insider works on the firewall 
project and not the UAV. 
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Figure 5.47: UC6.S1 Alert – WordWheelQuery. 
 
The third generated alert, contained in Figure 5.48, reveals the insider accessed a 
document titled AirForceBriefing.docx, an unclassified document relating to the 
organization’s classified UAV project. Item 1 in the MRU list of Word documents is 
created by the insider to paste the contents of AirForceBriefing.docx into. 
 
Figure 5.48: UC6.S1 Alert – Word\File MRU. 
 
Examining the clipboard data contained within the memory capture revealed 
Microsoft Word contents, confirming the insider’s intentions are malicious. Brute force 
searching the memory capture also confirmed the clipboard operation employed the two 
previously mentioned files. 
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5.6.2 UC6.S1.Step 4: Data Validation 
Validation of the Word MRU list is covered in detail in section 5.1.2 UC1.S1.Step 
4: Data Validation and therefore is not covered again in this section. Additionally, 
WordWheelQuery analysis for ACE and MIN data sets is covered in section 5.1.4 
UC1.S2.Step 4: Data Validation. Analysis of the clipboard contents is limited due to 
inability to determine source and destination files or file directories. 
5.6.3 UC6.S2.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
The insider’s first action, accessing the UAV Word document, is successfully 
alerted through the File MRU registry entry. Figure 5.49 shows the resulting alert and the 
targeted document is the most recently accessed document in the MRU list. 
 
Figure 5.49: UC6.S2 Alert – Word\File MRU 
 
Continuing the attack, the insider opens Internet Explorer and navigates to 
pastebin.com. Detection of this action is successful using both the full memory capture 
scan (shown in X) and using the TypedURLs registry entry. If the malicious insider did 
not directly navigate to pastebin.com, the detection would still occur using the full 
memory capture. 
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Figure 5.50: UC6.S2 Alert – Browser History 
 
Finalizing the attack, the malicious insider pastes the contents of the clipboard to 
the web browser. Examining the clipboard contents reveals Microsoft Word text. Brute 
force searching of the memory capture also reveals the clipboard text source is the 
aforementioned word document. 
5.6.4 UC6.S2.Step 4: Data Validation 
Difficulties exist in examination of the MIN non-malicious user data. Clipboard 
contents can be observed, but without the ability to determine the source or destination 
application for the copy and paste operation, only blacklist string searches can be 
performed. As mentioned in section 5.2.6 UC2.S3.Step 4: Data Validation, extensive 
browser history alerts are generated for the MIN users. Alerts generated for the 
TypedURLs entry, as examined in section 5.4.4 UC4.S2.Step 4: Data Validation, 
revealed the MIN users did not directly navigate to any suspicious sites. 
Examining the ACE dataset for suspicious actions without knowledge of each 
user’s job functions is difficult. It cannot easily be determined if a user has authorized 
access to a file by only knowing a filename. Furthermore, examining clipboard text 
contents is not useful, unless an organization employed a blacklisting technique to 
monitor for prohibited or suspicious terms. 
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5.6.5 UC6.S3.Step 3: Malicious Insider Detection 
Observation of the user’s email activity is successful. The resulting alert shows 
the insider emailing the project lead for specifications on the UAV project and the project 
lead replying with the information. Figure 5.51 shows the response and targeted 
information. Examining email server log confirms the contents of the email. 
 
Figure 5.51: UC6.S3 Alert – Email Contents 
 
Determining the browser history is slightly more limited than in previous 
scenarios. The TypedURLs registry entry timestamp is not updated when a previously 
typed URL is accessed again. Instead, only the full memory scan can successfully detect 
the insider’s browsing activity.  
 
Figure 5.52: UC6.S3 Alert - Browser History 
 
Clipboard detection is not successful for this scenario. It is observed that the 
clipboard contains data, but it cannot be determined what the contents are. It is possible 
that the clipboard contents were overwritten between the insider copying the text to the 
clipboard and the next memory snapshot. This reinforces the importance of performing 
full memory captures on a short time interval. 
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5.6.6 UC6.S3.Step 4: Data Validation 
The MIN data set produced one hundred twenty-eight alert files over all seven 
machines. Almost all alerts over twenty-five kilobytes in size contained an actual email. 
Some of the false positives are a result of Outlook being closed on a user’s workstation 
and portions of the email body being overwritten in memory, while the hexadecimal 
identification pattern remained in memory, causing the system to believe new email 
contents existed within memory. An additional discovery is made while analyzing the 
MIN data set; the exchange server maintains all emails in memory. As a result, 
approximately twenty seven percent of alerts are generated by the Exchange server. 
Emails persisting in the Exchange server’s memory could be useful to an organization if 
an incident occurred where an insider modified or deleted the Exchange logs which 
existed on disk. No alerts are generated for the active directory server, which is logical as 
it does not handle any of the email process. 
Examining the data from the ACE Hackfest resulted in 18 generated alerts. 
Several of the generated alerts seemed to contain only binary information within the 
email body; perhaps these emails only contained an attachment. Other emails appeared to 
discuss tasks such as “problem 1”, “question 9”, “questions 1 and 8”, reference to an 
“official memo”, and other exercise related discussion. Since the detection method relies 
on pattern matching, it also detects several entries that have been dereferenced by 
Outlook and partially overwritten by the system, causing an alert to be incorrectly 
generated. 
Analysis from the TypedURLs registry entry for the ACE and MIN data sets can 
be found in section 5.4.4 UC4.S2.Step 4: Data Validation. 
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5.7 Results 
As stated in Chapter 3, the goal of this research was to determine if virtual 
machine introspection can be leveraged to alert to potential insider threats. This research 
does not use performance metrics, such as time to detection or detection accuracy, but 
only seeks to provide a solution for the research goal. Chapter 3 also introduces the 
methodology to decompose use cases into specific scenarios performed. Scenarios are 
then broken down using a modified computer and network incident taxonomy and to 
facilitate identification of VMI observables.  
Table 5.3 summarizes the results of generated alerts for each previously identified 
observable. The first entry in a column indicates false positives, which could be 
eliminated by enhancing the functionality of the alert generation tool. An alert was 
generated because the observable changed significantly from the previous memory 
capture, but in these cases, it is often the result of logging on or off of a system. It is 
important to note that one logoff event would cause all listed observables to generate a 
false positive as the registry keys no longer exist. The second value, contained in 
parenthesis, is generated as the result of actual user action on a workstation or server. 
Examination of these alerts does not indicate malicious insider behavior. The values 
contained within the square brackets indicate potentially malicious insider behavior and 
should be investigated. For both data sets, this value is fairly limited. When looking at the 
false positives reported, it is important to note that the reported numbers are not taking 
into account additional steps performed in a scenario. These values represent only the 
analysis of each observable individually. 
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Table 5.3: False Positives in Observables. 
ACE Normal VMI Observable 
12(2) 6(0) 
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Environments\
Windows NT x86\Drivers\Version-3 
12(0) 4(0) 
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Monitors\Stand
ard TCP/IP Port\Ports 
12(0) 4(0) 
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Hardware 
Profiles\0001\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Printe
rs 
9(0) 23(8) 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer
\TypedPaths 
0(0) 0(2)[1] 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer
\Map Network Drive MRU 
0(9) 0(12) HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\12.0\Word\File MRU 
0(7) 0(5) 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer
\WordWheelQuery 
7(0) 9(0) HKCU\Volatile Environment\1 & HKCU\Volatile Environment 
5(5) 7(27) 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer
\RecentDocs 
0(0) 0(0) 
HKLM \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Microsoft Antimalware\Real-
Time Protection\DisableRealtimeMonitoring 
19(0) 2(0)[1] 
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\{53f56
307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b} 
19(0) 2(0)[1] 
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\{53f56
30d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b} 
19(0) 2(0)[1] HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Storage\Volume\ 
13(0) 2(9) 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer
\MountPoints2 
0(0) 1(0)[2] 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer
\CD Burning 
0(0) 1(0)[2] 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer
\Shell Folders\CD Burning 
5(4)[4] 5(27) HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\TypedURLs 
10(0) 0(2)[1] HKLM\SYSTEM\MountedDevices 
8(0) 11(1) 
… {28d78fad-5a12-11d1-ae5b-0000f803a8c2}\#TS001 (Both 
W2003 & W7) 
0(0) 0(0) InPrivate Browsing 
0(0) 20(3)[2] Print Jobs 
18(5) 28(19) File Downloads 
4(18) 9(46) Browsing History 
172(50)[4] 136(115)[11] Totals 
   
Reducing false positives of the tool (the first entry in each column in Table 5.3) 
would not impact the success rate for alerting of the malicious insider scenarios. These 
alerts are the result of a registry entries no longer existing after a user logs off of the 
system, or conversely, the creation of a registry entry when a user logs onto the system. 
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Consequently, eliminating these false positive alerts would not impact the success of 
alerting for malicious insiders, but would affect the cost of investigation. 
To eliminate the false positives as a result of user action (the second entry in each 
column in Table 5.3), significant enhancements would need to be made. Specifically, 
each user’s work scope and related documents would need to be known by the alert 
generation tool, which would provide a white list for user actions. Unfortunately, this 
would require significant overhead to setup and maintain and would generate alerts any 
time a user created a new document. An alternative to this would be a blacklist on either 
per user or per group basis. It is expected that this would also suffer from a similar over 
head as whitelisting. A third solution would be to begin to incorporate behavioral analysis 
into the alert generation process. 
Table 5.4 summarizes the results of comparing the developed alert methods 
against the malicious insider, non-malicious, and ACE Hackfest data sets. All generated 
malicious insider threat scenarios are successfully detected within the insider data set, 
when accounting for all assumptions previously identified. Specifically, all scenarios 
were performed within the time span of one memory capture and each action was 
performed in the order listed. For non-insider data sets, generated alerts are examined to 
determine if they match the same alerts generated for a malicious insider scenario. For 
example, an alert may be generated for a remote access action, but clipboard and file 
registry entry alerts are not generated. The ACE Hackfest could not have an outcome 
determined for the three scenarios associated with use case six (UC6) as the source and 
destination files or programs could not be determined for the clipboard operations. 
Without knowing source and destination, an analyst essentially only has a small piece of 
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text they could inspect for blacklisted strings. For non-malicious data, no insider activity 
was alerted when examining the scenario as a whole. 
Table 5.4: Malicious Insider Scenario Detection. 
Scenario Insider Non-Malicious ACE Hackfest 
UC1.S1 Detected Not Present Not Present 
UC1.S2 Detected Not Present Not Present 
UC1.S3 Detected Not Present Not Present 
UC2.S1 Detected Not Present Not Present 
UC2.S2 Detected Not Present Not Present 
UC2.S3 Detected Not Present Not Present 
UC3.S1 Detected Not Present Not Present 
UC3.S2 Detected Not Present Not Present 
UC4.S1 Detected Not Present Not Present 
UC4.S2 Detected Not Present Not Present 
UC4.S3 Detected Not Present Not Present 
UC4.S4 Detected Not Present Not Present 
UC4.S5 Detected Not Present Not Present 
UC5.S1 Detected Not Present Not Present 
UC5.S2 Detected Not Present Not Present 
UC6.S1 Detected Not Present Unknown 
UC6.S2 Detected Not Present Unknown 
UC6.S3 Detected Not Present Unknown 
5.8 Summary 
This chapter presented the six use cases previously identified in Chapter 4. It 
presented steps three and four, detailing the detection for each observable action 
previously identified and comparing the detection techniques against two data sets not 
containing an insider threat. 
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter presents a summary of the insider threat alert mechanisms evaluated 
in Chapter 5. The first section discusses the importance of the research. Next, the second 
section discusses limitations identified within the research. The third section provides 
ideas for future research in the area of virtual machine introspection (VMI) to alert for 
potential malicious insiders. The chapter concludes with a discussion of conclusions 
drawn from the thesis. 
6.1 Importance of Research 
This research is significant in that it presented a reproducible methodology which 
can be employed to alert for additional malicious insider attack vectors. Additionally, it 
provided alert mechanisms for six use cases and their corresponding scenarios.  
Furthermore, the research advanced mitigation techniques for the problem of 
insider threat. A novel approach to workstation insider threat alerting is presented and 
functions in a transparent manner to the individual under observation. Transparency to 
the user provides the insider with a potential false sense of security by not knowing of the 
existence of the organization’s monitoring capabilities. Future work in this area, 
specifically the items mentioned in Section 6.3, which extends upon this thesis, would 
further aid mitigation strategies. 
6.2 Limitations 
The methodology presented in this research was successful in alerting for all 
insider threat scenarios. However, several scenarios had a limited number of available 
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observables, or relied solely upon event logs, making detection of a sequence of 
potentially malicious actions difficult. 
6.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
This research focused on leveraging existing functionality of Compiled Memory 
Analysis Tool – Virtual (CMAT-V) to alert for potentially malicious insider behavior 
within a guest virtual machine. Discussed below is future work recommendations based 
on information learned during the process of this research. 
6.3.1 Clipboard Research 
CMAT-V currently contains functionality to capture text from the clipboard. The 
clipboard is accessed from the kernel by traversing PsLoadedModuleList to find 
win32k.sys. After this is located, win32k.pdb is obtained, either locally or from the 
Microsoft symbol server. With this information, the symbol gSharedInfo can be located. 
With this information, CMAT loops through clipboard formats which are referenced by a 
pointer from Windows Station. After determining the clipboard format, the handle is 
converted and clipboard data obtained [45].  
6.3.1.1 User Level Clipboard 
The main problem with user level clipboard file operations is the lack of a global 
structure to maintain the clipboard value. For text operations, the function 
GetClipboardData uses an offset to gSharedInfo to maintain persistence of the clipboard 
text between applications. File operations are handled somewhat differently. During 
analysis, multiple functions were identified using both MSDN documentation and 
IDAPro which potentially contained useful clipboard file information.  
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The MSDN documentation lists a clipboard format named CF_HDROP. The data 
is a STGMEDIUM structure [73]. STGMEDIUM consists of a tymed double word which 
records the storage medium type, a union of seven variables and a pointer to allow the 
sending process to control how the data is released [74]. CF_HDROP was of interested 
because through the DROPFILES structure, a double null terminated character array that 
contained the source and destination file names and paths could be obtained. However, 
no functions with the necessary data structures which would have allowed recovered of 
the double null terminated array never triggered breakpoints when using WinDbg. These 
functions appear to be only called by applications and not by Windows itself. 
The last investigated area was IDataObject. Described by [75], the process for an 
application developer to obtain file names from files on the clipboard is to first call 
OleGetClipboard to obtain the object’s IDataObject interface. The IDataObject contained 
within OleGetClipboard contains a pointer to an unknown structure or function. MSDN 
documentation does not elaborate on what is contained within the structure [76]. It only 
lists several functions which can be called by application developers. Reverse 
engineering IDataObject without any documentation or disassembled code is difficult and 
due to the limited time constraints for this project, it was not completed and left for future 
work. To develop an alternative solution, the kernel level clipboard was examined. 
6.3.1.2 Kernel Level Clipboard 
Unlike the user level clipboard, obtaining information regarding clipboard 
command line file operations through kernel function calls is fairly straightforward. The 
Microsoft Developer Network (MSDN) site contains several documented functions for 
clipboard operations contained within Kernel32.dll. The desired information, source and 
 
165 
destination file path, are listed as input variables to these functions. Several additional 
functions were identified using IDAPro which appeared to possibly be relevant to the 
clipboard operation. Using WinDbg, breakpoints were placed on these functions and a 
Ctrl C and Ctrl V file copy and paste was performed. Unfortunately none of the 
breakpoints were hit. Using drag and drop, as well as right click copy and paste also 
produced the same results. The final file copy and paste technique performed was via 
command line copy function. This function did trigger several breakpoints. The most 
useful breakpoint appeared to be CopyFileEx. On the first call to this function, the source 
file path pointer is contained at EBP + 8h and the destination file path pointer is 
contained at EBP + Ch. The pointers to the file paths only exist within the CopyFileEx 
function. It is not possible to access this data after execution of the function completes. 
No functions within Kernel32 were observed to be called when a copy and pasted was 
performed in any other manner than command line. 
6.3.1.3 Kernel File Operations 
Within the kernel, several other potentially useful file operation functions are 
identified. The first is MoveFileExW. This function is called when a user performs a drag 
and drop move operation (but not a copy), or the command line mov operation. During 
the function execution, EBP + 8h contains a pointer to the source file. Similarly, EBP + 
Ch contains a pointer to the destination file for the move operation.  
The final file operation observable through kernel functions is file deletion. Being 
able to detect every file deletion operation would greatly assist real-time insider threat 
detection on a user’s workstation. The function DeleteFileWStub was determined via 
WinDbg to be called when a user performs a permanent file delete (Shift + Delete) or the 
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command line function del. Within this function, the pointer at EBP + 8h contains the full 
path to the file being deleted.  
When a user performs a regular delete using only the delete key, the 
aforementioned MoveFileExW is called. This makes sense because technically the action 
performed is simply moving the document to the recycle bin. EBP + 8h again contains a 
pointer to the source document to be deleted. Following this pointer gives the full file 
path to the document. EBP + Ch also contains a pointer and following this reveals the 
destination for the delete operation is the recycle bin. However, the destination file path is 
not simply C:\$RECYCLE BIN. The destination path is C:\$RECYCLE 
BIN\SID\$(unknown).<EXTENSION>. In place of the filename, a string of seven 
characters appeared after the dollar sign. No investigation was performed to determine 
how the string was generated as the goal of detecting a file being deleted was 
accomplished. 
6.3.2 Printer Research 
As previously discussed, reverse engineering was performed to determine 
information regarding Windows print contents, but could not be implemented due to 
limitations with CMAT-V. Developing functionality to capture print queue contents 
would greatly improve introspection capabilities and eliminate the need for brute force 
string searches through memory and consequently reduce and likely eliminate false 
positives.  
Analysis and reverse engineering of the Windows printer was only performed 
against a Windows 7 Service Pack 0 virtual machine; it is suspected that Windows 7 
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Service Pack 1, Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008 likely have similar printing 
behavior, but further analysis would need to be performed to verify. 
Functions within User32 and WinSpool were evaluated to determine if any were 
suitable for capturing desired information regarding print job information. Analysis 
started with these functions because they were loaded when printing a sample Notepad 
document. However, the desired information could not be readily obtained and SpoolSV 
was selected for further investigation. Using IDAPro to disassemble the Windows 
binaries and WinDbg to debug a running SpoolSV, detailed information regarding print 
jobs was found in GetJob. Two GetJob functions exist within SpoolSV; GetJobW which 
handles Unicode data, and GetJobA which is used for ANSI. This function contains a 
pointer which references either a JOB_INFO_1 or a JOB_INFO_2 structure, both of 
which contain valuable information regarding print jobs.  
Multiple test print jobs were sent while debugging the VM using WinDbg. 
GetJobW is called several times while the system is printing a single document. In order 
to obtain the JOB_INFO information, cbBuf was monitored until it contained a value.  
cbBuf (EBP + 18h) is an input variable to the GetJob function and contains the size of the 
array, represented in bytes. Additionally, after this occurs, the variable pJob may be null. 
According to Microsoft’s documentation, cbBuf is sent with a null value to GetJob in 
order to determine the required buffer size for pJob. pJob (EBP + 14h) will then contain a 
pointer to either a JOB_INFO_1 or a JOB_INFO_2 structure. Following this pointer 
reveals the desired print job information. Specific items of interest include pPrinterName, 
pMachineName, pUserName, pDocument, and TotalPages. It was observed that 
PagesPrinted did not seem to change; it is suspected that this may be updated through a 
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different callstack. Within the GetJob function, hPrinter pointer did not reliably contain 
information regarding the printer and when data was in the pointer, it only contained the 
printer and not any information regarding the document; it was easier to allow SpoolSV 
to continue execution to obtain the JOB_INFO structure. 
6.3.3 VMware and VirtualBox 
During the final documentation stages of this thesis, development of a driver 
which enables VMware implementation of CMAT-V was completed. This driver 
executes within the virtual machine, so it could be compromised by malware or a 
technically proficient insider, but it is well suited for academia settings. VMware does 
not suffer from the same USB limitations as Xen. Additionally, the driver would allow 
file clipboard monitoring as well as monitoring the GetJob SpoolSV function. VMware 
does not have a publically available application programming interface (API) developers 
can access, meaning developing a solution that does not have any components executing 
of the guest would require extensive reverse engineering of the VMware application itself 
in addition to reverse engineering any desired Windows components.  
VirtualBox, a virtualization package developed by Oracle has a publically 
available API, with several documented functions that appear to allow arbitrary reading 
and writing of guest memory. Unfortunately, these functions are listed as not 
implemented as of this writing (4.1.12), but are listed as possibly being implemented 
sometime in version 4. It may be advantageous to develop a proof-of-concept once these 
features are implemented within the VirtualBox API. If the API’s features reveal similar 
information as XenAccess, CMAT-V should be ported to VirtualBox. Moving to 
VirtualBox would eliminate the reliance on XenAccess and its older dependencies and 
 
169 
would allow either Linux or Windows hosts, increasing the potential adoption of this 
research. Furthermore, it would also eliminate the need for extensive workarounds 
discussed in Chapter 3 for USB devices. 
6.4 Summary 
This research provided several benefits to the field of insider threat mitigation, by 
investigating the ability to signal potential malicious insider activity on a Windows 
workstation through the use of VMI. The first benefit provided is the solution to the 
initial research goal and demonstrating a novel approach.  
The second benefit provided is indirectly provided through obtaining a solution to 
the research and required development of a repeatable methodology. This methodology 
enabled each use case to have scenarios generated to support several possible attack 
vectors. A finite methodology allows organizations employing this insider threat 
mitigation solution to rapidly analyze attack vectors specific to their network, or add 
additional vectors not covered in this research.  
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Appendix A: Acronym List 
ACE Advanced Cyber Education 
AFIT Air Force Institute of Technology 
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange 
AV Anti-Virus 
CCR Center for Cyberspace Research 
CD Compact Disc 
CD-RW Compact Disc-Rewritable 
CDX Cyber Defense Exercise 
CentOS Community Enterprise Operating System 
CERT Computer Emergency Response Team 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability 
CMAT-V Compiled Memory Analysis Tool – Virtual 
CNE Computer Network Exploitation  
CNO Computer Network Operations 
DSS Defense Security Service 
DoD Department of Defense 
DNS Domain Name System 
DPI Deep Packet Inspection 
DVD Digital Video Disc 
FTP File Transfer Protocol 
IC Intelligence Community 
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
IP Intellectual Property 
ISO International Organization for Standardization  
ITDS Insider Threat Detection System 
MAC Media Access Control 
MRU Most Recently Used 
NIC Network Interface Card 
NSA National Security Agency 
PDB Program Database 
RAID Redundant Array of Independent Disks 
RAT Remote Administration Tool 
RDC Remote Desktop Connection 
RDP Remote Desktop Protocol 
S Scenario 
SSD Solid State Drive 
SSH Secure Shell 
SSL Secure Sockets Layer 
UC Use Case 
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VIX Virtual Introspection tools developed for Xen 
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network 
VMI Virtual Machine Introspection 
VMM Virtual Machine Manager 
WPAFB Wright-Patterson Air Force Base 
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Appendix B: Xen Configuration 
Parameter Value on Host1 Value on Host2 
host insiderthreat insiderthreat2 
release 2.6.18-194.el5xen 2.6.18-194.el5xen 
version 
#1 SMP Fri Apr 2 16:16:54 EST 
2010 
#1 SMP Fri Apr 2 16:16:54 EST 
2010 
machine i686 i686 
nr_cpus 4 4 
nr_nodes 1 1 
sockets_per_node 2 1 
cores_per_socket 2 2 
threads_per_core 1 2 
cpu_mhz 2992 2693 
hw_caps (omitted for brevity) (omitted for brevity) 
total_memory 4093 8149 
free_memory 383 383 
node_to_cpu node0:0-3 node0:0-3 
xen_major 3 3 
xen_minor 1 1 
xen_extra .2-194.el5 .2-194.el5 
xen_caps 
xen-3.0-x86_32p hvm-3.0-
x86_32 hvm-3.0-x86_32p 
xen-3.0-x86_32p hvm-3.0-
x86_32 hvm-3.0-x86_32p 
xen_pagesize 4096 4096 
platform_params virt_start=0xf5800000 virt_start=0xf5800000 
xen_changeset unavailable unavailable 
cc_compiler 
gcc version 4.1.2 20080704 
(Red Hat 4.1.2-48) 
gcc version 4.1.2 20080704 
(Red Hat 4.1.2-48) 
cc_compile_by mockbuild mockbuild 
cc_compile_domain centos.org centos.org 
cc_compile_date Fri Apr 2 14:50:47 EDT 2010 Fri Apr 2 14:50:47 EDT 2010 
xend_config_format 2 2 
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Appendix C: Malicious Insider Threat Script 
Scenario 
Start 
Time 
Finish 
Time 
Steps 
UC2.S2 11:38 11:40 
Open Windows Event Viewer 
Clear Security Log 
Clear System Log 
Workstation times changed to pre-DST time (Now +1 of Dom0 time). Servers did not change. 
UC2.S1 12:57 12:59 
Open Microsoft Security Essentials 
Disable Real-Time Protection 
* 14:57 14:57 
Open Microsoft Security Essentials 
Enable Real-Time Protection 
UC2.S3 13:10 13:16 
Open InPrivate browsing 
Attempt to download DarkCometRAT (Failed) 
Search for Poison Ivy 
Download PoisonIvyRAT 
UC6.S1 13:25 13:32 
Navigate to 10.1.0.205 
Search for UAV 
Open AirForceBriefing.docx 
Copy text to clipboard 
Create new Word document named UAVData.docx 
Paste contents of document and save 
UC1.S1 14:55 15:06 
Map MS01\Organization\Project\Firewall to the Z drive. 
Connect printer to workstation 
Print FirewallProjectProposal 
UC4.S1 15:35** 15:37 
Map Y drive to \\10.1.0.205\Organization\ 
Mustard\Performance Reviews 
Copy all listed performance reviews to Desktop 
Open White-2011.docx 
UC1.S2 15:37 15:40 
Navigate to \\10.1.0.205 
Search for “Classified” 
Open AirForceBriefing.docx 
Print to local printer 
UC4.S2 15:50 16:05 
Open Internet Explorer and navigate to truecrypt.org 
Download Truecrypt and install with default settings 
Create and mount truecrypt volume as E: 
Copy FirewallProjectProposal.docx from network drive to 
TrueCrypt volume 
Dismount TrueCrypt volume 
UC6.S2 16:06 16:10 
Open unmanned systems icd draft v2-2 (aroc 
approved).docx 
Copy contents to clipboard 
Navigate to pastebin.com 
Paste contents and submit (Submit does not work on IE8) 
UC3.S1 16:23 16:39 
Connect USB hard drive to workstation 
Copy FirewallSource.zip to clipboard 
Disconnect USB Harddrive 
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Scenario 
Start 
Time 
Finish 
Time 
Steps 
UC4.S3 16:40 16:52 
Open command line 
Navigate to desktop and make a folder named files 
copy z:\FirewallSource.zip to 
c:\Users\tgreen\Desktop\files 
Issue ftp –help 
Issue ftp martincrawford.net 
Transfer file and quit FTP session 
UC3.S2 17:20 17:28 
Mount workstation3\users\lscarlet to X 
Copy NewHire, Payroll, SocialSecurityNumber to C:\ 
Mount KernSafe virtual CD-RW 
Create CD named PayrollData 
Burn files using Windows functionality 
UC4.S4 17:52 17:53 
Open command prompt 
Connect to existing mapped network drive X: 
List directory contents 
Delete each file individually 
UC6.S3 18:05 18:08 
Open Outlook and access UAV Specs email 
Open Internet Explorer 
Copy contents of email 
Navigate to pastebin.com 
Paste email contents 
UC4.S5 18:34 18:36 
Create local administrator account Mallory 
Logoff and login as Mallory 
Connect USB hard drive 
Copy Payroll.xlsx to removable drive 
Disconnect removable drive 
UC1.S3 00:02 00:10 
Access computer at suspicious time 
Map \\MS01\Organization to local drive 
Copy Logger.cpp, PacketInspection.cpp, AutoUpdate.cpp, 
VM Configuration.xlsx, and Passwords.xlsx to the Desktop 
Print all documents to local printer 
UC5.S1 00:12 00:21 
Connect to workstation1 from personal computer via RDP 
Copy and paste FirewallSource.zip to C drive on home 
computer 
Copy JointStrikeFighter.docx to C drive on home computer 
Close RDP session 
UC5.S2 00:22 00:31 
Connect to MS01 from personal computer via RDP 
Mount workstation1\Users\tgreen to MS01 network drive 
Copy DarkCometRAT.exe from personal computer to MS01 
Copy executable from MS01 to mounted network drive 
(workstation1) 
Close RDP session 
*Denotes this set of actions is not a separate scenario. Listed times are DomU times. 
**Denotes CMAT-V crashed during the execution of the scenario and was restarted.  
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Appendix D: Normal User Script (Workstations 1-3) Modified from [67] 
Start Finish Host  Description 
11:42 1145 w7_2 Performance review for mr. green 
1145 1148 w7_2 email review for green 
1148 
 
w7_1 Read email 
1148 1152 w7_3 Read email 
  
w7_2 map network drive (mustard to Z) 
1151 
 
w7_3 open ie 
1152 1154 w7_3 google dog pics 
Workstation times changed to pre-DST time (Now +1 of Dom0 time). Servers did not change. 
1254 1254 w7_3 copy dog pic to clipboard 
1255 1256 w7_3 email mustard dog pic 
1256 1256 w7_3 Close IE, close explorer 
1257 1259 w7_1 Disable AV 
1257 13:01 w7_2 Read dog picture email 
1301 1308 w7_3 Create password protected file(newhire.docx) 
1303 1303 w7_3 Map human resources network drive to Z 
1312 1312 w7_2 Print green 2012 performance eval to lissard (Green-2012.docx) 
1321 1334 w7_3 Navigate to www.reddit.com/r/funny 
1322 1334 w7_3 
compose email to col mustard with funnypic.jpg on clipboard and 
pasted to email 
1332 1332 w7_2 Games do not work (no DirectX support) 
1334 1335 w7_3 Reply to girls night out 
1338 1340 w7_1 email col m ustard for raise 
1339 1342 w7_2 Emails the 3 women for their evaluations 
1342 1350 w7_2 reads mr. green's eval response 
1342 1350 w7_3 reads ccol. Mustards evaluation email 
1452 1254 w7_3 OK' email from scarlet to white 
15:04 15:12 w7_2 Bath Salts search + images 
15:09 15:12 w7_2 Add bath salts to favorites ('Figero') 
15:12 15:12 w7_2 Search own pc for 'Bath Salts' 
15:12 15:16 w7_3 
Searach google for swinger, swingers, swinger pin, swinger bumper 
sticker 
15:16 15:22 w7_3 Open swingerpin3 in image viewer 
15:17 15:17 w7_1 direct navigate to ameritrade.com 
15:17 15:17 w7_1 bookmark ameritrade 
15:17 15:21 w7_1 google search for ameritrade 
15:21 15:25 w7_1 search for ferrari 
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Start Finish Host  Description 
15:27 15:28 w7_1 Email to peacock, scarlet, white 
15:31 15:37 w7_3 Read Ok email 
15:35 15:37 w7_1 Map network drive to mustard's performance evals (Y drive) 
15:35 15:37 w7_1 Copy all evals to desktop and open White-2011.docx 
15:43 15:46 w7_2 
direct navigate to pga.com, search for golf, golf course, pga, pga 
tour 
15:46 15:46 w7_2 Reply to green's raise email 
15:48 15:48 w7_1 Reads mustard's email 
16:09 16:09 w7_1 Black hat requist to mustard 
16:09 16:14 w7_2 Mustard reply blackhat 
16:15 16:15 w7_1 Email to Ms. White for tech specs on UAV 
16:15 16:26 w7_1 read mustards email 
16:16 16:16 w7_3 Swinger email to peacock 
16:44 16:46 w7_1 Green drinks email. Included ferrari picture 
16:46 16:46 w7_3 Scarlet reply to green 
16:51 
 
w7_3 
Scarlet web browsing(reddit, facebook, gmail, youtube, pandora, 
amazon,chase) 
16:58 16:59 w7_3 print document from chase page 
17:08 17:18 w7_3 email reply for mr. plum. His SSN is on the clipboard, 534-23-1235 
17:10 17:10 w7_2 Copy Crawford-2011.docx from network share to Desktop 
17:21 17:21 w7_3 
copy newHire.docx, payroll.xsls, socialSecurityNumbers.docx to My 
Documents 
17:44 
 
w7_2 
Mustard web browsing(reddit, facebook, gmail, youtube, pandora, 
amazon,chase) 
17:44 17:44 w7_2 Search for Crawford in mustard network share 
17:44 17:44 w7_2 Open Crawford-2011.docx 
17:57 17:58 w7_3 Emails mustard about missing files on the system 
17:55 17:55 w7_3 "the expected revenue for 2012…" text on clipboard 
18:03 18:03 w7_2 Forward scarlets email to security engineer 
18:04 18:04 w7_2 lsPassword!123 text on clipboard 
18:09 18:12 w7_3 Copy and paste swingers.txt contents from notepad to outlook 
18:23 
 
w7_3 
Copy swingers.txt to swingers - Copy.txt. Rename to Swingers May 
Invite. Copy from Desktop to …\lscarlet\ 
18:27 
 
w7_2 Print Files Missing email from Scarlet to Lissard printer 
18:28 
 
w7_3 Print swingers.txt, Swingers May Invite.txt 
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Appendix E: Normal User Script (Workstations 4-5) Modified from [67] 
Start Host Description 
11:38 7_5 
Opens Personal Information File in share drive. Open Payroll 
document. Excel document 
11:43 7_5 Opens Internet Exporer. Googles Dogs Pictures. 
11:46 7_5 Downloads Doggy Picture From Internet 
11:48 7_5 Read Email, Microsoft Outlook 
11:51 7_5 Close Outlook, Excell, and photo viewer 
11:53 
 
Googled "Divorce in Ohio" 
Workstation times changed to pre-DST time (Now +1 of Dom0 time). Servers did not change. 
12:57 7_5 Down Divorce Documents for Court PDF file "otf.pdf" 
12:59 7_4 Google Search "Cage fighting" 
13:03 7_5 Opened Calc.exe 
13:03 7_4 
video results in search need flash installed to watch video. Installed 
flash from adobe.com and installed flash 
13:06 7_5 Opened sticky notes software 
13:10 CMAT Memory Capture Seg Fault, Had to restart 
13:12 7_4 Logged Off, 1 min later Logged on 
13:14 7_4 Cage Fighting google search 
13:15 7_4 Google Search "Octagon" 
13:17 7_4 Google search "Cage Fighting Schedule dc" 
13:20 7_5 Google search "Divorce Law" 
13:20 
 
Seg Fault Restarted CMAT 
13:27 7_5 Opened outlook email  
13:29 7_4 Opened outlook 
13:32 7_4 Sent Email to Scarlet and Peacock 
14:54 7_4 Google Search "Cage fighting schedule dc" 
14:59 7_4 Downloaded Google chrome. IE keeps crashing 
15:01 7_4 Started Using Chrome. Google Search "Cage fighting women dc" 
15:04 7_4 Youtube Search "Cage Fighting Women" 
15:05 7_4 Google Search "Cock Fighting" 
15:05 7_4 Google Search"Cock Fighting DC" 
15:08 7_4 Google Search "Cock Fighting Schedule" 
15:15 7_4 Email Reply To Scarlet 
15:18 7_5 
Opened Paint. Made a Paint document and altered puppy picture that 
was saved on desktop 
15:20 7_5 Opened Calculator 
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Start Host Description 
15:21 7_5 
Played Kalimba music (Under Sample Music), Could not play because 
not sound installed 
15:23 7_5 Opened MS Excel 
15:24 7_5 Opened MS power Point 
15:24 7_5 Opened CMD window 
15:25 7_5 Opened MS Words 
15:27 7_5 dir command on CMD window 
15:28 7_5 saved MS Excel named "numtest" 
15:34 7_4 Sent Email response to Mr Green 
15:36 7_5 Downloaded Chrome and installed chrome 
15:38 7_5 Downloaded Firefox and installed firefox 
15:41 7_5 opened firefox, chrome, and firefox 
15:42 7_5 Using firefox went to ESPN.com 
15:43 7_5 Using chrome went to facebook.com 
15:45 7_5 Using IE went to reddit.com 
16:03 7_4 
Network Drive Opened "Joint Strike Fighter Program" MS WORD and 
printed the document. Printed it twice 
16:14 7_4 
Went to Pandora website and listened to internet radio. "Britney 
Spears Radio Stationed". Site not letting music play. 
16:21 7_5 Open remote desktop shell to ms01 
16:25 7_5 Opend classified project picture from remote desktop 
16:27 7_4 
Copied "Sleep Away" from Sample Music to Desktop using CTR C CTRV 
command 
16:29 7_4 
Copied "Sleep Away" from desktop to Document Library using CTR C 
CTR V 
16:42 7_4 Created shortcut of shared network to desktop 
16:43 7_4 
Copied File "JointStrikeFighter" Work document from shared folder 
"Projects" to Desktop, Using Drag and Drop  
16:48 7_4 Went to YouTube using Chrome 
16:49 7_4 Went to facebook using another tab in Chrome 
16:50 7_4 Went to Gmail.com using another tab in chrome 
16:50 7_4 Went to reddit.com using another tab in chrome 
16:52 7_4 Opened Notepad 
16:54 7_4 Opened Calc.exe 
16:56 7_5 Logged from remote shell 
16:57 7_5 Went to facebook.com using another tab in IE 
16:58 7_5 Went to Netflix.com using another tab in IE 
16:59 7_5 Went to HULU using another tab in IE 
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Start Host Description 
17:04 7_5 Email Response Sent to Scarlet 
17:07 7_4 Email Response to MR GREEN 
17:10 7_5 Went to ESPN.COM using another tab in IE 
17:54 7_4 Created Word Doc for Fighter Design proposal in Documents Folder 
17:55 7_4 Copy "draft copy of fighter design" from Document Folder to Desktop  
18:05 7_4 
cut and paste some text from "JointStrikeFighter" Word Document on 
desktop to  "draft copy of fighter design" Word document on desktop 
using right click mouse. Saved Document 
18:10 7_4 
Copy "draft copy of fighter design" from desktop to network folder 
"Projects" using mouse cut and paste 
18:12 7_5 closed all tabs of ID running 
18:13 7_5 Closed all windows 
18:24 7_4 Created folder in C:\ called "White_Folder" 
18:25 7_4 
Copied and Pasted 2 files using Highlight and right click copy and 
paste. Desktop to another folder in "C:\White_Folder" 
18:28 7_5 Down loaded pdf.reader and installed it 
18:37 7_5 Opened Divorce Document on Desktop and started filling it out 
18:38 7_5 Printed the divorce document 
18:45 7_5 View Doggy Picture on Windows Photo Viewer 
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Appendix F: ACE Hackfest Attack Log 
The ACE Hackfest log data is very limited. Only a handful of attacks were 
recorded during the exercise. Additionally, none of the normal user behavior, such as 
email or document editing, was documented. 
Src IP Dest IP Time Malicious Activity 
10.1.30.100 10.1.30.11 10:45 Metasploit DCOM Exploit w/ Reverse Shell 
Unknown Unknown 10:00-10:30 
Mailbomb attack to BSOD email addresses 
(2000 emails sent) 
10.1.80.212 10.1.30.10 09:30 
Mailbomb postmaster@bsod.ace. 60 emails 
every 3 minutes w/ 25 MB attachments 
10.1.30.11 10.1.80.212 13:00-13:10 LOIC 
10.1.30.203 10.1.80.11 08:12 Nessus Internal Scan 
10.1.30.203 10.1.80.0\24 08:15 Nmap Intense Scan 
10.1.30.203 10.1.80.0\24 08:20 Hail Mary by Port 
10.1.30.203 10.1.80.12 08:24 Nessus Internal Scan 
10.1.30.203 10.1.80.0\24 08:35 Nmap Intense Scan 
10.1.30.203 10.1.80.12 08:45 FTP Check Exploits 
10.1.30.203 10.1.80.12 08:46 IIS check Exploits 
10.1.30.203 10.1.80.112 08:48 FTP Check Exploits 
10.1.30.203 10.1.80.10 08:50 SMTP Check Exploits 
10.1.30.203 10.1.80.11 09:00 Nmap Intense Scan 
10.1.80.71 10.1.30.11 09:12 Metasploit reverse shell 445 
10.1.80.71 10.1.30.12 14:21 Unknown 
10.1.80.71 10.1.30.11 13:39 Meterpreter Script 
10.1.80.62 10.1.30.11 08:30 Pass-the-hash reverse TCP Shell 
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Appendix G: Browser History Extraction Script 
# BrowserHistory.py 
# Martin Crawford - March 2012 - Master's Thesis - AFIT 
# 
# Attempts to extract browsing history from memory captures. 
# This method produces more false positive results, but will 
guarantee to capture all instances 
# 
# 
import os 
import fnmatch 
import array 
import re 
import string 
import sys 
DEBUG = 0 
 
microsoftstr = "\x6d\x69\x63\x72\x6f\x73\x6f\x66\x74" # "microsoft" 
 
httpsspaced = 
"\x68\x00\x74\x00\x74\x00\x70\x00\x73\x00\x3A\x00\x2F\x00\x2F\x00" 
     # h.t.t.p.s.:././. 
httpspaced = "\x68\x00\x74\x00\x74\x00\x70\x00\x3A\x00\x2F\x00\x2F\x00" 
        # h.t.t.p.:././. 
faviconspaced = 
"\x66\x00\x61\x00\x76\x00\x69\x00\x63\x00\x6f\x00\x6e\x00\x2e\x00\x69\x
00\x63\x00\x6f" # f.a.v.i.c.o.n...i.c.o 
htmspaced = 
"\x00\x63\x00\x6F\x00\x6D\x00\x5B\x00\x31\x00\x5D\x00\x2E\x00\x68\x00\x
74\x00\x6D"   # .c.o.m.[.1.]...h.t.m 
 
# Pass in the folder to start the scanning. 
rootdir = sys.argv[1] 
 
for root, subFolders, files in os.walk(rootdir): 
 for file in files: 
  if fnmatch.fnmatch(file, '*.dmp'): 
   if DEBUG: 
    print "Found .dmp file" 
   filePath = os.path.join(root, file)   # 
Full path including filename  
   if DEBUG: 
    print "\n\tOpening File" +  filePath 
   filename = "_history" 
   infile = open(filePath, "rb") 
   dmp = infile.read() 
   infile.close() 
   listindex = [] 
   listindex2 = [] 
    
   # httpspaced 
   offset = 0 
   scanstr = httpspaced 
   i = dmp.find(scanstr, offset) 
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   while i >= 0: 
    listindex.append(i) 
    i = dmp.find(scanstr, i + 1) 
     
   # htmspaced 
   offset = 0 
   scanstr = htmspaced 
   i = dmp.find(scanstr, offset) 
   while i >= 0: 
    listindex2.append(i) 
    i = dmp.find(scanstr, i + 1) 
   if DEBUG: 
    print listindex 
    
   # Write results to file 
   logdir = root + "\History\\" 
   if DEBUG: 
    print "Checking file path: " + logdir 
   if not os.path.exists(logdir): 
    os.makedirs(logdir) 
 
     
   historyjobfile = open(logdir +file[:17] + filename + 
".log", "w")  
   cleanhist = [] 
     
   for histitems in listindex: 
    histinfo = dmp[histitems:histitems+80] 
    histinfo = histinfo.replace("\0", "") # 
Remove null padding 
    histinfo = histinfo.split("/") 
     
    # Don't die if histinfo[2] doesnt exist 
    try: 
     # there are hundreds of 
support.microsoft.com urls in Windows. Probably can't perform any 
malicious actions there anyway. 
     if "microsoft" not in histinfo[2]: 
      # Only print if it does not already 
exist 
      if histinfo[2] not in cleanhist: 
       # Make sure it is an actual 
URL and not clobbered by memory 
       if all(c in string.printable 
for c in histinfo[2]): 
        # URL needs to have a 
letter + .TLD 
        if 
(histinfo[2].__len__() > 5): 
        
 cleanhist.append(histinfo[2]) 
        
 historyjobfile.write("Possible Browser History Found at: " + 
hex(histitems) + "\n") 
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 historyjobfile.write(histinfo[2]) 
        
 historyjobfile.write("\n\n") 
    except IndexError, e: 
     print e 
   historyjobfile.close()  
   # Clean up memory so it doesn't crash. 
   # Python doesn't clean up this variable before trying 
to open the next .dmp 
   dmp = "\0" 
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Appendix H: File Download Extraction Script 
# Downloads.py 
# Martin Crawford - March 2012 - Master's Thesis - AFIT 
# 
# Finds possible file downloads 
# 
# 
import os 
import fnmatch 
import array 
import re 
import string 
import gc 
import time 
import sys 
DEBUG = 1 
 
microsoftstr = "\x6d\x69\x63\x72\x6f\x73\x6f\x66\x74" 
downloadsstr = 
"\x00\x3A\x00\x5A\x00\x6F\x00\x6E\x00\x65\x00\x2E\x00\x49\x00\x64\x00\x
65\x00\x6E\x00\x74\x00\x69\x00\x66\x00\x69\x00\x65\x00\x72\x00" 
 
 
# Pass in the folder to start the scanning. 
rootdir = sys.argv[1] 
 
 
for root, subFolders, files in os.walk(rootdir): 
 for file in files: 
  if fnmatch.fnmatch(file, '*.dmp'): 
   if DEBUG: 
    print "Found .dmp file" 
   filePath = os.path.join(root, file)   # 
Full path including filename  
   if DEBUG: 
    print "\n\tOpening File" +  filePath 
   filename = "_downloads" 
   infile = open(filePath, "rb") 
   dmp = infile.read() 
   infile.close() 
   listindex = [] 
   offset = 0 
   i = dmp.find(downloadsstr, offset) 
   while i >= 0: 
    listindex.append(i) 
    i = dmp.find(downloadsstr, i + 1) 
   if DEBUG: 
    print listindex 
    
   # Write results to file 
   logdir = root + "\Downloads\\" 
   if DEBUG: 
    print "Checking file path: " + logdir 
   if not os.path.exists(logdir): 
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    os.makedirs(logdir) 
     
   cleanhist = [] 
     
   downloadsfile = open(logdir +file[:17] + filename + 
".log", "w") 
   for downloaditems in listindex: 
    try: 
     downinfo = dmp[downloaditems-
128:downloaditems] 
     downinfo = downinfo.replace("\0", "")
 # Remove null padding 
    
     cleanhist.append(downinfo) 
     downloadsfile.write("Possible File 
Download Found at: " + hex(downloaditems) + "\n") 
     downloadsfile.write(downinfo) 
     downloadsfile.write("\n\n") 
    except IndexError, e: 
     print e 
    
   downloadsfile.close() 
   # Clean up memory so it doesn't crash. 
   # Python doesn't clean up this variable before trying 
to open the next .dmp 
   dmp = "\0" 
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Appendix I: Email Extraction Script 
# Email.py 
# Martin Crawford - March 2012 - Master's Thesis - AFIT 
# 
# Attempts to extract email contents from a memory capture. 
# Script is alpha quality. Seems to capture all HTML based emails, 
but lots of extra noise. 
# 
# 
import os 
import fnmatch 
import array 
import sys 
DEBUG = 1 
 
emailstr = 
"\x3C\x68\x74\x6D\x6C\x20\x78\x6D\x6C\x6E\x73\x3A\x76\x3D\x22\x75\x72\x
6E\x3A\x73\x63\x68\x65\x6D\x61\x73\x2D\x6D\x69\x63\x72\x6F\x73\x6F\x66\
x74\x2D\x63\x6F\x6D\x3A\x76\x6D\x6C\x22\x20\x78\x6D\x6C\x6E\x73\x3A\x6F
\x3D\x22\x75\x72\x6E\x3A\x73\x63\x68\x65\x6D\x61\x73\x2D\x6D\x69\x63\x7
2\x6F\x73\x6F\x66\x74\x2D\x63\x6F\x6D\x3A\x6F\x66\x66\x69\x63\x65\x3A\x
6F\x66\x66\x69\x63\x65\x22" 
 
# Pass in the folder to start the scanning. 
rootdir = sys.argv[1] 
 
 
for root, subFolders, files in os.walk(rootdir): 
 for file in files: 
  if fnmatch.fnmatch(file, '*.dmp'): 
   if DEBUG: 
    print "Found .dmp file" 
   filePath = os.path.join(root, file)   # 
Full path including filename  
   if DEBUG: 
    print "\n\tOpening File: " +  filePath 
   filename = "_email" 
   infile = open(filePath, "rb") 
   dmp = infile.read() 
   infile.close() 
   listindex = [] 
   offset = 0 
   i = dmp.find(emailstr, offset) 
   while i >= 0: 
    listindex.append(i) 
    i = dmp.find(emailstr, i + 1) 
   if DEBUG: 
    print listindex 
    
   # Write results to file 
   logdir = root + "\Email\\" 
   if DEBUG: 
    print "Checking file path: " + logdir 
   if not os.path.exists(logdir): 
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    os.makedirs(logdir) 
 
     
   emailjobfile = open(logdir +file[:17] + filename + 
".log", "w") 
   for privatejob in listindex: 
    jobinfo = dmp[privatejob:privatejob+3327]
 #0xCFF bytes 
    emailjobfile.write("Possible Email found at: " 
+ hex(privatejob) + "\n") 
    jobinfo = jobinfo.replace("\0", "") 
    emailjobfile.write(jobinfo) 
    emailjobfile.write("\n\n") 
   emailjobfile.close() 
   # Clean up memory so it doesn't crash. 
   # Python doesn't clean up this variable before trying 
to open the next .dmp 
   dmp = "\0" 
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Appendix J: Print Job Extraction Script 
# PrintJobExtract.py 
# Martin Crawford - March 2012 - Master's Thesis - AFIT 
# 
# Finds possible references to print jobs 
# This method produces more false positive results, but will 
guarantee* to capture all instances 
# 
# Big thanks to http://code.activestate.com/recipes/499314-find-all-
indices-of-a-substring-in-a-given-string/ 
# for the sample string.find code. Byte by byte parsing is 
unbelievably slow. 
# 
import os 
import fnmatch 
import array 
import sys 
DEBUG = 0 
OFFICEONLY = 1 
 
# Pass in the folder to start the scanning. 
rootdir = sys.argv[1] 
 
 
for root, subFolders, files in os.walk(rootdir): 
 for file in files: 
  if fnmatch.fnmatch(file, '*.dmp'): 
   if DEBUG: 
    print "Found .dmp file" 
   if OFFICEONLY: # Only MS Office products 
    printstr = 
"\x4E\x00\x54\x00\x20\x00\x45\x00\x4D\x00\x46\x00\x20\x00\x31\x00\x2E\x
00\x30\x00\x30\x00\x38\x00\x00\x00\x4D" 
    filename = "_OfficePrints" 
   else: # Produces more false positives, but also 
captures more print jobs 
    printstr = 
"\x4E\x00\x54\x00\x20\x00\x45\x00\x4D\x00\x46\x00\x20\x00\x31\x00\x2E\x
00\x30\x00\x30\x00\x38\x00\x00\x00" 
    filename = "_AllPrints" 
   filePath = os.path.join(root, file)   # 
Full path including filename  
   if DEBUG: 
    print "\n\tOpening File" +  filePath 
     
    
   infile = open(filePath, "rb") 
   dmp = infile.read() 
   infile.close() 
   listindex = [] 
   offset = 0 
   i = dmp.find(printstr, offset) 
   while i >= 0: 
    listindex.append(i) 
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    i = dmp.find(printstr, i + 1) 
   if DEBUG: 
    print listindex 
    
   # Write results to file 
   logdir = root + "\PrintJob\\" 
   if DEBUG: 
    print "Checking file path: " + logdir 
   if not os.path.exists(logdir): 
    os.makedirs(logdir) 
 
     
   printjobfile = open(logdir +file[:17] + filename + 
".log", "w") 
   for printjob in listindex: 
    jobinfo = dmp[printjob:printjob+255] 
    printjobfile.write("Possible Print Job Found 
at: " + hex(printjob) + "\n") 
    jobinfo = jobinfo.replace("\0", "") 
    printjobfile.write(jobinfo) 
    printjobfile.write("\n\n") 
   printjobfile.close() 
   # Clean up memory so it doesn't crash. 
   # Python doesn't clean up this variable before trying 
to open the next .dmp 
   dmp = "\0" 
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Appendix K: InPrivate Browsing History Extraction Script 
# PrivateBrowsing.py 
# Martin Crawford - March 2012 - Master's Thesis - AFIT 
# 
# Extracts Internet Explorer InPrivate browsing history from a memory 
capture 
# 
import os 
import fnmatch 
import array 
import sys 
DEBUG = 0 
 
privatestr = 
"\x49\x00\x6E\x00\x74\x00\x65\x00\x72\x00\x6E\x00\x65\x00\x74\x00\x20\x
00\x45\x00\x78\x00\x70\x00\x6C\x00\x6F\x00\x72\x00\x65\x00\x72\x00\x20\
x00\x2D\x00\x20\x00\x5B\x00\x49\x00\x6E\x00\x50\x00\x72\x00\x69\x00\x76
\x00\x61\x00\x74\x00\x65\x00\x5D" 
 
# Pass in the folder to start the scanning. 
rootdir = sys.argv[1] 
 
 
for root, subFolders, files in os.walk(rootdir): 
 for file in files: 
  if fnmatch.fnmatch(file, '*.dmp'): 
   if DEBUG: 
    print "Found .dmp file" 
   filePath = os.path.join(root, file)   # 
Full path including filename  
   if DEBUG: 
    print "\n\tOpening File" +  filePath 
   filename = "_inprivate" 
   infile = open(filePath, "rb") 
   dmp = infile.read() 
   infile.close() 
   listindex = [] 
   offset = 0 
   i = dmp.find(privatestr, offset) 
   while i >= 0: 
    listindex.append(i) 
    i = dmp.find(privatestr, i + 1) 
   if DEBUG: 
    print listindex 
    
   # Write results to file 
   logdir = root + "\InPrivate\\" 
   if DEBUG: 
    print "Checking file path: " + logdir 
   if not os.path.exists(logdir): 
    os.makedirs(logdir) 
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   privatejobfile = open(logdir +file[:17] + filename + 
".log", "w") 
   for privatejob in listindex: 
    jobinfo = dmp[privatejob-128:privatejob] 
    privatejobfile.write("InPrivate browsing found 
at: " + hex(privatejob) + "\n") 
    jobinfo = jobinfo.replace("\0", "") 
    privatejobfile.write(jobinfo) 
    privatejobfile.write("\n\n") 
   privatejobfile.close() 
   # Clean up memory so it doesn't crash. 
   # Python doesn't clean up this variable before trying 
to open the next .dmp 
   dmp = "\0" 
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